بقلم: غوليد يوسف عيدان

لم يكن الحدث في كلمات الأطفال. الحدث كان في القرار التحريري الذي انتشل مقطعاً عفوياً من بحر الإنترنت، وحوّله إلى “قضية سياسية” تُبث لملايين المشاهدين. هنا لا نتحدث عن زلة صحفية، بل عن اختيار متعمد لاستخدام براءة الأطفال كوقود لمعركة سياسية لا يفهمونها.

في العلوم السياسية والقانون الدولي، الطفل لا يمثل الدولة. لكن “الجزيرة” ارتكبت انحطاطاً مهنياً حين حولت كلمات أطفال إلى “مؤشر” على موقف سياسي. استثمرت في براءتهم لصناعة دليل يصعب الرد عليه—لأن مهاجمته تبدو وكأنها مهاجمة للطفولة نفسها. هذا ليس تأطيراً إعلامياً، بل تجنيد بريء لخدمة سردية مُعدة سلفاً.

الصحافة التي تختزل شعوباً في لقطات مبتورة ليست صحافة حرة، بل صناعة للوعي المُوجَّه

المعايير المزدوجة: صوماليلاند كبش فداء

ذات القناة التي تُضخّم مقطع أطفال في صوماليلاند، تمرّ بصمت مطبق على عقود من التطبيع العربي الرسمي. مصر وقعت معاهدة سلام 1979. الأردن 1994. الإمارات والبحرين والمغرب والسودان وقّعوا اتفاقيات إبراهيم 2020. سبع دول عربية تعترف بإسرائيل رسمياً وتتجارة معها بمليارات الدولارات

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لكن “الجزيرة” لا تُطلق حملات ضد هذا التطبيع. لا تستضيف علماءً لإدانة حكومات هذه الدول على الهواء. لماذا؟ لأنها في “النادي”—نادي الدول المعترف بها. وصوماليلاند خارجه. بلا صوت في قاعات القوة، عُرضة للاستهداف المُصنَّع.

والسؤال الذي يُسدل الستار: إذا كانت هذه الدول تُدين صوماليلاند بسبب علاقاتها المزعومة بإسرائيل، فلماذا لا تُلغي اتفاقيات السلام؟ لماذا لا تُغلق السفارات في القاهرة وعمّان وأبوظبي؟

لا يستطيعون. لأن “القدس” عندهم ليست قضية مقدسة، بل سلعة إعلامية—تُرفع حين يناسبهم وتُخفى حين لا تناسبهم.

المفارقة القطرية: البكاء على القدس واستضافة آلة الحرب

قطر، التي تدفع رواتب مُذيعي “الجزيرة”، تستضيف على أراضيها قاعدة “العديد”—أكبر قاعدة عسكرية أمريكية في الشرق الأوسط. هذه القاعدة تخدم كمركز القيادة المركزية الأمريكية (CENTCOM)، تنسّق العمليات العسكرية الإقليمية بما فيها تبادل المعلومات الاستخباراتية مع إسرائيل.

في 2025–2026، أصبحت القاعدة أكثر مركزية. فتحت CENTCOM خلية جديدة للتنسيق الجوي والدفاع الصاروخي في العديد، صُمّمت لتعزيز “التعاون الدفاعي الإقليمي” ضد التهديدات المشتركة—بما فيها التهديدات الإيرانية لإسرائيل. وفي يونيو 2025، استهدفت إيران القاعدة انتقاماً لدعم أمريكا لإسرائيل، مؤكدةً دورها كحلقة وصل في البنية الأمنية الأمريكية-الإسرائيلية.

في الدوحة نفسها، ممثلون إسرائيليون يتفاوضون ويتاجرون كجزء من النظام الدبلوماسي القطري. بينما يبكي مُذيعو “الجزيرة” على الهواء للقدس.

كيف تتباكى قناة قطرية على “القدس المحتلة” وتستخدمها كـ”عصا غليظة” لضرب صوماليلاند، بينما تستضيف حكومتها القاعدة التي تحمي العمليات العسكرية الإسرائيلية؟ هذا ليس تأطيراً مهنياً، بل نفاق مؤسسي يكشف أن “الجزيرة” ليست منبراً للحرية، بل بوقاً لتلميع صفقات النظام.

ما محته “الجزيرة”

أخطر أشكال التضليل ليس الكذب، بل “الصحافة بالاختيار”—حذف السياق التاريخي الذي لا يتناسب مع السردية.

صوماليلاند استقلت 26 يونيو 1960، قبل جنوب الصومال بخمسة أيام. اعترفت بها 35 دولة وانضمت للأمم المتحدة. هذا ليس انفصالاً، بل استعادة للسيادة بعد اتحاد فاشل. في 1991، تفككت الجمهورية الصومالية. استعادت صوماليلاند سيادتها بعد عقود من الإبادة على يد نظام سياد بري، الذي دمّر المدن الشمالية وقصف هرجيسا حتى أصبحت ركاماً.

منذ 2003، أجرت أربع انتقالات سلمية للسلطة وانتخابات تعددية. بينما مقديشو لا تستطيع تأمين مطارها بدون جنود أتراك، صوماليلاند أجرت انتخابات رئاسية تنافسية استوفت معايير المراقبة الدولية. ميناء بربرة تُديره DP World باستثمار 442 مليون دولار. هذه ليست دولة تابعة—إنها دولة أُعيد تأسيسها بعد انهيار اتحاد فاشل.

صوماليلاند تُعاقَب ليس على ذنوبها، بل على نجاحها

لماذا تُرعِب صوماليلاند “النادي”؟

الحملة ليست عن إسرائيل ولا عن أطفال. إنها عن مصالح مُهددة. تركيا استثمرت مليارات في مقديشو ولا تريد بديلاً ديمقراطياً يفضح افلاس نموذج “الدولة التابعة”. قطر تستخدم “الجزيرة” لتشكيل سرديات تخدم توازنها—استضافة قواعد أمريكية بينما تتظاهر بأنها صوت المقاومة. الجامعة العربية تخشى السابقة. والاتحاد الأفريقي يتشبث بخريطة الحدود الاستعمارية.

صوماليلاند بنت دولة من دون اعتراف، أجرت انتخابات من دون إشراف أممي، أدارت موانئ من دون قروض بنكية، وحافظت على السلام من دون قوات حفظ سلام. إنها دحض حيّ لسردية أن أفريقيا بحاجة إلى منقذين خارجيين.

الجزيرة تُشعل الفتنة: حين يصبح الإعلام آلة لاستعداء المسلمين

هنا يتجاوز الأمر النقد الإعلامي إلى التحريض المُمنهج. “الجزيرة” لا تكتفي بتضليل المشاهد حول صوماليلاند—إنها تسعى بشكل متعمد إلى استعداء الشعوب المسلمة ضد شعب صوماليلاند.

باختيارها مقطعاً لأطفال صوماليلاند وتضخيمه كـ”قضية إيمانية” و”خيانة للقضية الفلسطينية”، تُرسّل “الجزيرة” رسالة خطيرة لجمهورها الممتد من المحيط إلى الخليج: “هذا الشعب عدوّكم.” تُحوّل مقطعاً عفوياً لأطفال إلى “دليل” على أن صوماليلاند شعبٌ مُرتدٌ عن “الخط الإسلامي”، وأن معاداته واجب ديني.

هذا ليس تغطية إعلامية. هذا تأليب طائفي مُقنَّع. “الجزيرة” تعلم أن جمهورها المسلم يتأثر بالقضية الفلسطينية عاطفياً ودينياً. فتستثمر هذه العاطفة لصناعة عدوّ داخلي جديد—ليس الدول العربية التي طبّعت مع إسرائيل، بل شعب بلا دولة لا يملك حتى حق الرد على الشاشة.

“الجزيرة” تستثمر عاطفة المسلمين بالقدس لصناعة عدوّ داخلي جديد—ليس الدول المطبّعة، بل شعب بلا دولة

النتيجة؟ موجات من الكراهية على وسائل التواصل ضد صوماليلاند. تهديدات. حملات مقاطعة. دعوات للتكفير. كلها مُغذّاة بقرار تحريري اتخذه مُحرّر في الدوحة يعرف تماماً أنه يُشعل فتيلاً قد يحرق أطفالاً أبرياء في هرجيسا وبربرة وبوصاصو.

أين المسؤولية المهنية؟ أين حماية الأطفال التي تتشدق بها المواثيق الصحفية؟ “الجزيرة” لم تُضخّم المقطع لأنه “خبر”—لأن الخبر الحقيقي هو أن دولاً عربية كاملة طبّعت مع إسرائيل. بل اختارته لأنه يخدم وظيفة سياسية محددة: تبرير العداء لصوماليلاند، وتسهيل أي ضغط إقليمي مستقبلي عليها، وإقناع الجمهور المسلم أن معاداة هذا الشعب الضعيف “جهاد”، بينما التطبيع مع الدول القوية “سياسة واقعية”.

هذا هو التحريض بعينه: تحويل السخط المشروع على الظلم إلى سيفٍ يُسلَّط على الضعفاء. “الجزيرة” لا تحارب التطبيع—إنها تُعيد توجيه الغضب نحو من لا يستطيع الدفاع عن نفسه.

الأسئلة التي لن تجيب عنها “الجزيرة”

لو انتشر مقطع لأطفال مصريين يُثنون على إسرائيل، هل كانت “الجزيرة” ستُذيعه كـ”أزمة سياسية”؟ أم ستُهمَّش كأمر غير ذي صلة بفضل معاهدة السلام الرسمية؟

لماذا لا تُذيع مقاطع لأطفال إماراتيين يعبّرون عن آرائهم في إسرائيل؟ هل لأن تلك الدول في “النادي”، وكلمات أطفالها “غير جديرة بالإعلام”؟

كم ساعة تحقيق استقرت “الجزيرة” في المفاوضات التجارية القطرية-الإسرائيلية؟ كم تقريراً عن التنسيق بين العديد والعمليات العسكرية الإسرائيلية؟

إذا كانت العلاقات المزعومة لصوماليلاند مع إسرائيل هي المشكلة، فلماذا تركز الحملة على الأطفال بدلاً من الحكومة المنتخبة ديمقراطياً؟ هل لأن مهاجمة الأطفال لا تتطلب أدلة، بينما مهاجمة الحكومة تتطلب وقائع؟

أين وثائقي “الجزيرة” عن إبادة صوماليلاند 1988–1991؟ عن قصف هرجيسا؟ عن المقابر الجماعية؟ أم أن صوماليلاند لا تظهر إلا حين يمكن استخدامها للهجوم عليها؟

الخاتمة

إلى “الجزيرة”: نحن لا نحتاج اعترافكم لنوجد. لا نحتاج إذنكم لنحكم. لا نحتاج سرديتكم لتُصدِّق تاريخنا.

نحن في صوماليلاند نبني دولة بينما أنتم تُشعلون الفتن في الاستوديوهات. نُدير موانئنا ونُوقّع اتفاقياتنا وندافع عن مصالح شعبنا—بصدق، من دون خجل، ومن دون نفاق.

انتهى الزمن الذي يُقرَّر فيه مصيرنا في أنقرة أو الدوحة أو القاهرة أو مكة دوننا. الاعتراف بنا آتٍ—ليس عبر حوار مفروض أو بيانات مُجمَّعة من دول تخون مبادئها كل يوم، بل عبر دبلوماسية مستقلة وحازمة.

لقد تغيّر التاريخ. ومن لم يدرك ذلك—سيتجاوزه الزمن بلا رحمة.

والسلام على من اتبع الهدى. أما المنافقون—فلا سلام ولا هدى.

There are moments in life that stop time itself.

Moments that make your heart swell until you can barely breathe.

Moments that remind you why hope is worth holding onto, even when the world tells you — over and over, in a thousand different ways — to let go.

Today was one of those moments.

After 34 years — thirty-four long, aching, bone-deep years of waiting, praying, and believing against every odd, every dismissal, every closed door — I watched something I had only dared to dream of in the quietest hours of the night:

The President of the Republic of Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi (Cirro), standing on foreign soil, receiving a welcome not as a supplicant, not as a beggar, not as someone who needs to explain himself — but as a leader. A welcome in Israel.

And I wept.

Not tears of sadness. Not even tears of joy, exactly.

Tears that had been gathering for three decades — three decades of carrying a weight so heavy that you forget you’re carrying it until someone finally lifts it off your shoulders.

Tears of a people who have whispered their story into a world that too often refused to listen. Who have knocked on doors that never opened. Who have stood in rooms where their name was not spoken, where their flag was not flown, where their very existence was treated as an inconvenience.

Tears of mothers who buried their sons for this dream — sons who died believing in something they would never live to see. Who held their children’s bodies and wondered if the world would ever know their names, ever acknowledge that they died for a country that the world pretended didn’t exist

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Tears of fathers who worked barren lands with hands cracked and bleeding, believing — against all evidence, against all reason — that one day, the world would see what they saw. That one day, someone would look at this land and see not a ‘breakaway region,’ not a ‘self-declared state,’ but a nation. A people. A heartbeat.

Tears of a generation that grew up hearing ‘you don’t exist’ — at airports, at embassies, at border crossings, in classrooms where teachers marked their maps with a single Somalia and no room for Somaliland — yet never stopped existing. Never stopped believing. Never stopped being.

The Weight of 34 Years

1991.

Do you remember what 1991 felt like?

I do. I remember it in my bones, even though I was just a child.

I remember the smell of burning. I remember the sound of my mother’s voice, raw and terrified, telling us to get under the bed. I remember the silence that came after the guns — a silence so heavy it felt like drowning.

I remember the earth. Still wet. Still warm. Still holding everything we had lost.

And yet — and this is the miracle, the thing that still makes me weep when I think about it — in the ashes of our own destruction, we chose something so radical that the world still doesn’t know how to process it:

Peace.

Not because someone offered it to us. Not because the international community brokered it. Not because we had any reason to believe it would be rewarded.

We chose peace because it was who we are. Because we had seen the alternative, and we had buried it. Because there was a moment — a single, fragile moment — when we looked at each other across the rubble and decided: Not again. Never again.

While the world looked away, we built.

While they called us ‘the region that doesn’t matter,’ we mattered — to ourselves, to each other, to the future we refused to surrender.

We built democratic institutions when no one demanded them of us. When there was no one watching, no one grading our homework, no one who would have noticed if we had chosen the easier path of strongmen and silence.

We held elections that the world ignored — elections that were freer and fairer than many ‘recognized’ nations could claim — yet we celebrated as if the whole earth was watching. Because for us, it wasn’t about the world. It was about us. It was about proving to ourselves that we could do this. That we were worthy of our own dreams.

We maintained stability in a neighborhood where stability is a foreign language. While the world watched other conflicts with horror and fascination, our peace was invisible. Our quiet determination was unnewsworthy. Our refusal to become what they expected us to become — a failed fragment of a failed state — was treated as an anomaly, not an achievement.

We did this not for recognition.

We did this because it was who we are.

But oh.

Oh, how we longed to be seen.

How many nights did Somalilanders stare at maps of the world, tracing borders that were drawn by colonial hands, by war, by politics — wondering why our border, drawn in the blood and sacrifice of our own people, meant so little? Why our line on the map was invisible while others, drawn with the same violence, were sacred?

How many young people — bright, ambitious, full of potential — packed their dreams into suitcases and left? Not because they didn’t love this land. Not because they didn’t believe in it. But because they feared it would never love them back on the world stage. Because they couldn’t bear to spend their lives in a country that the world refused to name.

I know them. I am one of them. I left. And I carried Somaliland in my chest like a secret, like a wound that never healed, like a love I could never fully explain to anyone who hadn’t felt it.

The Moment That Changed Everything

And then, today.

I watched President Cirro — this man who carries not just the title of president, but the unspoken prayers of millions, the hopes of a diaspora scattered across the globe like seeds in the wind — walk into a room in Israel and be greeted with respect.

Not pity. Not the condescending smile of someone who thinks they’re doing you a favor. Not curiosity, the way you might look at a rare animal in a zoo. Not the nod reserved for those who ‘almost matter.’

Respect.

The kind of respect you give to someone who has earned their place at the table. The kind of respect that says: We see you. We know what you have done. We know what you have survived. And we are willing to sit with you as an equal.

Do you understand what that means?

It means that somewhere, in the corridors of power where decisions are made by people who have never set foot in Hargeisa, never smelled the dust of our roads, never heard the call to prayer echoing across our hills — someone finally looked at Somaliland and saw what we have always known:

A nation that has earned its place.

A nation that has paid its dues not in violence, not in threats, not in the currency that the world too often trades in — but in patience. In proof. In persistent, quiet, unglamorous excellence.

This is not about one visit.

This is not about one handshake.

This is not about one photograph that will circulate on social media and then be forgotten.

This is about the arc of history finally — finally — bending toward justice for a people who have waited so long that waiting became a way of life. A people who learned to hope in whispers, to dream in shadows, to believe in the dark.

For Those Who Didn’t Live to See This

I want to pause here. Because this moment is not just for us who are alive to witness it.

This is for the ones who didn’t make it.

For the freedom fighters of the SNM who fell in the struggle — whose names we sing in songs that grow fainter with each generation, whose faces grow dim in memory, whose sacrifices built the foundation we stand on today. This welcome is for you. You did not die in vain. You did not bleed for nothing. The world is beginning to know what you knew: that Somaliland is real, that Somaliland is worthy, that Somaliland is here.

For the elders who died believing — who sat under acacia trees and told their grandchildren, with voices rough with certainty and eyes that had seen too much, ‘One day, they will know us. The world is slow, but it is not blind forever.’ This is your day. Your faith was not foolish. Your hope was not naive. You saw what the world could not see, and you held that vision until your last breath.

For the refugees who perished in foreign lands — in the waters of the Mediterranean, in the deserts of Libya, in the detention centers of Europe — clutching passports that called them ‘stateless’ when they were anything but. We see you. We remember you. This moment belongs to you. You carried our name into the world, even when the world would not carry you.

I think of my own grandfather.

He used to sit under the acacia tree behind our house — the same tree that had been there before the war, that had watched everything, that had survived when so much did not — and speak of Somaliland as if it were a person he loved. Not a place. A person. Someone he had known his whole life, someone he had fought for, someone he had mourned for, someone he refused to abandon.

‘They will come around,’ he would say, his voice rough with certainty, his eyes fixed on a horizon I couldn’t see. ‘The world is slow. Oh, it is so slow. But it is not blind forever.’

He did not live to see this.

But I feel him here, in this moment, smiling that quiet smile of his — the one that said he knew something the rest of us were still learning. The one that said patience is not weakness. The one that said faith is not foolishness.

I feel him. And I weep again.

What This Means

This welcome in Israel is more than diplomacy.

It is validation — the kind that seeps into your bones and changes how you stand, how you speak, how you breathe.

It is the world beginning to whisper what we have shouted for 34 years, what we have whispered in the dark, what we have carried in our chests like a second heartbeat:

Somaliland is here.

Somaliland has always been here.

And Somaliland is not going anywhere.

It means hope — real, tangible, hold-it-in-your-hands hope — for the child in Hargeisa who dreams of being a diplomat, not in spite of where she comes from, but because of it. Because she has seen her president welcomed as a leader, and she knows — she knows — that her dreams are not foolish. That her country is not a fantasy. That she belongs to a nation that the world is beginning to see.

It means hope for the entrepreneur in Berbera who has built something beautiful with his own hands, who has created jobs and futures and possibilities in a place where possibility was supposed to die — and who now sees a world that might finally trade with him as an equal. Not as charity. Not as aid. But as a partner.

It means hope for the student in Burao who studies international law late into the night, believing — against every textbook that erases his country, against every map that draws him out of existence — that one day, his nation will have a seat where laws are made. That one day, he will stand in a room and say, ‘I am from Somaliland,’ and the world will nod and say, ‘We know. We see you.’

It means that our voice — this voice that has been hoarse from shouting into a wind that never seemed to carry our words anywhere — is finally being heard.

Not by everyone. Not yet. But by someone. And someone is how everything begins.

The Road Ahead

I will not pretend that one welcome solves everything.

The journey is not over. The road is still long, still hard, still full of obstacles that would break a lesser people.

There will still be days when we feel invisible. When doors close in our faces. When the word ‘unrecognized’ stings like a fresh wound, like a slap, like a reminder that the world has not fully caught up to the truth we have known for 34 years.

But today reminds us of something essential — something we must hold onto when the darkness returns:

History moves.

Slowly. Painfully. Unpredictably. Sometimes so slowly that you wonder if it moves at all.

But it moves.

And we have moved it.

Not with violence. Not with demands. Not with the tactics that the world too often rewards. But with the quiet, stubborn, beautiful persistence of a people who refused to become what the world expected them to become.

A failed fragment of a failed state.

That is what they expected. That is what they were prepared for. That is the narrative that would have been so easy to fulfill.

Instead, we became something the world did not expect:

A success story without a title page.

A nation that built peace when no one was watching. That held elections when no one was counting. That maintained stability when no one was measuring. That proved, over and over, that we were worthy of a place at the table — even when the table had no chair for us.

Until today.

Today, someone turned the page.

And on that page, for the first time in 34 years, the title is beginning to appear.

To Every Somalilander, Everywhere

Wherever you are — in Hargeisa, in London, in Minneapolis, in Dubai, in a refugee camp, in a university dorm, in a hospital ward, in a taxi driving through streets that don’t know your name — feel this in your bones:

You are seen today.

You are not a statistic.

You are not a footnote.

You are not ‘the northern region of Somalia.’

You are not a problem to be solved, an anomaly to be explained, a curiosity to be catalogued.

You are a citizen of a nation that has defied every prediction of its demise. A nation that rose from its own ashes and chose light over darkness, again and again, when no one would have blamed it for choosing otherwise.

You are the inheritor of a legacy of resilience that would break lesser peoples. A resilience forged not in comfort, not in privilege, but in the fire of survival. In the choice, made every single day for 34 years, to believe in something the world refused to name.

You are part of a story that is still being written. And today — today — the ink ran a little brighter. The page turned a little easier. The words came a little clearer.

This welcome is for you.

For your patience. For your pride. For the way you have carried this identity like a secret treasure, showing it only to those worthy of its weight, protecting it from those who would diminish it, nurturing it in the dark when no one else would.

Today, we show it to the world.

And the world — finally, beautifully, tearfully, gratefully — is beginning to look.

Long Live Somaliland

After 34 years of waiting, today feels like a dream realized.

But it is not just a dream.

It is the harvest of seeds planted in tears, watered with faith, and tended by generations who refused to abandon the field even when the harvest seemed impossible.

It is a reminder that persistence is not futile. That the quiet work of building, believing, and waiting matters — even when no one sees it, even when no one rewards it, even when the world tells you that you are wasting your time.

It is a reminder that history bends toward those who refuse to break. That the arc of justice is long, but it is real. That the truth, spoken softly and consistently for 34 years, eventually finds ears willing to hear it.

It is a reminder that the aspirations of a determined people — a people who have known the darkest nights, who have buried their dead, who have watched their children leave, who have carried an invisible nation in their chests for three decades — cannot be ignored forever.

Today, Somalilanders everywhere have reason to feel proud.

This is not simply a welcome for a president.

It is a welcome that reflects the hopes, the heartaches, the sacrifices, the quiet triumphs, and the soaring aspirations of an entire nation.

It is a welcome that says: You exist. You matter. You have always mattered.

Long live the Republic of Somaliland.

by Gulaid Yusuf idaan

𝑰𝑰. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝑫𝒂𝒚𝒔 𝑻𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑾𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏’𝒕 𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝑴𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓

To understand why a taxi driver in Hargeisa wept at midnight, you have to understand what Somaliland is — or rather, what the world has insisted it is not.

The story begins on June 26, 1960, when the British lowered their flag over a scrubland protectorate and a new nation blinked into the sunlight. The Republic of Somaliland was born. Thirty-five countries recognized it. It had a parliament, a prime minister, a seat at the table of nations. For five glorious days, it was real.
Then it vanished.

On July 1, 1960, Somaliland merged with the former Italian Somaliland to its south to form the Somali Republic — a pan-Somali dream of unity that would, within three decades, become a nightmare. The capital moved to Mogadishu. The Italian-educated elite from the south took power. The British-trained bureaucrats of Hargeisa found themselves marginalized, then persecuted, then hunted.

The man who hunted them was Siad Barre, a military dictator who ruled from 1969 to 1991 with a blend of Soviet-era socialism and clan-based brutality. In the 1980s, as his regime crumbled, Barre turned his American-supplied warplanes on the northern clans — particularly the Isaaq, Somaliland’s dominant group. The bombing of Hargeisa in 1988 reduced the city to what survivors still call Hargeisa Gorayaa — “the place where Hargeisa was buried.” Between 50,000 and 200,000 people died. Mass graves were dug with bulldozers. The world watched, and did nothing.

When Barre fled Mogadishu in January 1991, Somaliland did not wait for permission. On May 18, 1991, elders from the clans gathered in Burao and declared independence. Not from Somalia — they insisted they were simply reclaiming the sovereignty they had never surrendered. The five days of 1960, they argued, were a legal fact that the 31 years of union had never extinguished.

The world disagreed. The African Union’s principle of uti possidetis — respecting colonial borders to prevent secessionist contagion — held firm. Somaliland became the world’s longest-running de facto state: real in every way that mattered to the people who lived there. Invisible to the maps, the banks, the airlines, the Olympic committees, the everything that makes a country count.
Until Israel broke the dam.

𝑰𝑰𝑰. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑳𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒚
Here is the strangest thing about Somaliland: it worked.

Not in the way of international development reports, with their metrics and their jargon. But in the way that matters when you are starting from zero, with no foreign aid, no recognition, no help.

The elders who gathered in Burao in 1991 were not revolutionaries. They were clan leaders, businessmen, former civil servants — men who understood that if they did not build something, the chaos consuming southern Somalia would consume them too. They created a hybrid system that should not have worked, and somehow did: a bicameral parliament with an elected lower house and an upper house of traditional clan elders, the Guurti, who mediated conflicts in the way their ancestors had for centuries.

They held elections. Real ones, with multiple parties and peaceful transfers of power. In 2003, the incumbent president lost by 80 votes — and stepped down. In 2010, the opposition won and took office without violence. In 2024, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi — “Cirro,” a former foreign minister — won the presidency on a platform of anti-corruption and, above all, recognition.

While Somalia descended into warlordism, then Islamist insurgency, then the endless battle with Al-Shabaab, Somaliland built. It created its own currency, the Somaliland shilling, printed on presses in Britain because no one else would do business with a non-state. It built universities — the University of Hargeisa, Amoud University in Borama — that educated a generation in law, medicine, engineering. It developed a private sector so dynamic that telecom companies like Telesom and Somtel provided better mobile coverage than many recognized African states.

The diaspora sent money home — an estimated $500 million annually — and returned to build hotels, hospitals, and shopping malls. The livestock trade with the Gulf became a lifeline. And in 2016, DP World, the Dubai-based port operator, signed a deal to transform the ancient port of Berbera into a modern container terminal, investing $442 million in a facility that could handle half a million containers a year.

All of this happened in the dark. Somaliland could not get World Bank loans. It could not join the WTO. Its passport was accepted nowhere. Its athletes competed under no flag. When COVID-19 arrived, it had to smuggle vaccines across the Ethiopian border because it could not procure them legally.

“We are the most successful failure in the world,” a Somaliland diplomat told me once, in a Nairobi café where we spoke in whispers because he had no official status. “We have built a state that functions better than most recognized states. And the world rewards us by pretending we do not exist.”

𝑰𝑽. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑴𝒂𝒏 𝑾𝒉𝒐 𝑵𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒂 𝑾𝒊𝒏

Benjamin Netanyahu did not wake up one morning thinking about Somaliland.

By late 2025, the Israeli prime minister was a man cornered by history. The Gaza war, now in its fifteenth month, had isolated Israel as never before. The International Criminal Court had issued arrest warrants for him and his defense minister. The International Court of Justice was examining allegations of genocide. Domestically, the “Qatargate” scandal — accusations that his aides had taken payments from Qatar in exchange for favorable policies toward Gaza — was consuming his government. His coalition was fraying. His legacy was in ruins.

He needed a win. And he needed it somewhere far from Gaza, far from the ICC, far from the protesters in Tel Aviv and the condemnations in The Hague.

Somaliland was perfect.
The courtship had begun quietly. Israeli intelligence had long monitored the Bab el-Mandeb strait, the chokepoint between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean through which 30% of global container shipping passes. The Iran-backed Houthi movement in Yemen, just 300 kilometers across the water from Somaliland’s coast, had been attacking commercial vessels for over a year, disrupting global trade and threatening Israeli interests. Israel needed eyes and ears on that coast. It needed a partner.

The UAE had paved the way. The Emirates had invested heavily in Berbera port and built a military base nearby. They had encouraged the Israelis to look north, to see what they saw: a stable, pragmatic, hungry partner in a region of chaos. The Abraham Accords — the 2020 normalization agreements with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan — had already redrawn Israel’s diplomatic map. Why not extend them to the Horn?

Netanyahu’s calculation was cold and precise. Recognizing Somaliland would cost him nothing with the Arab states that mattered — Saudi Arabia and the Gulf were already furious about Gaza; this would be a drop in an ocean of anger. It would win him support from the Israeli right, which loved the symbolism of expanding the Accords. It would give Israel strategic depth in the Red Sea. And it would be his answer to the ICC: You isolate me? I will create new realities.

On December 26, 2025, he signed the joint declaration with President Cirro. The ghost state had its first believer.

𝑽. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒌𝒆
The aftershocks arrived before the ink dried.

In Mogadishu, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud understood immediately what this meant. For 33 years, Somalia’s strategy had been simple: deny, delay, and wait for the international community to enforce the fiction of unity. As long as no country recognized Somaliland, the fiction held. Israel had shattered it.

“This is an illegal aggression against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia,” Mohamud declared, his voice trembling with genuine fury. “No external actor has the authority to alter Somalia’s territorial configuration.” He called an emergency cabinet meeting, then an emergency session of parliament, then an emergency appeal to the African Union.

The AU responded with unusual speed. On January 6, 2026, the Peace and Security Council convened an emergency ministerial session in Addis Ababa. The communiqué was unequivocal: the AU “reiterates its unwavering commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia” and rejects “any initiative or measure aiming to recognize Somaliland.” The message to Israel was clear: you have crossed a line that this continent does not permit to be crossed.

But the AU’s condemnation was only the beginning. Within days, a coalition of the unwilling had formed:

Egypt, already locked in existential conflict with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile, saw the Berbera Axis as strategic encirclement. Cairo had long backed Somalia’s unity; now it had a visceral reason to double down. Egyptian officials warned that Israel’s move would “destabilize the entire region.”

Turkey, which had built its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu and positioned itself as Somalia’s security guarantor, framed the recognition as part of an Israeli “expansionist policy.” President Erdoğan, never one to miss a geopolitical opportunity, offered to mediate — on terms that would, of course, expand Turkish influence.

Saudi Arabia, normally aligned with the UAE, broke ranks. Riyadh denounced the move as entrenching “unilateral separatist measures” — a remarkable position given its own reliance on Red Sea security. The Saudi calculation was cold: if Somaliland could be recognized, what about other restive regions? What precedent would be set?

Eritrea, Ethiopia’s former province and current nemesis, watched with alarm. An Ethiopia with Red Sea access through Somaliland would reduce Asmara’s leverage over its larger neighbor. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, a master of regional proxy warfare, had every incentive to destabilize the emerging arrangement.

At the UN Security Council, the confrontation was brutal. Somalia’s representative, eyes burning, turned to the Israeli delegate: “It is outrageous for you to lecture us today while you are deliberately starving Gaza.” South Africa’s delegate accused Israel of “undermining the territorial integrity of Somalia” after having “been allowed to get away with myriad transgressions.” The Israeli delegate sat in silence, knowing that in this forum, he had no allies.
The subtext of every speech was the same: this was not about Somaliland. It was about whether a single country could unilaterally redraw African borders — and whether the international order, already fraying, would let it.

𝑽𝑰. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑩𝒆𝒓𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒂 𝑨𝒙𝒊𝒔
Beneath the diplomatic shouting, a quieter realignment was taking shape — one that would redraw the map of the Horn of Africa more profoundly than any UN resolution.

The Berbera port sits on the Gulf of Aden, where the Red Sea meets the Indian Ocean. It is an ancient place — mentioned in Egyptian papyri, used by Ottoman fleets, a waypoint for dhows carrying frankincense and myrrh. For centuries, it was a backwater. Then, in 2016, DP World arrived with $442 million and a vision.

The upgraded port, completed in 2021, could handle 500,000 containers annually. It had a free trade zone. It had a new airport. It had a road stretching 240 kilometers to the Ethiopian border, built with the explicit purpose of giving Africa’s second-most-populous nation an alternative to Djibouti.

Ethiopia’s need was desperate. Since losing Eritrea’s ports in 1993 and paying $1.5 billion annually to use Djibouti’s facilities, Addis Ababa had been choked by dependency. In January 2024, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed had signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland: recognition and a 50-year naval lease in exchange for 20 kilometers of coastline.

That deal had been frozen under pressure from Somalia and Turkey, which mediated the Ankara Declaration in December 2024 — a face-saving compromise that restored Ethiopia-Somalia diplomatic ties without resolving the core issue. But Israel’s December 2025 move changed the equation entirely.

Now, Ethiopia faced a choice. Former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi had once said Ethiopia “would not be the first to recognize Somaliland, but it would not be the third either.” With Israel having broken the seal, Addis Ababa was no longer the first. By early 2026, Ethiopian officials were actively studying recognition, with State Minister Tarekegn Bululta Godana calling Israel’s move “a significant diplomatic move that could alter the future trajectory of the Horn of Africa.”

The logic was compelling. Any new Ethiopia-Somaliland deal would now be concluded with a recognized state, offering stronger legal grounding and reducing the cost of regional objections. Berbera could finally become Ethiopia’s alternative to Djibouti. A proposed railway linking the port deep into Ethiopian territory could transform regional trade.

Analysts began speaking of a “Berbera Axis” — Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Israel, bound together by port access, security cooperation, and shared hostility to Iranian influence. The Times of Israel reported on an emerging international economic corridor stretching from India through Yemen, Somaliland, and Ethiopia toward Europe — a route that would bypass traditional choke points and reshape global shipping.

It was a vision of the future. But it was also a recipe for conflict.

𝑽𝑰𝑰. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓-𝑨𝒙𝒊𝒔: 𝑬𝒈𝒚𝒑𝒕, 𝑬𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑭𝒆𝒂𝒓
For every action in the Horn of Africa, there is an equal and opposite reaction.

Egypt, already locked in a bitter dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile, saw the Berbera Axis as strategic encirclement. Cairo had long backed Somalia’s territorial integrity; now it had a visceral reason to double down. Egyptian officials condemned Israel’s recognition as a violation of international law and pledged “full support” for Somalia’s unity.

Eritrea, Ethiopia’s former province and current nemesis, watched with alarm. An Ethiopia with Red Sea access through Somaliland would reduce its leverage over its larger neighbor. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, a master of regional proxy warfare, had every incentive to destabilize the emerging arrangement.

Turkey, which had built its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu and positioned itself as Somalia’s security guarantor, framed Israel’s move as part of an “expansionist policy” threatening regional stability. Ankara had mediated the Ethiopia-Somalia thaw in 2024; now it faced the prospect of its painstaking diplomacy unraveling.

Even Saudi Arabia, normally aligned with the UAE, broke ranks. Riyadh denounced the recognition as entrenching “unilateral secessionist measures” — a remarkable position given its own role in the Yemen war and its reliance on Red Sea security. The Saudi calculation was clear: if Somaliland could be recognized, what about other restive regions? What about its own Shiite-majority Eastern Province?

The result was a bifurcating Red Sea: one axis of Somaliland-Ethiopia-Israel-UAE, another of Somalia-Egypt-Eritrea-Turkey-Saudi Arabia, with the Houthis as a wild card capable of imposing their own maritime rules through missile and drone attacks.

It was, in essence, the Middle East’s proxy conflicts — exported to Africa.

𝑽𝑰𝑰𝑰. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑱𝒆𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒎 𝑬𝒎𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒚 𝑪𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒔: 𝑴𝒂𝒚 2026
The situation escalated dramatically in May 2026.

On May 19, Somaliland’s first-ever ambassador to a foreign country presented his diplomatic credentials in Israel and announced plans to open an embassy in Jerusalem — a city whose status is among the most contested in international diplomacy. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar welcomed the decision as a way of strengthening bilateral relations.

The response was swift and unified. On May 24, fifteen Arab and Muslim countries — Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, Djibouti, Somalia, Palestine, Oman, Sudan, Yemen, Lebanon, and Mauritania — issued a joint statement condemning the move as a “blatant violation of international law” and a “direct infringement on the legal and historical status of occupied Jerusalem.”

The embassy plan transformed a bilateral recognition into a multilateral crisis touching the third rail of Middle Eastern politics. For Somaliland, it was a bold assertion of sovereign equality; for its enemies, proof that the “ghost state” was being used as a pawn in Israel’s broader regional agenda.

The question now was whether Somaliland had overplayed its hand — or whether the world was simply catching up to a reality it had refused to see.

𝐈𝐗. 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐀𝐦𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐧 𝐐𝐮𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧: 𝐖𝐢𝐥𝐥 𝐓𝐫𝐮𝐦𝐩 𝐅𝐨𝐥𝐥𝐨𝐰?

Throughout this drama, one voice has been notably cautious: Washington.

In August 2025, Republican Senator Ted Cruz wrote to then-President-elect Donald Trump urging formal U.S. recognition of Somaliland. Influential Republicans had introduced a bill to that effect in June 2025. The logic was familiar: Somaliland is stable, democratic, and strategically located; Somalia is fragile, corrupt, and a haven for Al-Shabaab. Why continue the fiction?

But Trump’s response, given to the New York Post after Israel’s recognition, was characteristically blunt: “Does anyone know what Somaliland is, really?”

The answer, as of June 2026, appears to be no — at least not yet. The Biden administration had maintained the traditional U.S. position of supporting Somalia’s territorial integrity. The Trump administration, for all its iconoclasm, has not moved to recognize Somaliland, perhaps calculating that the diplomatic cost of alienating African and Arab allies outweighs the strategic benefit.

This leaves Somaliland in a peculiar position: recognized by Israel, courted by Ethiopia, celebrated by its diaspora, and still unrecognized by the world’s most powerful nation. The first crack in the dam has not yet become a flood.

𝑬𝒑𝒊𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒖𝒆: 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑷𝒆𝒐𝒑𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑴𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒍𝒆
In Hargeisa, life goes on.

The markets bustle. The telecoms connect. The diaspora sends money home. Somalilanders have been building their country for 33 years without recognition; they will continue regardless of what the UN or the AU decides.

But something has shifted. For the first time, a child born in Hargeisa can hold a passport recognized by another country. For the first time, a Somalilander diplomat sits in a foreign capital. For the first time, the map of the world has moved, however slightly, to accommodate a reality that 5 million people have lived every day for a generation.

“The recognition does not create a new reality,” said, a former Somaliland government official. “It acknowledges an existing one.”

That may be the most radical thing about Israel’s decision: not that it changed Somaliland, but that it finally saw it. In a world of diplomatic fictions and frozen conflicts, seeing is the first step toward believing — or toward war.
The Horn of Africa is holding its breath. And Somaliland, after 33 years in the shadows, is waiting to see whether the dawn lasts until morning.
________________________________________
Gulaid Goohe Idaan

In 2026, the U.S. Department of State submitted to Congress a two-page unclassified document entitled the Report to Congress on Potential Areas for Improved United States Engagement with Somaliland, produced in compliance with Section 7019(e) of the FY2026 Appropriations Act. Despite its brevity, this mandated report represents a discernible inflection point in the evolution of Washington’s diplomatic posture toward the Horn of Africa. While formally reaffirming the longstanding American commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia, the report simultaneously delineates Somaliland as a viable partner for security cooperation, diplomatic dialogue, and geoeconomic development. Employing critical discourse analysis, this article posits that the document embodies an emerging U.S. policy of strategic engagement operating under conditions of diplomatic non-recognition. By examining the report’s linguistic framing, strategic priorities, and broader geopolitical context, this study demonstrates that the United States is increasingly treating Somaliland as a de facto strategic actor. The analysis reveals a gradual paradigm shift from a status-centric, legalistic approach toward an interest-driven framework shaped by maritime security, Red Sea geopolitics, counterterrorism imperatives, and regional connectivity. Although the document deliberately refrains from endorsing formal recognition, it signals a growing institutional acceptance of Somaliland as a distinct and consequential political entity within the American strategic calculus.

Keywords: Somaliland; U.S. Foreign Policy; Strategic Ambiguity; De Facto Statehood; Horn of Africa; Geoeconomic Statecraft; AFRICOM; Diplomatic Recognition.

1. Introduction

Diplomatic communiqués and legislative reports often convey their most profound strategic shifts through calibrated omissions and nuanced framing rather than explicit declarations. In 2026, the U.S. Department of State submitted to Congress a two-page unclassified report entitled Report to Congress on Potential Areas for Improved United States Engagement with Somaliland. The document was produced in compliance with Section 7019(e) of the National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2026 (Division F, Public Law 119-75), and House Report 119-217, and bears an UNCLASSIFIED classification on both pages.

At a superficial level, this mandated document adheres to conventional diplomatic orthodoxy: it reiterates the official American position that Somaliland remains an integral part of the Federal Republic of Somalia, while identifying pragmatic avenues for bilateral cooperation. Yet, a rigorous diplomatic reading suggests the document is far more consequential than its brevity and unclassified status imply.

This report emerges during a period of profound geopolitical realignment in the Horn of Africa and the broader Red Sea region. Intensifying great-power competition, escalating concerns over maritime domain awareness, persistent disruptions to international shipping, and the strategic imperative of securing global trade corridors have dramatically elevated the geopolitical valuation of territories along the Red Sea littoral. Within this volatile environment, Somaliland’s strategic relevance has become increasingly difficult for major powers to marginalize.

Consequently, this article argues that the report should not be construed merely as a technical, legally mandated assessment of bilateral engagement. Rather, it must be understood as a reflection of structural changes in American strategic thinking regarding Somaliland and its anticipated role in the emerging regional order.

2. Methodological Framework

This article employs critical discourse analysis (CDA) to examine the 2026 Congressional Report. CDA is particularly efficacious for analyzing diplomatic texts, as it facilitates the unpacking of how language is utilized to construct political realities, legitimize policy shifts, and navigate complex international norms (Fairclough, 2013). The analysis situates the report’s textual choices within the broader geopolitical context of the Horn of Africa, drawing upon international relations literature concerning de facto states, strategic ambiguity, and geoeconomic statecraft.

3. The Architecture of Diplomatic Language: Navigating De Jure and De Facto Realities

One of the most revealing aspects of the report is its meticulous calibration of diplomatic language. Throughout the document, Washington maintains its formal, de jure commitment to Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Concurrently, however, the report treats Somaliland as an independent, distinct subject of policy analysis.

This discursive distinction is highly significant. In diplomatic practice, states rarely dedicate formal congressional reports to entities they consider politically irrelevant or purely sub-national. The very existence of a document examining opportunities for enhanced engagement with Somaliland demonstrates that the territory has acquired a level of strategic importance sufficient to warrant independent policy consideration.

Equally critical is the report’s deliberate and repeated reference to “Somaliland authorities.” Such terminology reflects more than administrative convenience; it implicitly acknowledges the existence of functioning political institutions capable of governing territory, maintaining internal security, and engaging external actors. From a diplomatic perspective, this constitutes a form of pragmatic acknowledgment. While it does not amount to legal recognition, it reflects a de facto recognition of institutional capacity and political relevance (Caspersen, 2012). The report thus illustrates a growing operational distinction between juridical recognition and functional diplomatic engagement.

4. Geopolitical Reassessment: The Primacy of Strategic Geography

The report’s most pronounced emphasis concerns Somaliland’s strategic location, revealing a critical shift in analytical perspective. For decades, international discourse concerning Somaliland centered primarily on normative questions of self-determination, statehood, and post-colonial territorial integrity. The 2026 report, however, evaluates Somaliland through a distinctly realist lens: strategic geography.

Located along the Gulf of Aden and adjacent to the Bab al-Mandab Strait, Somaliland occupies one of the world’s most vital geopolitical chokepoints. A significant portion of global maritime traffic moving between Europe and Asia via the Suez Canal must traverse this region. Any disruption to these routes carries immediate and severe implications for international commerce and global energy markets.

The report’s emphasis on maritime security reflects the growing urgency of this reality. By identifying Somaliland as a potential partner in safeguarding freedom of navigation and monitoring regional security threats, the United States effectively integrates Somaliland into a broader, functional regional security architecture. This represents a conceptual transformation from viewing Somaliland merely as a “territorial dispute” to viewing it as an active “strategic node.” Historically, entities that become strategically valuable to major powers often experience expanded engagement regardless of unresolved legal questions concerning their sovereign status (Geldenhuys, 2009).

5. Security Statecraft: Functional Engagement as a Diplomatic Catalyst

The report explicitly highlights the possibility of cooperation in addressing extremist threats and monitoring connections between regional militant actors. This emphasis is particularly revealing of contemporary U.S. strategic priorities.

Security cooperation has frequently served as the foundational bedrock upon which broader diplomatic relationships are constructed. Unlike formal recognition, which carries significant domestic and international political costs, security engagement allows states to pursue convergent interests while sidestepping contentious legal and normative questions.

In this context, the report’s reference to ongoing, albeit low-profile, engagement between Somaliland authorities and the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) is especially noteworthy. Such interactions suggest that institutional channels already exist and that Somaliland is increasingly viewed by U.S. defense planners as a credible security interlocutor. Diplomatically, this is significant because security partnerships generate trust, familiarity, and interdependence. They create networks of cooperation that often exert more influence on the ground than formal diplomatic declarations. The report indicates that Somaliland is being gradually but deliberately incorporated into American security calculations for the Horn of Africa.

6. Geoeconomic Statecraft: The Berbera Corridor and Regional Connectivity

The report’s discussion of trade and investment merits particular scholarly attention. It highlights Somaliland’s proactive efforts to attract foreign direct investment and emphasizes the growing strategic importance of the Port of Berbera and Berbera Airport as critical regional infrastructure assets.

From the perspective of international political economy, economic infrastructure is rarely viewed solely through a commercial lens. Ports, transport corridors, and logistics hubs increasingly function as instruments of geoeconomic statecraft and geopolitical influence (Blackwill & Harris, 2016). The report’s recognition of Berbera’s potential role in serving landlocked Ethiopia and facilitating broader regional trade suggests that American policymakers are beginning to view Somaliland as an integral part of a macro-economic and strategic network linking the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and East Africa.

This assessment carries implications that extend far beyond commerce. Infrastructure investments create long-term strategic relationships and path dependencies. As economic connectivity increases, political and diplomatic engagement frequently follows. The inclusion of Berbera within the report’s analysis reflects a growing appreciation of Somaliland’s geoeconomic significance.

7. Strategic Ambiguity as an Instrument of Statecraft

Perhaps the most striking feature of the 2026 report is its deliberate embrace of strategic ambiguity. On one hand, the document explicitly reaffirms Somalia’s territorial integrity. On the other, it actively advocates for deeper, multi-sectoral engagement with Somaliland.

This dual approach is not contradictory; rather, it reflects a calculated diplomatic strategy. Strategic ambiguity allows the United States to pursue practical, interest-based cooperation while avoiding the political and legal consequences associated with formal recognition. It reassures Mogadishu and the African Union that Washington’s formal normative position remains unchanged, while simultaneously providing the executive branch with the flexibility to engage Somaliland in areas deemed vital to American national interests (Ross, 1998).

Such ambiguity has become a hallmark of contemporary diplomacy. In an increasingly complex and multipolar international environment, states frequently prioritize functional, results-oriented relationships over rigid adherence to traditional, Westphalian diplomatic categories. The Somaliland case demonstrates how overriding strategic interests can drive substantive engagement even in the persistent absence of formal recognition.

8. The Paradox of Strategic Engagement: Evaluating the Impact on Somaliland

In the study of unrecognized states, the pursuit of international legitimacy is rarely a linear progression toward formal de jure recognition. More commonly, it is characterized by a protracted phase of functional integration. The 2026 U.S. Congressional Report on Potential Areas for Improved United States Engagement with Somaliland epitomizes this dynamic. Assessing whether such developments are ultimately beneficial to Somaliland requires moving beyond binary evaluations. Instead, it demands an analysis of the strategic trade-offs inherent in the “paradox of strategic ambiguity.” While expanded U.S. engagement offers Somaliland substantial short-term statecraft advantages, it concurrently introduces significant long-term risks of strategic entrapment.

9. The Pragmatic Dividends of Functional Engagement

For a polity that has spent decades combating diplomatic invisibility, the calibrated engagement outlined in recent U.S. policy documents represents a tangible diplomatic triumph. The most profound dividend is the shift in discursive framing. By treating Somaliland as a distinct subject of policy analysis and engaging directly with “Somaliland authorities,” the United States implicitly validates the territory’s institutional capacity, gradually shifting the diplomatic “Overton window” in Washington.

Economically, the explicit acknowledgment of the Port of Berbera and regional connectivity corridors serves as a powerful catalyst for economic statecraft. Being identified by a hegemonic power as a vital node in the Red Sea trade network legitimizes Somaliland’s economic policies to global financial institutions and private investors. Furthermore, security engagement with the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) provides critical intelligence sharing and military professionalization, projecting an image of Somaliland as a stable, democratic anchor in a volatile region. Finally, in an era of great-power competition in the Red Sea, Somaliland can astutely leverage its geopolitical position, using its indispensability to the West to increase its broader diplomatic bargaining power.

10. The Perils of Strategic Entrapment

Despite these tangible benefits, the architecture of strategic ambiguity harbors profound risks for Somaliland’s ultimate sovereign aspirations. The paramount danger is the “functional trap.” The United States can achieve its primary strategic objectives—maritime security, counter-terrorism cooperation, and trade route stability—through functional engagement, thereby removing the political urgency to grant de jure recognition. Somaliland risks being trapped in a perpetual state of “almost recognized,” where its strategic utility to Washington actively disincentivizes the U.S. from disrupting the regional status quo.

Furthermore, the relationship is characterized by asymmetric interdependence. While Somaliland requires U.S. backing for international legitimacy, the United States possesses alternative regional partners, such as Djibouti or the Federal Government of Somalia in Mogadishu. This asymmetry allows Washington to dictate the terms of engagement and impose political conditionalities without offering reciprocal sovereign concessions. There is also the risk of geopolitical instrumentalization; if engagement is driven predominantly by military and maritime interests, Somaliland risks being reduced to a strategic outpost rather than a sovereign equal, which could provoke domestic backlash and exacerbate diplomatic friction with Mogadishu and the African Union.

11. Implications for the International Order and Somaliland’s Diplomatic Trajectory

The 2026 Congressional Report does not alter Somaliland’s de jure legal status. Nevertheless, it contributes to a gradual, cumulative transformation in Somaliland’s international profile.

Most importantly, it reflects an emerging consensus within influential segments of the American foreign policy establishment that Somaliland possesses strategic value independent of the broader “Somalia question.” This development is significant because international recognition rarely emerges in a vacuum. More often, it is preceded by a prolonged intermediate phase during which an entity acquires strategic relevance, institutional legitimacy, and practical, institutionalized relationships with influential states (Walls, 2014).

The report suggests that Somaliland is increasingly navigating this intermediate phase of “gradual normalization.” Whether this trajectory eventually culminates in formal recognition remains uncertain and subject to complex regional dynamics. However, the report clearly indicates that Somaliland is becoming more deeply embedded within American strategic thinking.

12. Conclusion

The 2026 Congressional Report is best understood not as a definitive statement on legal recognition, but as a definitive statement on strategic relevance. Its primary significance lies in its implicit acknowledgment that Somaliland has become an increasingly important, autonomous actor in the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa.

By emphasizing security cooperation, diplomatic engagement, and economic connectivity, the report reflects a broader shift in American foreign policy from legal abstraction toward strategic pragmatism. The document reveals an emerging framework in which Somaliland is viewed simultaneously as an unrecognized territory and a valuable strategic partner. This apparent contradiction is, in reality, the defining essence of contemporary, interest-driven diplomacy.

The report therefore marks an important milestone in the evolution of U.S.-Somaliland relations. While it leaves the ultimate question of recognition unresolved, it confirms that Somaliland has become a subject of growing strategic interest within Washington. In diplomatic terms, this functional integration may ultimately prove as consequential as formal recognition itself.

Buugga caanka ah ee Al-Muqaddimah, oo uu qoray Ibn Khaldun, waxa uu ka kooban yahay qiyaastii 700 ilaa 1,400 bog, waxaana loo aqoonsan yahay mid ka mid ah qoraallada ugu muhiimsan ee taariikhda aadanaha ee laga qoray siyaasadda, bulshada, dawladnimada, dhaqaalaha, iyo ilbaxnimada.

Qoraalkan kooban waxay soo koobaysaa fikradaha iyo aragtiyaha ugu muhiimsan ee buugga, iyadoo si gaar ah diiradda loo saaray xaaladda Somaliland, iyo sida aragtiyada Ibn Khaldun loogu dabaqi karo fahamka waaqica siyaasadeed, bulsho, iyo dowladnimo ee maanta.

Qoraalkani waxa uu iftiiminayaa habka ay dawladuhu u karaan, u xoogaystaan, uguna dambayn u burburaan, iyo muhiimadda ay leedahay isku-duubnida bulshada, caddaaladdu, hoggaan wanaagsan, iyo ilaalinta dareenka qaranimo. Sidaas darteed, waa daraasad gacan ka geysan karta fahamka mustaqbalka Somaliland iyo dhismaha dowladnimo waarta.

Haddii aad rabto inaad si dhab ah u fahanto, akhri oo falanqee.”

Dee Akhri Hadab

“Ayno Bilowno Safarka”

Aragtida Ibn Khaldun ee koritaanka iyo Dhicida Dawladaha iyo Casharrada ay Somaliland Ka Baran Karto (Ibn Khaldun’s Theory of the Rise and Fall of States and Lessons Somaliland Can Learn)

Dulmar

Ibn Khaldun waxa uu ka mid yahay mufakiriintii ugu horreeyay ee si nidaamsan u sharxa sababta dawladuhu u koraan, u xoogaystaan, ugu dambayn u burburaan. Bartamaha aragtidiisa waxa ku jirta fikradda Casabiyadda — isku-duubnida bulshada ama wadajirka bulshada (social cohesion or collective solidarity) —taas oo uu u arkayay saldhigga dhabta ah ee awoodda siyaasadeed (political power) iyo horumarka ilbaxnimada (civilizational development). Sida uu qabo Ibn Khaldun, kuna sharxay kitaabkiisa Al- Muqaddimah dawladuhu waxay guulaystaan marka ay yeeshaan midnimo adag, nidaam, geesinimo, iyo ujeeddo wadajir ah (shared purpose). Hase yeeshee, guusha iyo barwaaqada dhaqaale (economic prosperity) ee la gaadhaa waxay si tartiib tartiib ah u dhalinayaan raaxo, dabacsanaan, iyo musuqmaasuq siyaasadeed (political corruption), kuwaas oo ugu dambayn wiiqa Casabiyaddii markii hore horseeday awoodda dawladda

Maqaalkani waxa uu si qoto dheer u falanqaynayaa aragtida Ibn Khaldun ee ku saabsan guusha, xoogaysiga, iyo guuldarrada dawladaha isaga oo diiradda saaraya Casabiyadda — isku-duubnida bulshada ama wadajirka bulshada (social cohesion or collective solidarity) — hoggaanka, nidaamka dhaqaalaha, awoodda militariga (military power), diinta, iyo isbeddelka jiilalka (generational transformation). Waxa uu muujinayaa in Ibn Khaldun u arkayay hoos-u-dhaca siyaasadeed (political decline) inuusan ahayn dhacdo kedis ah ama shil taariikheed, balse uu yahay hannaan dabiici ah oo si tartiib tartiib ah uga dhasha isbeddelka gudaha ee bulshada, daciifnimada Casabiyadda, iyo isbeddelka qaab-dhismeedka awoodda siyaasadeed (political power).

Sidoo kale, maqaalku waxa uu si gaar ah u eegayaa xaaladda Somaliland isaga oo ku dabaqaya aragtiyaha Ibn Khaldun waaqica siyaasadeed, bulsheed, iyo dowladnimo ee Somaliland maanta. Waxa uu falanqaynayaa sida Somaliland ugu guulaysatay dhismaha dawladnimo (statehood), nabadda, iyo xasilloonida siyaasadeed (political stability) iyada oo ka faa’iidaysatay wadajir bulsho (collective unity), shir-beeleedyo, iyo nidaam isku dhafan oo mideeya dhaqanka bulshada iyo hay’adaha casriga ah.

Dhanka kale, maqaalka waxa uu iftiiminayaa khataraha mustaqbalka ay Waajihikarto Somaliland ee ka iman kara musuqmaasuq siyaasadeed (political corruption), kala qaybsanaan bulsheed (social fragmentation), daciifnimada dareenka qaranimo, iyo hoos-u-dhaca Casabiyadda.

Intaa waxa dheer, maqaalkan waxa uu soo bandhigayaa casharrada ay Somaliland ka baran karto aragtida Ibn Khaldun , gaar ahaan muhiimadda ay leedahay ilaalinta isku-duubnida bulshada, xoojinta sharciyadda siyaasadeed (political legitimacy), horumarinta caddaaladda, iyo hubinta in jiilasha cusub lagu beero dareen qaran iyo Wadaniyeyed, masuuliyad wadajir ah, iyo ka qaybgal bulsho oo firfircoon si loo sii adkeeyo jiritaanka iyo mustaqbalka dowladnimada Somaliland.

Hordhac (Introduction)

mid ka mid ah mufakiriintii ugu waaweynaa ee taariikhda siyaasadda iyo bulshada, Ibn Khaldun waxa uu leeyahay meel gaar ah oo uu kaga duwan yahay culimadii iyo taariikhyahannadii ka horreeyay. Qarnigii afraad iyo tobnaad ayuu ku qoray buuggiisa caanka ah ee Muqaddimah, isaga oo isku dayay inuu sharxo sababta dawladaha qaarkood u gaadhaan awood iyo ilbaxnimo weyn halka kuwa kalena ugu dambayn u dhacaan burburka dawladaha (state collapse) iyo daciifnimo.

Si ka duwan qoraayaashii hore ee dhacdooyinka siyaasadeed ku macnayn jiray qaddar rabbaani ah ama shakhsiyadda hoggaamiyeyaasha, Ibn Khaldun waxa uu isku dayay inuu helo xeerar bulsheed iyo taariikheed oo sharxaya dhaq-dhaqaaqa ilbaxnimooyinka iyo dawladaha.

Bartamaha aragtidiisa waxa taagan fikradda Casabiyadda, taas oo uu ku qeexay isku-duubnida bulshada ama wadajirka bulshada (social cohesion or collective solidarity), dareen kooxeed (group feeling), iyo daacadnimo kooxeed. Sida uu qabo Ibn Khaldun , awoodda siyaasadeed (political power) kama dhalato oo keliya hanti ama awood militari (military power), balse waxay ka dhalataa awoodda bulshada u leedahay inay ilaaliso midnimo bulsheed (social unity), wadajir bulsho (collective unity), iyo ujeeddo wadajir ah (shared purpose).

Ibn Khaldun waxa uu aaminsanaa in taariikhdu leedahay wareeg taariikheed (historical cycle) iyo wareegga ilbaxnimada (cycle of civilization).

Kooxo ku nool meelaha durugsan oo aay saameeyaan nolol adag iyo halgan joogto ahi waxay yeeshaan Casabiyad xooggan oo u saamaxda inay ka adkaadaan , halka bulshooyinka magaaloyinku (urban society) oo ay daciifiyeen raaxo iyo kala qaybsanaan bulsheed (social fragmentation). Marka kooxahaasi dhistaan dowladnimo (statehood) oo ay gaadhaan barwaaqo dhaqaale (economic prosperity), waxay si tartiib tartiib ah u lumiyaan nidaamkii iyo isku-duubnidii horseeday guushooda. Jiilba jiilka ka dambeeya, raaxadu waxay beddeshaa naf-hurnimada (self-sacrifice), ku-tiirsanaantu waxay beddeshaa isku-filnaanshaha (self-reliance), waxaana bilowda hoos-u-dhac siyaasadeed (political decline).

Casabiyadda: Aasaaska Awoodda Dawladaha (Asabiyyah as the Foundation of Political Power)

Tiirka ugu muhiimsan ee aragtida Ibn Khaldun waa Casabiyadda — isku-duubnida bulshada ama wadajirka bulshada (social cohesion or collective solidarity). Waxa uu aaminsanaa in aanay jirin dawladnimo (statehood) soo bixi karta ama sii jiri karta haddii aanay jirin isku-duubni bulsheed oo adag. Casabiyaddu waxay bulshada ku abuurtaa midnimo bulsheed (social unity), geesinimo, nidaam, iyo diyaar u ahaanshaha naf-hurnimo (self-sacrifice) si loo ilaaliyo danta guud.

Sida uu qabo Ibn Khaldun, bulsho qabiil (tribal society) iyo bulsho reer guuraa (nomadic society) ahi waxay inta badan leeyihiin Casabiyad ka xooggan tan bulsho magaalo (urban society) ku nool. Sababta arrintani waa in nolosha adag ee ay ku noolyihiin ay ku khasabto wadajir bulsho (collective unity), isku-tiirsanaan bulsho (social interdependence), iyo adkaysi bulsho (social resilience). Dhibaatada iyo halganku waxay abuuraan daacadnimo iyo xoog bulsheed (social force).

Dhanka kale, bulshooyinka magaalooyinka ku nool waxay si fudud ugu dhacaan raaxo, nolol dabacsan, iyo ku-tiirsanaan nidaamka biroqraasiyadda (bureaucratic system). Marka barwaaqadu korodho, shakhsiyaadku waxay xoogga saaraan danahooda gaarka ah halkii ay ka ilaalin lahaayeen danta guud. Tani waxay si tartiib tartiib ah u wiiqdaa Casabiyadda.

Ibn Khaldun waxa uu Casabiyadda u arkayay awoodda ugu weyn ee dhismaha dawladaha (state formation), ilaalinta xukun siyaasadeed (political rule), iyo sii jiritaanka dawladaha. Marka Casabiyaddu xooggan tahay, dawladdu way adkaysataa; marka ay daciiftona, dawladdu waxay bilaabataa hoos-u-dhac siyaasadeed (political decline).

Koritanka Dawladaha: Midnimo, Hoggaan, iyo Qabsasho (The Rise of States: Unity, Leadership, and Conquest)

Ibn Khaldun waxa uu sharxay in guusha dawladuhu ka bilaabato kooxo leh Casabiyad adag oo ka adkaada bulshooyin jilicsan oo kala qaybsan. Guusha siyaasadeed waxay timaaddaa marka bulsho mideysan ay hesho awood militari (military power) iyo awood siyaasadeed (political power) oo ka sarreysa kuwa kale.

Hoggaanku wuxuu leeyahay door muhiim ah. Hoggaamiye awood leh ayaa mideeya bulshada, hagaya tamarteeda, una jiheeya dhismaha dawladaha (state formation). Si kastaba ha ahaatee, hoggaanka keligiis kuma filna haddii aanu jirin taageero iyo daacadnimo bulsheed.

Marxaladaha hore ee dowladnimada (statehood) waxa lagu gartaa nolol adag, geesinimo, nidaam, iyo wadajir bulsho (collective unity). Hoggaamiyeyaashu waxay si dhow ula xidhiidhaan bulshada, awoodda militariguna waxay ku dhisan tahay daacadnimo iyo isku-duubni dhab ah.

Diintu sidoo kale waxay xoojisaa awoodda dawladaha. Ibn Khaldun waxa uu aaminsanaa in diintu ay ballaadhiso Casabiyadda iyada oo mideysa bulshooyin kala duwan kuna xidha ujeeddo wadajir ah (shared purpose). Diintu waxay bixisaa sharciyadda diimeed (religious legitimacy), nidaam akhlaaqeed (moral order), iyo midnimo bulsheed (social unity) oo kor u qaadda awoodda siyaasadeed (political power).

Raaxada iyo Bilowga Hoos-u-dhaca Dawladaha (Luxury and the Beginning of Political Decline)

Waxa xiiso leh in Ibn Khaldun uu aaminsanaa in guusha dawladuhu ay sidookale sabab u noqdaan oo ay wataan sababta keenta burburkooda. Marka dawladdu gaadho awood, xasillooni, iyo barwaaqo dhaqaale, hoggaamiyeyaashu waxay si tartiib tartiib ah ugu leexdaan nolol raaxo iyo dabacsanaan leh. Arrintaasina waxay daciifisaa nidaamkii, adkaysigii, iyo Casabiyaddii — isku-duubnidii bulshada — ee markii hore sababta u ahayd guusha iyo xoogga dawladnimada.

Marxaladaha hore, hoggaamiyeyaashu waxay la wadaagaan bulshada dhibaatada iyo halganka. Laakiin marka hantidu badato, waxay ka fogaadaan shacabka, waxayna ku mashquulaan raaxo iyo nolol xad-dhaaf ah. Jiilasha cusubna waxay ku barbaaraan iyaga oo aan waligood la kulmin dhibkii iyo halgankii dhisay dawladda.

Sida uu qabo Ibn Khaldun, raaxadu waxay daciifisaa geesinimada, isku-filnaanshaha (self-reliance), iyo dareenka masuuliyadda wadajirka ah. Dadku waxay mudnaanta siiyaan danahooda gaarka ah halkii ay ka ilaalin lahaayeen danta guud. Xilalka siyaasadeedna waxay isu beddelaan dariiq lagu gaadho faa’iido iyo mudnaan gaar ah.

Isbeddelkan ayaa si tartiib tartiib ah u burburiya Casabiyadda. Midnimadii bulshada way daciiftaa, musuqmaasuq siyaasadeed (political corruption) wuu bataa, waxaana hoos u dhacda awooddii akhlaaqeed ee dawladdu ku taagnayd.

Dhaqaalaha, Cashuuraha, iyo Daciifnimada Dawladaha (Economy, Taxation, and State Weakness)

Ibn Khaldun waxa uu aaminsanaa in hoos-u-dhaca siyaasadeed uu ka dhasho maamul-xumo dhaqaale (economic mismanagement) iyo nidaam maamul oo aad u ballaadhan oo ay maamulaan tiro badan oo mas’uuliyiin ahi (excessive bureaucracy). Marka dawladuhu sii xoogaystaan oo balaadhaan, waxay u baahanayaan hay’ado dowladeed oo badan, ciidamo joogto ah, iyo kharashaad sare oo lagu maamulo dowladda iyo qasriyada. Si loo daboolo kharashaadkaas sii kordhaya, hoggaamiyeyaashu waxay bilaabaan inay kordhiyaan cashuuraha laga qaado shacabka.

Bilowga, cashuuraha dhexdhexaadka ahi waxay taageeraan horumar siyaasadeed (political development) iyo horumar bulsheed (social development). Hase yeeshee, marka hoggaamiyeyaashu kordhiyaan cashuuraha si ay u daboolaan kharashaadka sii badanaya, wax-soo-saar dhaqaale (economic productivity) wuu yaraadaa.
Marka dakhliga dawladdu hoos u dhaco, hoggaamiyeyaashu waxay mar kale kordhiyaan cashuuraha, taas oo sii xumaysa hoos-u-dhac dhaqaale (economic decline). Sidaas ayuu u samaysmaa wareeg burbur dhaqaale iyo daciifnimo siyaasadeed.

Isbeddelka Jiilalka iyo Burburka Boqortooyooyinka (Generational Transformation and the Collapse of Empires)

Qodob muhiim ah oo ka mid ah aragtida Ibn Khaldun waa in dawladuhu maraan marxalado ku salaysan isbeddelka jiilalka (generational transformation). Jiilka koowaad wuxuu awoodda ku dhisaa halgan, geesinimo, iyo Casabiyad adag. Waxay leeyihiin nidaam, karti militari, iyo xidhiidh dhow oo bulshada ah.
Jiilka labaad wuxuu dhaxlaa awoodda iyo barwaaqadii ay abuureen kuwii ka horreeyay. Inkasta oo ay weli xasuustaan dhibkii hore, haddana waxay bilaabaan inay u janjeedhaan dhinaca raaxada iyo nolol dabacsan.
Jiilka saddexaadna wuxuu si buuxda ula qabsadaa mudnaanta iyo raaxada. Iyaga oo aan waligood la kulmin halgankii hore, waxay lumiyaan nidaamkii, adkaysigii, iyo Casabiyaddii lagama maarmaanka u ahayd sii jiritaanka dawladda.
Marxaladdan, dawladdu waxay u nuglaataa kooxo cusub oo leh Casabiyad ka xooggan. Kooxo cusub oo kasoo baxa meelaha durugsan ayaa ugu dambayn beddela boqortooyada sii daciifaysa, waxaana dib u bilaabma wareeg taariikheed (historical cycle) cusub.

Somaliland iyo Aragtiida Ibn Khaldun : Guulaha, Khataraha, iyo Mustaqbalka Dawladnimada (Somaliland and Ibn Khaldun’s Theory: Successes, Risks, and the Future of Statehood)
Marka xaaladda Somaliland lagu eego aragtida Ibn Khaldun, Somaliland waxay noqotaa tusaale xiiso leh oo muujinaya sida Casabiyadda — isku-duubnida bulshada ama wadajirka bulshada (social cohesion or collective solidarity) — ay u noqon karto saldhigga dhismaha dawladnimo (statehood) iyo xasilloonida siyaasadeed (political stability). Muddo ka badan soddon sano, Somaliland waxay ku guulaysatay inay dhisto nidaam siyaasadeed iyo maamul dowladeed (state administration) gudaha kasoo unkamay, xilli gobolka Geeska Afrika uu la daalaa dhacayay burbur, dagaallo, iyo kala daadsanaan siyaasadeed.
Guusha ugu weyn ee Somaliland waxay ahayd inay samayso nidaam isku dhafan oo mideeya dhaqanka bulshada iyo hay’adaha casriga ah. Golaha guurtida, shir-beeleedyadii dib-u-heshiisiinta, iyo dhaqanka wada-tashigu waxay abuureen wadajir bulsho (collective unity) iyo sharciyadda siyaasadeed (political legitimacy) oo horseeday dib-u-dhis dawladnimo. Tani waxay si weyn ula jaanqaadaysaa aragtida Ibn Khaldun ee ah in dawladuhu ku dhashaan Casabiyad adag iyo awood bulsho oo mideysan.

Bulshada Somaliland waxay dagaalkii kadib yeelatay dareen guud oo ku salaysan badbaado wadajir ah, nabad, iyo dib-u-dhis qaran. Dareenkaasi wuxuu noqday xoog bulsheed (social force) u suurtogeliyay bulshada inay dhisto ciidamo, hay’ado dowladeed, doorashooyin, iyo nidaam sharci. Sida uu qabo Ibn Khaldun, dawlad kasta oo guulaysata waxay marka hore ku dhalataa isku-duubni bulsheed (social cohesion or collective solidarity), naf-hurnimo (self-sacrifice), iyo ujeeddo wadajir ah (shared purpose). Somaliland waxay si cad u muujisay arrintaas.
Dhanka kale, aragtida Ibn Khaldun waxay sidoo kale bixisaa digniino muhiim ah oo ku saabsan mustaqbalka Somaliland.

Ibn Khaldun waxa uu aaminsanaa in dawladaha marka ay gaadhaan xasillooni iyo barwaaqo dhaqaale (economic prosperity), ay si tartiib tartiib ah u bilaabaan inay lumiyaan Casabiyaddii iyo wadajirkii bulshada ee markii hore horseeday guusha. Calaamadahaas qaar ayaa maanta laga dareemi karaa Somaliland.
Mid ka mid ah khataraha ugu waaweyn waa musuqumaasuq siyaasadeed (political corruption) iyo in awoodda siyaasadeed (political power) mararka qaarkood loo adeegsado dano gaar ah halkii ay ka ahaan lahayd danta guud. Ibn Khaldun waxa uu ka digayay in marka hoggaamiyeyaashu ku mashquulaan raaxo, dano shakhsiyadeed, iyo tartan awoodeed, ay daciifto Casabiyaddii ilaalinaysay dawladnimada. Haddii nidaamka siyaasadeed uu noqdo mid ku salaysan shaqsiyaad, qabiyaalad siyaasadaysan, ama kooxo dano gaar ah leh, waxa sii daciifaya wadajirkii bulshada ee ay kadhalatay dhisayna Somaliland

Sidoo kale, kala qaybsanaaan bulsheed (social fragmentation) iyo murannada siyaasadeed ee sii xoogaysanaya waxay noqon karaan calaamado muujinaya hoos-u-dhac siyaasadeed (political decline) haddii aan si taxaddar leh loo maareyn. Inkasta oo tartanka siyaasadeed iyo dimuqraadiyaddu ay yihiin astaamo caafimaad qaba, haddana marka khilaafaadka siyaasadeed isu beddelaan colaad bulsho ama qabyaalad, waxay dhaawici karaan isku-duubnida bulshada ama wadajirka bulshada (social cohesion or collective solidarity).

Arrin kale oo muhiim ah oo Ibn Khaldun ka digayay waa isbeddelka jiilalka (generational transformation). Jiilkii dib-u-dhiska Somaliland sameeyay wuxuu lahaa naf-hurnimo (self-sacrifice), adkaysi bulsho (social resilience), iyo dareen qaran oo xooggan. Waxay ahaayeen jiil kasoo baxay dagaal, burbur, iyo xaalado adag, taas oo ku abuurtay isku-duubni bulsheed iyo masuuliyad wadajir ah.

Hase yeeshee, jiilasha cusub ee ku koray nabadda, xasilloonida, iyo nidaamka dowladeed ee jira waxa laga yaabaa inay si tartiib tartiib ah uga fogaadaan dareenka wadajirka ahaa ee saldhigga u ahaa dhismaha Somaliland. Jiilashani ma aysan soo marin dhibkii iyo halgankii ay soo mareen jiilkii hore, sidaas darteed waxa dhici karta inay yaraato qiimaynta ay siinayaan wadajirka bulshada, qaranimada, iyo ilaalinta dowladnimada. . Haddii aan la xoojin aqoonsiga qaran, nidaamka akhlaaqeed (moral order), iyo ka qaybgalka dhalinyarada, waxa daciifi kara saldhigii bulshada ee dawladnimadu ku taagnayd

Marka aragtida Ibn Khaldun lagu dabaqo Somaliland, isbeddelka jiilalka laguma cabbiro oo keliya tirada sannadaha ay Somaliland jirtay, balse waxa lagu cabbiraa sida ay isu beddeleen jiilashii dhisay, xoojiyay, iyo kuwa maanta maamulaya nidaamka dowladnimo

Haddii aynu qaadanno in jiil siyaasadeed uu celcelis ahaan yahay qiyaastii 25 ilaa 30 sano, Somaliland oo dib ula soo noqotay dowladnimadeeda sannadkii 1991 waxay maanta ku dhowdahay dhammaadka jiilkii koowaad ama bilowga jiilka labaad ee aragtida Ibn Khaldun.

Jiilka koowaad (1991–2020 ku dhowaad) wuxuu ahaa jiilkii dib-u-dhiska iyo badbaadinta qaranka. Waxay lahaayeen Casabiyad adag (strong social cohesion), naf-hurnimo, dareen qaran, dib-u-heshiisiin, iyo awood ay ku dhisaan hay’adaha dowladeed. Jiilkani wuxuu kasoo baxay dagaal iyo burbur, taas oo si weyn ugu dhow marxaladdii koowaad ee Ibn Khaldun sharxay, halkaas oo dawladnimadu ku dhalato isku-duubni bulsheed iyo halgan wadajir ah.

Jiilka labaad (2020-meeyada iyo wixii ka dambeeya) waa jiil ku koray xasillooni iyo nidaam dowladeed oo jira. Waxay dhaxleen hay’ado dowladeed, doorashooyin, nabad, iyo maamul shaqaynaya. Si kastaba ha ahaatee, waxa sidoo kale soo muuqan kara tartan siyaasadeed oo xooggan, musuqmaasuq, qabyaalad siyaasadaysan, iyo daciifnimada dareenka wadajirka ah.

Sidaas darteed, marka laga eego aragtida Ibn Khaldun, Somaliland wali kuma jirto marxalad burbur ama hoos-u-dhac buuxa, balse waxay ku jirtaa marxalad muhiim ah oo lagu qiimaynayo in Casabiyaddii iyo wadajirkii bulshada ee dhisay dowladnimada la sii ilaalin karo iyo in kale.

Farqiga weyn ee Somaliland u dhexeeya dawladihii uu Ibn Khaldun ka hadlay ayaa ah in Somaliland leedahay nidaam doorasho, hay’ado casri ah, warbaahin, bulsho rayid ah, iyo nidaam isku dhafan oo mideeya dhaqanka iyo dowladnimada casriga ah. Arrimahaas ayaa dib u dhigi kara ama xitaa jebin kara wareegga burburka ee uu Ibn Khaldun sharxay haddii si wanaagsan loo maareeyo.

Sidaas darteed, haddii aan si joogto ah loo xoojin aqoonsiga qaran, nidaamka akhlaaqeed (moral order), waxbarashada waddaniyadda, iyo ka qaybgalka dhalinyarada ee siyaasadda iyo horumarinta bulshada, waxa si tartiib tartiib ah u daciifi kara saldhigii bulshada ee ay ku taagnayd dowladnimada Somaliland.

Khaldun. Wuxuu aaminsanaa in maamul-xumo dhaqaale (economic mismanagement), cashuuro aan caddaalad ahayn, iyo nidaam maamul oo aad u ballaadhan oo ay maamulaan tiro badan oo mas’uuliyiin ahi (excessive bureaucracy). ee sii fidaya ay dhaawacaan wax-soo-saar dhaqaale (economic productivity) iyo kalsoonida shacabka. Somaliland, korodhka shaqo la’aanta, saboolnimada, iyo ku-tiirsanaanta dhaqaale ee dibadda waxay noqon karaan khataro sii daciifiya xasilloonida mustaqbalka haddii aan la helin horumar bulsheed (social development) iyo fursado dhaqaale oo waara

Si kastaba ha ahaatee, Somaliland waxay leedahay faa’iidooyin muhiim ah oo ay kaga badbaadi karto wareegga burburka ee Ibn Khaldun sharxay. Midda ugu weyn waa in bulshada Somaliland wali leedahay dareen qaran iyo wadajir bulsho oo ka xooggan dalal badan oo gobolka ah. Sidoo kale, dhaqanka wada-tashiga, xalinta khilaafaadka, iyo nidaamka isku dhafan ee dhaqanka iyo sharciyada casriga ahi waxay Somaliland siinayaan awood ay ku ilaalin karto sharciyadda siyaasadeed (political legitimacy) iyo xasilloonida.

Aragtida Ibn Khaldun marka lagu dabaqo Somaliland waxay muujinaysaa laba xaqiiqo oo waaweyn. Midda koowaad waa in guusha Somaliland ay ka dhalatay Casabiyad adag, wadajir bulsho (collective unity), iyo rabitaanka bulshada ee dib-u-dhis qaran. Midda labaadna waa in sii jiritaanka guushaasi uu ku xidhan yahay awoodda Somaliland u leedahay inay ilaaliso midnimada bulshada, la dagaallanto musuqmaasuqa, xoojiso caddaaladda, isla markaana jiilasha cusub ku beerato dareenka qaranimo iyo masuuliyadda wadajirka ah.

Sida uu qabo Ibn Khaldun, dawladaha ma burburaan marka ay daciifaan militarigoodu oo keliya, balse waxay burburaan marka ay daciifto Casabiyaddii iyo isku-duubnidii bulshada ee markii hore dhistay awooddaas. Somaliland maanta waxay taagan tahay marxalad ay guusheedii hore isu beddeli karto laba waddo: mid horseeda sii xoojinta dowladnimada (statehood) iyo horumar siyaasadeed (political development), ama mid si tartiib tartiib ah ugu riixda kala qaybsanaan iyo daciifnimo siyaasadeed. Mustaqbalka Somaliland wuxuu sidaas darteed ku xidhan yahay awoodda ay u leedahay inay ilaaliso Casabiyadda iyo wadajirka bulshada ee ahaa saldhigga guusheeda.

Gunaanad (Conclusion)

Aragtida Ibn Khaldun ee guusha iyo guuldarrada dawladuhu waxay ka mid tahay aragtiyihii ugu qotada dheeraa ee lagu sharxay horumar siyaasadeed (political development) iyo horumarka ilbaxnimada (civilizational development). Bartamaha aragtidiisa waxa ku jirta Casabiyadda — isku-duubnida bulshada ama wadajirka bulshada (social cohesion or collective solidarity) — taas oo uu u arkayay awoodda ugu muhiimsan ee ka dambaysa awoodda siyaasadeed (political power), guusha militariga, iyo horumarka bulshada.

Sida uu qabo Ibn Khaldun, dawladuhu way guulaystaan marka ay leeyihiin midnimo bulsheed (social unity), hoggaan nidaamsan, wax-soo-saar dhaqaale (economic productivity), midnimo militari (military cohesion), iyo sharciyadda siyaasadeed (political legitimacy). Hase yeeshee, barwaaqada iyo raaxadu waxay si tartiib tartiib ah u daciifiyaan saldhigyadan, taas oo horseedda musuqmaasuq siyaasadeed (political corruption), kala qaybsanaan bulsheed (social fragmentation), iyo hoos-u-dhac siyaasadeed (political decline).

Ibn Khaldun waxa uu aaminsanaa in awoodda siyaasadeed (political power) ay ka dhalato midnimo iyo naf-hurnimo (self-sacrifice), laakiin guusha lafteedu ay ugu dambayn wiiqdo isku-duubnidii horseeday awooddaas. Sidaas darteed, taariikhdu waxay noqotaa wareegga ilbaxnimada (cycle of civilization) oo joogto ah — xoog iyo daciifnimo, koritaan iyo burbur, ilbaxnimo iyo hoos-u-dhac.

Marka aragtidan lagu dabaqo Somaliland, waxa muuqata in guusha Somaliland ay si weyn ugu xidhnayd Casabiyad adag, wadajir bulsho (collective unity), iyo rabitaanka bulshada ee dib-u-dhis qaran. Sidoo kale, waxa muuqata in mustaqbalka Somaliland uu ku xidhan yahay awoodda ay u leedahay inay ilaaliso isku-duubnida bulshada, xoojiso caddaaladda, la dagaallanto musuqmaasuqa, isla markaana jiilasha cusub ku beerato dareen qaran iyo masuuliyad wadajir ah.

Inkasta oo uu noolaa qarnigii afraad iyo tobnaad, fikirrada Ibn Khaldun ee ku saabsan hoggaanka, Casabiyadda, sharciyadda siyaasadeed (political legitimacy), iyo dhismaha dawladaha (state formation) ayaa weli saamayn weyn ku leh fahamka casriga ah ee siyaasadda, bulshada, iyo ilbaxnimooyinka.

𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 waxa uu ka mid yahay mufakiriintii ugu horreeyay ee si nidaamsan u sharxa sababta dawladuhu u koraan, u xoogaystaan, ugu dambayn u burburaan. Bartamaha aragtidiisa waxa ku jirta fikradda 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒚𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒂 — 𝙞𝙨𝙠𝙪-𝙙𝙪𝙪𝙗𝙣𝙞𝙙𝙖 𝙗𝙪𝙡𝙨𝙝𝙖𝙙𝙖 𝙖𝙢𝙖 𝙬𝙖𝙙𝙖𝙟𝙞𝙧𝙠𝙖 𝙗𝙪𝙡𝙨𝙝𝙖𝙙𝙖 (𝙨𝙤𝙘𝙞𝙖𝙡 𝙘𝙤𝙝𝙚𝙨𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙤𝙧 𝙘𝙤𝙡𝙡𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚 𝙨𝙤𝙡𝙞𝙙𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮) —taas oo uu u arkayay saldhigga dhabta ah ee awoodda siyaasadeed (𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓) iyo horumarka ilbaxnimada (𝒄𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒅𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒑𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕). Sida uu qabo 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧, kuna sharxay kitaabkiisa 𝑨𝒍- 𝑴𝒖𝒒𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒉 dawladuhu waxay guulaystaan marka ay yeeshaan 𝗺𝗶𝗱𝗻𝗶𝗺𝗼 𝗮𝗱𝗮𝗴, 𝗻𝗶𝗱𝗮𝗮𝗺, 𝗴𝗲𝗲𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗶𝗺𝗼, 𝗶𝘆𝗼 𝘂𝗷𝗲𝗲𝗱𝗱𝗼 𝘄𝗮𝗱𝗮𝗷𝗶𝗿 𝗮𝗵 (shared purpose). Hase yeeshee, guusha iyo barwaaqada dhaqaale (economic prosperity) ee la gaadhaa waxay si tartiib tartiib ah u dhalinayaan 𝒓𝒂𝒂𝒙𝒐, 𝒅𝒂𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒔𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒂𝒏, iyo 𝗺𝘂𝘀𝘂𝗾𝗺𝗮𝗮𝘀𝘂𝗾 𝘀𝗶𝘆𝗮𝗮𝘀𝗮𝗱𝗲𝗲𝗱 (political corruption), kuwaas oo ugu dambayn wiiqa Casabiyaddii markii hore horseeday awoodda dawladda.

Maqaalkani waxa uu si qoto dheer u falanqaynayaa aragtida 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 ee ku saabsan guusha, xoogaysiga, iyo guuldarrada dawladaha isaga oo diiradda saaraya 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒚𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒂 — isku-duubnida bulshada ama wadajirka bulshada (social cohesion or collective solidarity) — 𝗵𝗼𝗴𝗴𝗮𝗮𝗻𝗸𝗮, 𝗻𝗶𝗱𝗮𝗮𝗺𝗸𝗮 𝗱𝗵𝗮𝗾𝗮𝗮𝗹𝗮𝗵𝗮, 𝗮𝘄𝗼𝗼𝗱𝗱𝗮 𝗺𝗶𝗹𝗶𝘁𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗴𝗮 (military power), 𝒅𝒊𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒂, 𝒊𝒚𝒐 𝒊𝒔𝒃𝒆𝒅𝒅𝒆𝒍𝒌𝒂 𝒋𝒊𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒍𝒌𝒂 (𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏). Waxa uu muujinayaa in 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 u arkayay hoos-u-dhaca siyaasadeed (political decline) inuusan ahayn dhacdo kedis ah ama shil taariikheed, balse uu yahay hannaan dabiici ah oo si tartiib tartiib ah uga dhasha 𝗶𝘀𝗯𝗲𝗱𝗱𝗲𝗹𝗸𝗮 𝗴𝘂𝗱𝗮𝗵𝗮 𝗲𝗲 𝗯𝘂𝗹𝘀𝗵𝗮𝗱𝗮, 𝗱𝗮𝗰𝗶𝗶𝗳𝗻𝗶𝗺𝗮𝗱𝗮 𝗖𝗮𝘀𝗮𝗯𝗶𝘆𝗮𝗱𝗱𝗮, 𝗶𝘆𝗼 𝗶𝘀𝗯𝗲𝗱𝗱𝗲𝗹𝗸𝗮 𝗾𝗮𝗮𝗯-𝗱𝗵𝗶𝘀𝗺𝗲𝗲𝗱𝗸𝗮 𝗮𝘄𝗼𝗼𝗱𝗱𝗮 𝘀𝗶𝘆𝗮𝗮𝘀𝗮𝗱𝗲𝗲𝗱 (𝗽𝗼𝗹𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗰𝗮𝗹 𝗽𝗼𝘄𝗲𝗿).

Sidoo kale, maqaalku waxa uu si gaar ah u eegayaa xaaladda 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 isaga oo ku dabaqaya aragtiyaha 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 waaqica siyaasadeed, bulsheed, iyo dowladnimo ee 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 maanta. Waxa uu falanqaynayaa sida 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 ugu guulaysatay dhismaha dawladnimo (statehood), nabadda, iyo xasilloonida siyaasadeed (political stability) iyada oo ka faa’iidaysatay wadajir bulsho (collective unity), shir-beeleedyo, iyo nidaam isku dhafan oo mideeya dhaqanka bulshada iyo hay’adaha casriga ah.

Dhanka kale, maqaalka waxa uu iftiiminayaa khataraha mustaqbalka ay Waajihikarto 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 ee ka iman kara musuqmaasuq siyaasadeed (political corruption), kala qaybsanaan bulsheed (social fragmentation), daciifnimada dareenka qaranimo, iyo hoos-u-dhaca Casabiyadda.

Intaa waxa dheer, maqaalkan waxa uu soo bandhigayaa casharrada ay 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 ka baran karto aragtida 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 , gaar ahaan muhiimadda ay leedahay 𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗮 𝗶𝘀𝗸𝘂-𝗱𝘂𝘂𝗯𝗻𝗶𝗱𝗮 𝗯𝘂𝗹𝘀𝗵𝗮𝗱𝗮, 𝘅𝗼𝗼𝗷𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗮 𝘀𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗰𝗶𝘆𝗮𝗱𝗱𝗮 𝘀𝗶𝘆𝗮𝗮𝘀𝗮𝗱𝗲𝗲𝗱 (𝗽𝗼𝗹𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗰𝗮𝗹 𝗹𝗲𝗴𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗺𝗮𝗰𝘆), 𝗵𝗼𝗿𝘂𝗺𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗮 𝗰𝗮𝗱𝗱𝗮𝗮𝗹𝗮𝗱𝗱𝗮, 𝗶𝘆𝗼 𝗵𝘂𝗯𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗮 𝗶𝗻 𝗷𝗶𝗶𝗹𝗮𝘀𝗵𝗮 𝗰𝘂𝘀𝘂𝗯 𝗹𝗮𝗴𝘂 𝗯𝗲𝗲𝗿𝗼 𝗱𝗮𝗿𝗲𝗲𝗻 𝗾𝗮𝗿𝗮𝗻 𝗶𝘆𝗼 𝗪𝗮𝗱𝗮𝗻𝗶𝘆𝗲𝗲𝗱, 𝗺𝗮𝘀𝘂𝘂𝗹𝗶𝘆𝗮𝗱 𝘄𝗮𝗱𝗮𝗷𝗶𝗿 𝗮𝗵, 𝗶𝘆𝗼 𝗸𝗮 𝗾𝗮𝘆𝗯𝗴𝗮𝗹 𝗯𝘂𝗹𝘀𝗵𝗼 𝗼𝗼 𝗳𝗶𝗿𝗳𝗶𝗿𝗰𝗼𝗼𝗻 si loo sii adkeeyo jiritaanka iyo mustaqbalka dowladnimada 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱.

𝑯𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒉𝒂𝒄 (𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)

mid ka mid ah mufakiriintii ugu waaweynaa ee taariikhda siyaasadda iyo bulshada, 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 waxa uu leeyahay meel gaar ah oo uu kaga duwan yahay culimadii iyo taariikhyahannadii ka horreeyay. Qarnigii afraad iyo tobnaad ayuu ku qoray buuggiisa caanka ah ee 𝑴𝒖𝒒𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒉, isaga oo isku dayay inuu sharxo sababta dawladaha qaarkood u gaadhaan awood iyo ilbaxnimo weyn halka kuwa kalena ugu dambayn u dhacaan burburka dawladaha (state collapse) iyo daciifnimo.

Si ka duwan qoraayaashii hore ee dhacdooyinka siyaasadeed ku macnayn jiray qaddar rabbaani ah ama shakhsiyadda hoggaamiyeyaasha, 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 waxa uu isku dayay inuu helo xeerar bulsheed iyo taariikheed oo sharxaya dhaq-dhaqaaqa ilbaxnimooyinka iyo dawladaha.

Bartamaha aragtidiisa waxa taagan fikradda Casabiyadda, taas oo uu ku qeexay isku-duubnida bulshada ama wadajirka bulshada (social cohesion or collective solidarity), dareen kooxeed (group feeling), iyo daacadnimo kooxeed. Sida uu qabo 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 , awoodda siyaasadeed (political power) kama dhalato oo keliya hanti ama awood militari (military power), balse waxay ka dhalataa awoodda bulshada u leedahay inay ilaaliso midnimo bulsheed (social unity), wadajir bulsho (collective unity), iyo ujeeddo wadajir ah (shared purpose).

𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 waxa uu aaminsanaa in taariikhdu leedahay wareeg taariikheed (historical cycle) iyo wareegga ilbaxnimada (cycle of civilization).

Kooxo ku nool meelaha durugsan oo aay saameeyaan nolol adag iyo halgan joogto ahi waxay yeeshaan Casabiyad xooggan oo u saamaxda inay ka adkaadaan , halka bulshooyinka magaaloyinku (urban society) oo ay daciifiyeen raaxo iyo kala qaybsanaan bulsheed (social fragmentation). Marka kooxahaasi dhistaan dowladnimo (statehood) oo ay gaadhaan barwaaqo dhaqaale (economic prosperity), waxay si tartiib tartiib ah u lumiyaan nidaamkii iyo isku-duubnidii horseeday guushooda. Jiilba jiilka ka dambeeya, raaxadu waxay beddeshaa naf-hurnimada (self-sacrifice), ku-tiirsanaantu waxay beddeshaa isku-filnaanshaha (self-reliance), waxaana bilowda hoos-u-dhac siyaasadeed (political decline).

𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒚𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒂: 𝑨𝒂𝒔𝒂𝒂𝒔𝒌𝒂 𝑨𝒘𝒐𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒂 𝑫𝒂𝒘𝒍𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒉𝒂 (𝑨𝒔𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒚𝒚𝒂𝒉 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓)

Tiirka ugu muhiimsan ee aragtida 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 waa 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒚𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒂 — isku-duubnida bulshada ama wadajirka bulshada (social cohesion or collective solidarity). Waxa uu aaminsanaa in aanay jirin dawladnimo (statehood) soo bixi karta ama sii jiri karta haddii aanay jirin isku-duubni bulsheed oo adag. Casabiyaddu waxay bulshada ku abuurtaa midnimo bulsheed (social unity), geesinimo, nidaam, iyo diyaar u ahaanshaha naf-hurnimo (self-sacrifice) si loo ilaaliyo danta guud.

Sida uu qabo 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 , bulsho qabiil (tribal society) iyo bulsho reer guuraa (nomadic society) ahi waxay inta badan leeyihiin Casabiyad ka xooggan tan bulsho magaalo (urban society) ku nool. Sababta arrintani waa in nolosha adag ee ay ku noolyihiin ay ku khasabto wadajir bulsho (collective unity), isku-tiirsanaan bulsho (social interdependence), iyo adkaysi bulsho (social resilience). Dhibaatada iyo halganku waxay abuuraan daacadnimo iyo xoog bulsheed (social force).

Dhanka kale, bulshooyinka magaalooyinka ku nool waxay si fudud ugu dhacaan raaxo, nolol dabacsan, iyo ku-tiirsanaan nidaamka biroqraasiyadda (bureaucratic system). Marka barwaaqadu korodho, shakhsiyaadku waxay xoogga saaraan danahooda gaarka ah halkii ay ka ilaalin lahaayeen danta guud. Tani waxay si tartiib tartiib ah u wiiqdaa Casabiyadda.

𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 waxa uu 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒚𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒂 u arkayay awoodda ugu weyn ee dhismaha dawladaha (state formation), ilaalinta xukun siyaasadeed (political rule), iyo sii jiritaanka dawladaha. Marka Casabiyaddu xooggan tahay, dawladdu way adkaysataa; marka ay daciiftona, dawladdu waxay bilaabataa hoos-u-dhac siyaasadeed (political decline).

𝑲𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒂 𝑫𝒂𝒘𝒍𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒉𝒂: 𝑴𝒊𝒅𝒏𝒊𝒎𝒐, 𝑯𝒐𝒈𝒈𝒂𝒂𝒏, 𝒊𝒚𝒐 𝑸𝒂𝒃𝒔𝒂𝒔𝒉𝒐 (𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔: 𝑼𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒚, 𝑳𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕)

𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 waxa uu sharxay in guusha dawladuhu ka bilaabato kooxo leh Casabiyad adag oo ka adkaada bulshooyin jilicsan oo kala qaybsan. Guusha siyaasadeed waxay timaaddaa marka bulsho mideysan ay hesho awood militari (military power) iyo awood siyaasadeed (political power) oo ka sarreysa kuwa kale.

Hoggaanku wuxuu leeyahay door muhiim ah. Hoggaamiye awood leh ayaa mideeya bulshada, hagaya tamarteeda, una jiheeya dhismaha dawladaha (state formation). Si kastaba ha ahaatee, hoggaanka keligiis kuma filna haddii aanu jirin taageero iyo daacadnimo bulsheed.

Marxaladaha hore ee dowladnimada (statehood) waxa lagu gartaa nolol adag, geesinimo, nidaam, iyo wadajir bulsho (collective unity). Hoggaamiyeyaashu waxay si dhow ula xidhiidhaan bulshada, awoodda militariguna waxay ku dhisan tahay daacadnimo iyo isku-duubni dhab ah.

Diintu sidoo kale waxay xoojisaa awoodda dawladaha. 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 waxa uu aaminsanaa in diintu ay ballaadhiso 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒚𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒂 iyada oo mideysa bulshooyin kala duwan kuna xidha ujeeddo wadajir ah (shared purpose). Diintu waxay bixisaa sharciyadda diimeed (religious legitimacy), nidaam akhlaaqeed (moral order), iyo midnimo bulsheed (social unity) oo kor u qaadda awoodda siyaasadeed (political power).

𝑹𝒂𝒂𝒙𝒂𝒅𝒂 𝒊𝒚𝒐 𝑩𝒊𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒈𝒂 𝑯𝒐𝒐𝒔-𝒖-𝒅𝒉𝒂𝒄𝒂 𝑫𝒂𝒘𝒍𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒉𝒂 (𝑳𝒖𝒙𝒖𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑩𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒆)

Waxa xiiso leh in Ibn Khaldun uu aaminsanaa in guusha dawladuhu ay sidookale sabsabu noqdaan oo wataana wataan sababta keenta burburkooda. Marka dawladdu gaadho awood, xasillooni, iyo barwaaqo dhaqaale, hoggaamiyeyaashu waxay si tartiib tartiib ah ugu leexdaan nolol raaxo iyo dabacsanaan leh. Arrintaasina waxay daciifisaa nidaamkii, adkaysigii, iyo Casabiyaddii — isku-duubnidii bulshada — ee markii hore sababta u ahayd guusha iyo xoogga dawladnimada.

Marxaladaha hore, hoggaamiyeyaashu waxay la wadaagaan bulshada dhibaatada iyo halganka. Laakiin marka hantidu badato, waxay ka fogaadaan shacabka, waxayna ku mashquulaan raaxo iyo nolol xad-dhaaf ah. Jiilasha cusubna waxay ku barbaaraan iyaga oo aan waligood la kulmin dhibkii iyo halgankii dhisay dawladda.

Sida uu qabo 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 , raaxadu waxay daciifisaa geesinimada, isku-filnaanshaha (self-reliance), iyo dareenka masuuliyadda wadajirka ah. Dadku waxay mudnaanta siiyaan danahooda gaarka ah halkii ay ka ilaalin lahaayeen danta guud. Xilalka siyaasadeedna waxay isu beddelaan dariiq lagu gaadho faa’iido iyo mudnaan gaar ah.

Isbeddelkan ayaa si tartiib tartiib ah u burburiya Casabiyadda. Midnimadii bulshada way daciiftaa, musuqmaasuq siyaasadeed (political corruption) wuu bataa, waxaana hoos u dhacda awooddii akhlaaqeed ee dawladdu ku taagnayd.

𝑫𝒉𝒂𝒒𝒂𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒉𝒂, 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉𝒖𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒉𝒂, 𝒊𝒚𝒐 𝑫𝒂𝒄𝒊𝒊𝒇𝒏𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒂 𝑫𝒂𝒘𝒍𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒉𝒂 (𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒚, 𝑻𝒂𝒙𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑾𝒆𝒂𝒌𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔)

𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 waxa uu aaminsanaa in hoos-u-dhaca siyaasadeed uu ka dhasho 𝒎𝒂𝒂𝒎𝒖𝒍-𝒙𝒖𝒎𝒐 𝒅𝒉𝒂𝒒𝒂𝒂𝒍𝒆 (𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕) iyo nidaam maamul oo aad u ballaadhan oo ay maamulaan tiro badan oo mas’uuliyiin ahi (𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒃𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒖𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒚). Marka dawladuhu sii xoogaystaan oo balaadhaan, waxay u baahanayaan hay’ado dowladeed oo badan, ciidamo joogto ah, iyo kharashaad sare oo lagu maamulo dowladda iyo qasriyada. Si loo daboolo kharashaadkaas sii kordhaya, hoggaamiyeyaashu waxay bilaabaan inay kordhiyaan cashuuraha laga qaado shacabka.

Bilowga, cashuuraha dhexdhexaadka ahi waxay taageeraan horumar siyaasadeed (political development) iyo horumar bulsheed (social development). Hase yeeshee, marka hoggaamiyeyaashu kordhiyaan cashuuraha si ay u daboolaan kharashaadka sii badanaya, wax-soo-saar dhaqaale (economic productivity) wuu yaraadaa.

Marka dakhliga dawladdu hoos u dhaco, hoggaamiyeyaashu waxay mar kale kordhiyaan cashuuraha, taas oo sii xumaysa hoos-u-dhac dhaqaale (economic decline). Sidaas ayuu u samaysmaa wareeg burbur dhaqaale iyo daciifnimo siyaasadeed.

𝑰𝒔𝒃𝒆𝒅𝒅𝒆𝒍𝒌𝒂 𝑱𝒊𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒍𝒌𝒂 𝒊𝒚𝒐 𝑩𝒖𝒓𝒃𝒖𝒓𝒌𝒂 𝑩𝒐𝒒𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒐𝒐𝒚𝒐𝒐𝒚𝒊𝒏𝒌𝒂 (𝑮𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒑𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑬𝒎𝒑𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒔)

Qodob muhiim ah oo ka mid ah aragtida 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 waa in dawladuhu maraan marxalado ku salaysan isbeddelka jiilalka (generational transformation). 𝑱𝒊𝒊𝒍𝒌𝒂 𝒌𝒐𝒐𝒘𝒂𝒂𝒅 wuxuu awoodda ku dhisaa halgan, geesinimo, iyo Casabiyad adag. Waxay leeyihiin nidaam, karti militari, iyo xidhiidh dhow oo bulshada ah.

𝑱𝒊𝒊𝒍𝒌𝒂 𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒂𝒂𝒅 wuxuu dhaxlaa awoodda iyo barwaaqadii ay abuureen kuwii ka horreeyay. Inkasta oo ay weli xasuustaan dhibkii hore, haddana waxay bilaabaan inay u janjeedhaan dhinaca raaxada iyo nolol dabacsan.

𝗝𝗶𝗶𝗹𝗸𝗮 𝘀𝗮𝗱𝗱𝗲𝘅𝗮𝗮𝗱𝗻𝗮 wuxuu si buuxda ula qabsadaa mudnaanta iyo raaxada. Iyaga oo aan waligood la kulmin halgankii hore, waxay lumiyaan nidaamkii, adkaysigii, iyo Casabiyaddii lagama maarmaanka u ahayd sii jiritaanka dawladda.

Marxaladdan, dawladdu waxay u nuglaataa kooxo cusub oo leh Casabiyad ka xooggan. Kooxo cusub oo kasoo baxa meelaha durugsan ayaa ugu dambayn beddela boqortooyada sii daciifaysa, waxaana dib u bilaabma wareeg taariikheed (historical cycle) cusub.

𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝒊𝒚𝒐 𝑨𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒕𝒊𝒅𝒂 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 : 𝑮𝒖𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒉𝒂, 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒉𝒂, 𝒊𝒚𝒐 𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍𝒌𝒂 𝑫𝒐𝒘𝒍𝒂𝒅𝒏𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒂 (𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 ’𝒔 𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒐𝒓𝒚: 𝑺𝒖𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔, 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌𝒔, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒖𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒅)

Marka xaaladda 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 lagu eego aragtida 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 , 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 waxay noqotaa tusaale xiiso leh oo muujinaya sida 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒚𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒂 — isku-duubnida bulshada ama wadajirka bulshada (social cohesion or collective solidarity) — ay u noqon karto saldhigga dhismaha dawladnimo (statehood) iyo xasilloonida siyaasadeed (political stability). Muddo ka badan soddon sano, 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 waxay ku guulaysatay inay dhisto nidaam siyaasadeed iyo maamul dowladeed (state administration) gudaha kasoo unkamay, xilli gobolka Geeska Afrika uu la daalaa dhacayay burbur, dagaallo, iyo kala daadsanaan siyaasadeed.

Guusha ugu weyn ee 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 waxay ahayd inay samayso nidaam isku dhafan oo mideeya dhaqanka bulshada iyo hay’adaha casriga ah. Golaha guurtida, shir-beeleedyadii dib-u-heshiisiinta, iyo dhaqanka wada-tashigu waxay abuureen wadajir bulsho (collective unity) iyo sharciyadda siyaasadeed (political legitimacy) oo horseeday dib-u-dhis dawladnimo. Tani waxay si weyn ula jaanqaadaysaa aragtida 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 ee ah in dawladuhu ku dhashaan Casabiyad adag iyo awood bulsho oo mideysan.

Bulshada 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 waxay dagaalkii kadib yeelatay dareen guud oo ku salaysan 𝗯𝗮𝗱𝗯𝗮𝗮𝗱𝗼 𝘄𝗮𝗱𝗮𝗷𝗶𝗿 𝗮𝗵, 𝗻𝗮𝗯𝗮𝗱, 𝗶𝘆𝗼 𝗱𝗶𝗯-𝘂-𝗱𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗾𝗮𝗿𝗮𝗻. Dareenkaasi wuxuu noqday xoog bulsheed (social force) u suurtogeliyay bulshada inay dhisto ciidamo, hay’ado dowladeed, doorashooyin, iyo nidaam sharci. Sida uu qabo 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 , dawlad kasta oo guulaysata waxay marka hore ku dhalataa 𝒊𝒔𝒌𝒖-𝒅𝒖𝒖𝒃𝒏𝒊 𝒃𝒖𝒍𝒔𝒉𝒆𝒆𝒅 (𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚), 𝒏𝒂𝒇-𝒉𝒖𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒎𝒐 (𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇-𝒔𝒂𝒄𝒓𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆), iyo 𝒖𝒋𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒅𝒐 𝒘𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒋𝒊𝒓 𝒂𝒉 (𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒖𝒓𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒆). 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 waxay si cad u muujisay arrintaas.

Dhanka kale, aragtida 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 waxay sidoo kale bixisaa 𝒅𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒊𝒏𝒐 𝒎𝒖𝒉𝒊𝒊𝒎 𝒂𝒉 oo ku saabsan mustaqbalka 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱.

𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 waxa uu aaminsanaa in dawladaha marka ay gaadhaan xasillooni iyo barwaaqo dhaqaale (economic prosperity), ay si tartiib tartiib ah u bilaabaan inay lumiyaan Casabiyaddii iyo wadajirkii bulshada ee markii hore horseeday guusha. Calaamadahaas qaar ayaa maanta laga dareemi karaa 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱.

Mid ka mid ah khataraha ugu waaweyn 𝒘𝒂𝒂 𝒎𝒖𝒔𝒖𝒒𝒎𝒂𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒒 𝒔𝒊𝒚𝒂𝒂𝒔𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒆𝒅 (𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒖𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) iyo 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒘𝒐𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒂 𝒔𝒊𝒚𝒂𝒂𝒔𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒆𝒅 (𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓) mararka qaarkood loo adeegsado dano gaar ah halkii ay ka ahaan lahayd danta guud. 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 waxa uu ka digayay in marka hoggaamiyeyaashu ku mashquulaan raaxo, dano shakhsiyadeed, iyo tartan awoodeed, ay daciifto Casabiyaddii ilaalinaysay dawladnimada. Haddii nidaamka siyaasadeed uu noqdo mid ku salaysan 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒒𝒔𝒊𝒚𝒂𝒂𝒅, 𝒒𝒂𝒃𝒚𝒂𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒅 𝒔𝒊𝒚𝒂𝒂𝒔𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒚𝒔𝒂𝒏, 𝒂𝒎𝒂 𝒌𝒐𝒐𝒙𝒐 𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒐 𝒈𝒂𝒂𝒓 𝒂𝒉 𝒍𝒆𝒉 , waxa sii daciifaya wadajirkii bulshada ee ay kadhalatay dhisayna 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱.

Sidoo kale, kala 𝒒𝒂𝒚𝒃𝒔𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒂𝒏 𝒃𝒖𝒍𝒔𝒉𝒆𝒆𝒅 (𝒔𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) iyo murannada siyaasadeed ee sii xoogaysanaya waxay noqon karaan calaamado muujinaya hoos-u-dhac siyaasadeed (political decline) haddii aan si taxaddar leh loo maareyn. Inkasta oo tartanka siyaasadeed iyo dimuqraadiyaddu ay yihiin astaamo caafimaad qaba, haddana marka khilaafaadka siyaasadeed isu beddelaan colaad bulsho ama qabyaalad, waxay dhaawici karaan isku-duubnida bulshada ama wadajirka bulshada (social cohesion or collective solidarity).

Arrin kale oo muhiim ah oo 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 ka digayay waa isbeddelka 𝗷𝗶𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗹𝗸𝗮 (𝗴𝗲𝗻𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗻𝘀𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻). Jiilkii dib-u-dhiska sameeyay wuxuu lahaa naf-hurnimo (self-sacrifice), adkaysi bulsho (social resilience), iyo dareen qaran oo xooggan. Hase yeeshee, jiilasha cusub ee ku koray xasilloonida iyo nidaamka jira waxa laga yaabaa inay si tartiib tartiib ah uga fogaadaan dareenka wadajirka ahaa ee dhisay 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱. Haddii aan la xoojin 𝒂𝒒𝒐𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒂 𝒒𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒏, 𝒏𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒂𝒎𝒌𝒂 𝒂𝒌𝒉𝒍𝒂𝒂𝒒𝒆𝒆𝒅 (𝒎𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓), 𝒊𝒚𝒐 𝒌𝒂 𝒒𝒂𝒚𝒃𝒈𝒂𝒍𝒌𝒂 𝒅𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒚𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒂, waxa daciifi kara saldhigii bulshada ee dawladnimadu ku taagnayd.

Arrin kale oo muhiim ah oo 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 ka digayay waa isbeddelka 𝗷𝗶𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗹𝗸𝗮 (𝗴𝗲𝗻𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗻𝘀𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻). Jiilkii dib-u-dhiska Somaliland sameeyay wuxuu lahaa naf-hurnimo (self-sacrifice), adkaysi bulsho (social resilience), iyo dareen qaran oo xooggan. Waxay ahaayeen jiil kasoo baxay dagaal, burbur, iyo xaalado adag, taas oo ku abuurtay isku-duubni bulsheed iyo masuuliyad wadajir ah.

Hase yeeshee, jiilasha cusub ee ku koray nabadda, xasilloonida, iyo nidaamka dowladeed ee jira waxa laga yaabaa inay si tartiib tartiib ah uga fogaadaan dareenka wadajirka ahaa ee saldhigga u ahaa dhismaha Somaliland. Jiilashani ma aysan soo marin dhibkii iyo halgankii ay soo mareen jiilkii hore, sidaas darteed waxa dhici karta inay yaraato qiimaynta ay siinayaan wadajirka bulshada, qaranimada, iyo ilaalinta dowladnimada.

Marka aragtida Ibn Khaldun lagu dabaqo Somaliland, isbeddelka jiilalka laguma cabbiro oo keliya tirada sannadaha ay Somaliland jirtay, balse waxa lagu cabbiraa sida ay isu beddeleen jiilashii dhisay, xoojiyay, iyo kuwa maanta maamulaya nidaamka dowladnimo.

Haddii aynu qaadanno in jiil siyaasadeed uu celcelis ahaan yahay 𝒒𝒊𝒚𝒂𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒊 25 𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒂 30 𝒔𝒂𝒏𝒐, Somaliland oo dib ula soo noqotay dowladnimadeeda sannadkii 1991 waxay maanta ku dhowdahay dhammaadka jiilkii koowaad ama bilowga jiilka labaad ee aragtida Ibn Khaldun.

𝑱𝒊𝒊𝒍𝒌𝒂 𝒌𝒐𝒐𝒘𝒂𝒂𝒅 (1991–2020 𝒌𝒖 𝒅𝒉𝒐𝒘𝒂𝒂𝒅) wuxuu ahaa jiilkii dib-u-dhiska iyo badbaadinta qaranka. Waxay lahaayeen Casabiyad adag (strong social cohesion), naf-hurnimo, dareen qaran, dib-u-heshiisiin, iyo awood ay ku dhisaan hay’adaha dowladeed. Jiilkani wuxuu kasoo baxay dagaal iyo burbur, taas oo si weyn ugu dhow marxaladdii koowaad ee Ibn Khaldun sharxay, halkaas oo dawladnimadu ku dhalato isku-duubni bulsheed iyo halgan wadajir ah.

𝑱𝒊𝒊𝒍𝒌𝒂 𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒂𝒂𝒅 (2020-𝒎𝒆𝒆𝒚𝒂𝒅𝒂 𝒊𝒚𝒐 𝒘𝒊𝒙𝒊𝒊 𝒌𝒂 𝒅𝒂𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒚𝒂) waa jiil ku koray xasillooni iyo nidaam dowladeed oo jira. Waxay dhaxleen hay’ado dowladeed, doorashooyin, nabad, iyo maamul shaqaynaya. Si kastaba ha ahaatee, waxa sidoo kale soo muuqan kara tartan siyaasadeed oo xooggan, musuqmaasuq, qabyaalad siyaasadaysan, iyo daciifnimada dareenka wadajirka ah.

Sidaas darteed, marka laga eego aragtida Ibn Khaldun, Somaliland wali kuma jirto marxalad burbur ama hoos-u-dhac buuxa, balse waxay ku jirtaa marxalad muhiim ah oo lagu qiimaynayo in Casabiyaddii iyo wadajirkii bulshada ee dhisay dowladnimada la sii ilaalin karo iyo in kale.

Farqiga weyn ee Somaliland u dhexeeya dawladihii uu Ibn Khaldun ka hadlay ayaa ah in Somaliland leedahay nidaam doorasho, hay’ado casri ah, warbaahin, bulsho rayid ah, iyo nidaam isku dhafan oo mideeya dhaqanka iyo dowladnimada casriga ah. Arrimahaas ayaa dib u dhigi kara ama xitaa jebin kara wareegga burburka ee uu Ibn Khaldun sharxay haddii si wanaagsan loo maareeyo.

Sidaas darteed, haddii aan si joogto ah loo xoojin 𝒂𝒒𝒐𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒂 𝒒𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒏, 𝒏𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒂𝒎𝒌𝒂 𝒂𝒌𝒉𝒍𝒂𝒂𝒒𝒆𝒆𝒅 (𝒎𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓), 𝒘𝒂𝒙𝒃𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒅𝒂 𝒘𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒚𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒂, iyo 𝒌𝒂 𝒒𝒂𝒚𝒃𝒈𝒂𝒍𝒌𝒂 𝒅𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒚𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒂 𝒆𝒆 𝒔𝒊𝒚𝒂𝒂𝒔𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒂 iyo 𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒖𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒂 𝒃𝒖𝒍𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒅𝒂 , waxa si tartiib tartiib ah u daciifi kara saldhigii bulshada ee ay ku taagnayd dowladnimada Somaliland.

Dhaqaalaha 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 sidoo kale waxa uu ku jiraa meel muhiim ah marka laga eego aragtida 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 . Wuxuu aaminsanaa in maamul-xumo dhaqaale (economic mismanagement), cashuuro aan caddaalad ahayn, iyo nidaam maamul oo aad u ballaadhan oo ay maamulaan tiro badan oo mas’uuliyiin ahi (𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒃𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒖𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒚). ee sii fidaya ay dhaawacaan wax-soo-saar dhaqaale (economic productivity) iyo kalsoonida shacabka. 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱, korodhka shaqo la’aanta, saboolnimada, iyo ku-tiirsanaanta dhaqaale ee dibadda waxay noqon karaan khataro sii daciifiya xasilloonida mustaqbalka haddii aan la helin horumar bulsheed (social development) iyo fursado dhaqaale oo waara.

Si kastaba ha ahaatee, 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 waxay leedahay faa’iidooyin muhiim ah oo ay kaga badbaadi karto wareegga burburka ee 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 sharxay. Midda ugu weyn waa in bulshada 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 wali leedahay 𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒒𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒏 iyo 𝒘𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒋𝒊𝒓 𝒃𝒖𝒍𝒔𝒉𝒐 oo 𝒌𝒂 𝒙𝒐𝒐𝒈𝒈𝒂𝒏 𝒅𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒍 𝒃𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒏 𝒐𝒐 𝒈𝒐𝒃𝒐𝒍𝒌𝒂 𝒂𝒉 . Sidoo kale, 𝒅𝒉𝒂𝒒𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒂 𝒘𝒂𝒅𝒂-𝒕𝒂𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒂, 𝒙𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒂 𝒌𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒂𝒇𝒂𝒂𝒅𝒌𝒂, iyo 𝒏𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒂𝒎𝒌𝒂 𝒊𝒔𝒌𝒖 𝒅𝒉𝒂𝒇𝒂𝒏 𝒆𝒆 𝒅𝒉𝒂𝒒𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒂 𝒊𝒚𝒐 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒄𝒊𝒚𝒂𝒅𝒂 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒂 𝒂𝒉𝒊 waxay 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 siinayaan awood ay ku ilaalin karto sharciyadda siyaasadeed (political legitimacy) iyo xasilloonida.

Aragtida 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 marka lagu dabaqo 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 waxay muujinaysaa 𝗹𝗮𝗯𝗮 𝘅𝗮𝗾𝗶𝗶𝗾𝗼 𝗼𝗼 𝘄𝗮𝗮𝘄𝗲𝘆𝗻. 𝑴𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒂 𝒌𝒐𝒐𝒘𝒂𝒂𝒅 waa in guusha 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 ay ka dhalatay Casabiyad adag, wadajir bulsho (collective unity), iyo rabitaanka bulshada ee dib-u-dhis qaran. 𝑴𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒂 𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒂𝒂𝒅𝒏𝒂 waa in sii jiritaanka guushaasi uu ku xidhan yahay awoodda 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 u leedahay inay ilaaliso midnimada bulshada, la dagaallanto musuqmaasuqa, xoojiso caddaaladda, isla markaana jiilasha cusub ku beerato dareenka qaranimo iyo masuuliyadda wadajirka ah.

Sida uu qabo 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 , dawladaha ma burburaan marka ay daciifaan militarigoodu oo keliya, balse waxay burburaan marka ay daciifto Casabiyaddii iyo isku-duubnidii bulshada ee markii hore dhistay awooddaas. 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 maanta waxay taagan tahay marxalad ay guusheedii hore isu beddeli karto laba waddo: 𝒎𝒊𝒅 horseeda sii xoojinta dowladnimada (statehood) iyo horumar siyaasadeed (political development), 𝒂𝒎𝒂 𝒎𝒊𝒅 si tartiib tartiib ah ugu riixda kala qaybsanaan iyo daciifnimo siyaasadeed. Mustaqbalka 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 wuxuu sidaas darteed ku xidhan yahay awoodda ay u leedahay inay ilaaliso 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒚𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒂 iyo wadajirka bulshada ee ahaa saldhigga guusheeda.

𝑮𝒖𝒏𝒂𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒅 (𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏)

Aragtida 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 ee guusha iyo guuldarrada dawladuhu waxay ka mid tahay aragtiyihii ugu qotada dheeraa ee lagu sharxay horumar siyaasadeed (political development) iyo horumarka ilbaxnimada (civilizational development). Bartamaha aragtidiisa waxa ku jirta 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒚𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒂 — isku-duubnida bulshada ama wadajirka bulshada (social cohesion or collective solidarity) — taas oo uu u arkayay awoodda ugu muhiimsan ee ka dambaysa awoodda siyaasadeed (political power), guusha militariga, iyo horumarka bulshada.

Sida uu qabo 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 , dawladuhu way guulaystaan marka ay leeyihiin midnimo bulsheed (social unity), hoggaan nidaamsan, wax-soo-saar dhaqaale (economic productivity), midnimo militari (military cohesion), iyo sharciyadda siyaasadeed (political legitimacy). Hase yeeshee, barwaaqada iyo raaxadu waxay si tartiib tartiib ah u daciifiyaan saldhigyadan, taas oo horseedda musuqmaasuq siyaasadeed (political corruption), kala qaybsanaan bulsheed (social fragmentation), iyo hoos-u-dhac siyaasadeed (political decline).

𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 waxa uu aaminsanaa in awoodda siyaasadeed (political power) ay ka dhalato midnimo iyo naf-hurnimo (self-sacrifice), laakiin guusha lafteedu ay ugu dambayn wiiqdo isku-duubnidii horseeday awooddaas. Sidaas darteed, taariikhdu waxay noqotaa wareegga ilbaxnimada (cycle of civilization) oo joogto ah — xoog iyo daciifnimo, koritaan iyo burbur, ilbaxnimo iyo hoos-u-dhac.

Marka aragtidan lagu dabaqo 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱, waxa muuqata in guusha 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 ay si weyn ugu xidhnayd Casabiyad adag, wadajir bulsho (collective unity), iyo rabitaanka bulshada ee dib-u-dhis qaran. Sidoo kale, waxa muuqata in mustaqbalka 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱 uu ku xidhan yahay awoodda ay u leedahay inay ilaaliso isku-duubnida bulshada, xoojiso caddaaladda, la dagaallanto musuqmaasuqa, isla markaana jiilasha cusub ku beerato dareen qaran iyo masuuliyad wadajir ah.

Inkasta oo uu noolaa qarnigii afraad iyo tobnaad, fikirrada 𝐈𝐛𝐧 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐮𝐧 ee ku saabsan hoggaanka, Casabiyadda, sharciyadda siyaasadeed (political legitimacy), iyo dhismaha dawladaha (state formation) ayaa weli saamayn weyn ku leh fahamka casriga ah ee siyaasadda, bulshada, iyo ilbaxnimooyinka.

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وليس لإثارة الضجيج.

وليس للمزايدة على أحد.

بل لكشف التناقضات.

وكشف المعايير المزدوجة.

وكشف المسافة الهائلة بين الخطاب المعلن...

والواقع الذي تحاولون إخفاءه.

هذا الخطاب ليس عن فلسطين وحدها.

وليس عن القدس وحدها.

بل عن الصدق السياسي.

وعن ازدواجية المعايير.

وعن أولئك الذين يتحدثون باسم المبادئ أمام الكاميرات...

ثم يتصرفون بمنطق المصالح خلف الأبواب المغلقة.

واليوم...

حين تتحدثون عن أرض الصومال...

وتوزعون الاتهامات...

وتُلقون المحاضرات...

فإن من حقنا أن نسأل:

من يتحدث؟

وبأي تاريخ يتحدث؟

وبأي سجلٍ سياسي يتحدث؟

أولاً: مصر... بلدك التي تتحدث باسمي

دعنا نبدأ من القاهرة.

من مصر.

من الدولة التي تتحدث اليوم وكأنها وصية على القضية الفلسطينية.

دعنا نبدأ من التاريخ.

من الحقائق.

من الوقائع التي لا يستطيع أحد إنكارها.

أنور السادات.

أول رئيس عربي يزور تل أبيب.

أول رئيس عربي يقف أمام الكنيست.

أول رئيس عربي يوقّع معاهدة سلام مع إسرائيل عام 1979.

هذه ليست اتهامات.

هذه حقائق.

هذه وثائق.

هذا تاريخ مكتوب لا يمكن محوه.

السادات لم يزر إسرائيل سراً.

لم يلتقِ الإسرائيليين في الظلام.

لم يخفِ علاقاته.

بل وقف أمام العالم كله.

وتحدث.

ووقّع.

وأعلن.

ثم تأتي اليوم...

بعد كل ذلك...

لتسألني عن التطبيع؟

وتُحاضر عليّ في العلاقات الدولية؟

وتُحاكم أرض الصومال لأنها تبحث عن مصالحها الوطنية؟

قبل أن تسألني...

اسأل تاريخك.

قبل أن تُحاكم غيرك...

حاسب نفسك.

معبر رفح... والحقيقة التي لا تُقال كاملة

ثم تتحدثون عن رفح.

عن المعبر.

عن غزة.

عن الحصار.

لكن السؤال الذي لا يُطرح كثيراً هو:

ما حقيقة هذا الواقع؟

تتحدثون وكأن القضية بسيطة.

وكأن المسؤوليات واضحة.

وكأن التاريخ بدأ بالأمس.

لكن الواقع أكثر تعقيداً.

وأكثر تشابكاً.

وأكثر امتلاءً بالتنسيق والترتيبات والاتفاقيات مما تريدون الاعتراف به أمام الجماهير.

ولهذا...

حين تتحدثون عن غزة...

وحين تتحدثون عن الحصار...

وحين تتحدثون عن المعاناة...

فإن السؤال يجب أن يُطرح على الجميع.

لا على طرف واحد فقط.

ولا على من لا يملك القرار وحده.

ثانياً: قطر... الدولة التي تدفع راتبك

والآن...

دعنا ننتقل إلى الدوحة.

إلى الدولة التي تبث منها.

إلى الدولة التي تدفع راتبك.

إلى الدولة التي تُشغّل الكاميرات التي تخاطبنا من خلالها.

قاعدة العديد.

أكبر قاعدة عسكرية أمريكية في الشرق الأوسط.

ليست إشاعة.

وليست نظرية مؤامرة.

وليست رواية سياسية.

إنها حقيقة قائمة على الأرض.

يراها الجميع.

ويعرفها الجميع.

ومع ذلك...

تستمر الخطب.

وتستمر الدموع.

وتستمر الشعارات.

الجزيرة تبكي على فلسطين نهاراً.

وفي الوقت نفسه...

تستضيف الدولة التي تبث منها أكبر حضور عسكري أمريكي في المنطقة.

أي مفارقة هذه؟

أي تناقض هذا؟

وأي خطاب هذا الذي يطلب من الآخرين ما لا يطلبه من نفسه؟

المكاتب الإسرائيلية واللغة المزدوجة

وفي الدوحة...

توجد مكاتب إسرائيلية.

يُقال إنها ليست سفارة.

ويُقال إنها مجرد مكاتب.

ويُقال إنها ترتيبات مختلفة.

لكن السؤال يبقى:

هل تغيير الاسم يغيّر الحقيقة؟

هل يصبح الشيء مختلفاً لمجرد أننا اخترنا له تسمية أخرى؟

هذه هي المشكلة.

ليست في الأسماء.

بل في محاولة تجميل الوقائع.

وفي محاولة تقديم الشيء نفسه للجمهور بأوصاف مختلفة.

ثالثاً: السبعة الذين سبقونا

دعونا نتحدث بصراحة.

وبهدوء.

وبدون شعارات.

مصر اعترفت.

الأردن اعترف.

الإمارات اعترفت.

البحرين اعترفت.

المغرب اعترف.

السودان وقّع.

ودول أخرى أقامت أشكالاً مختلفة من العلاقات.

هذه ليست أسراراً.

بل سياسات معلنة.

وموثقة.

ومعروفة.

لكن المثير للاهتمام...

ليس ما فعلته تلك الدول.

بل كيف يُنظر إلى الفعل نفسه عندما يصدر من أطراف مختلفة.

حين تقوم دولة كبيرة بذلك...

يسمونه واقعية سياسية.

وحين تقوم دولة أخرى بذلك...

يسمونه خيانة.

هنا تكمن المشكلة الحقيقية.

ليست المشكلة في الفعل.

بل في هوية الفاعل.

أردوغان... والزيارة التي لا يريد البعض تذكّرها

وأما أردوغان...

فدعونا نتحدث عنه أيضاً.

بعيداً عن الخطابات.

وبعيداً عن الشعارات.

وبعيداً عن التصفيق.

أردوغان زار إسرائيل عام 2005.

نعم...

زار إسرائيل.

التقى شارون.

وقف في “ياد فاشيم”.

وتجوّل في الأراضي التي تتحدثون عنها اليوم باسم القضية الفلسطينية.

ثم عاد ليقول:

“لم أزر القدس.”

لم يزر القدس؟

وكأن القدس ليست فلسطين.

وكأن فلسطين تنتهي عند أبواب القدس.

وكأن زيارة إسرائيل لا تعني المرور بقضية القدس نفسها.

تلك هي الازدواجية التي تحاولون إخفاءها.

لكن التاريخ لا ينسى.

ولا تمحوه الخطب.

ولا تمحوه الشعارات.

ولا تمحوه حملات العلاقات العامة.

الملك حسين... وعبدالله بن زايد... وغيرهما

وقبل ذلك...

زار الملك حسين إسرائيل بعد معاهدة وادي عربة.

وبعد ذلك...

زار عبدالله بن زايد إسرائيل.

والعلاقات مستمرة.

والاتفاقيات مستمرة.

والتفاهمات مستمرة.

لكن الغريب...

أن من فعل كل ذلك بالأمس...

يأتي اليوم ليُحاضر على الآخرين.

ويُوزّع شهادات الوطنية.

ويُصدر أحكام الخيانة.

وكأن الذاكرة قد ماتت.

وكأن التاريخ قد اختفى.

وكأن الشعوب لا تتذكر.

رابعاً: الإبادة الجماعية... والسؤال الذي يهرب منه الجميع

والآن...

دعونا ننتقل إلى غزة.

إلى الأطفال.

إلى الضحايا.

إلى الدمار.

إلى الصور التي هزّت ضمير العالم.

تسألني عن غزة؟

تسألني عن المجازر؟

تسألني عن الأطفال الذين يُقتلون تحت الأنقاض؟

حسناً...

دعنا نسأل السؤال كاملاً.

لا نصف السؤال.

ولا الجزء الذي يناسب الرواية السياسية.

إذا كانت غزة تنزف اليوم...

فمن الذي شارك في بناء الواقع الذي أوصلها إلى هذه المرحلة؟

من الذي وقّع الاتفاقيات؟

من الذي فتح العلاقات؟

من الذي حافظ على منظومات التنسيق لعقود طويلة؟

من الذي قرر أن يجعل القضية الفلسطينية ملفاً يُدار لا قضية تُحل؟

هذه أسئلة لا تُطرح كثيراً.

لأنها محرجة.

ولأنها تفتح أبواباً لا يريد كثيرون فتحها.

الإبادة الجماعية في غزة ليست مشهداً ظهر بالأمس.

وليست حدثاً بدأ هذا الصباح.

بل نتيجة مسار طويل.

ومعقد.

ومتشابك.

ساهمت فيه أطراف كثيرة.

بدرجات مختلفة.

وبأشكال مختلفة.

ثم يأتي البعض اليوم...

لينظر إلى أرض الصومال...

ويطلب منها أن تتحمل مسؤولية ما لم تصنعه.

وما لم تشارك فيه.

وما لم تكن طرفاً فيه أصلاً.

أرض الصومال لم توقع اتفاقية سلام مع إسرائيل.

أرض الصومال لم تُغلق حدودها أمام الفلسطينيين.

أرض الصومال لم تشارك في إدارة هذا الملف طوال العقود الماضية.

فلماذا يُوجّه السؤال إليها؟

ولماذا لا يُوجّه إلى أولئك الذين كانوا جزءاً من المشهد منذ البداية؟

إذا كانت هناك مساءلة...

فينبغي أن تشمل الجميع.

أما الانتقائية...

فليست عدالة.

وليست أخلاقاً.

وليست سياسة نزيهة.

خامساً: الأخوة الإسلامية... بين الشعار والواقع

يتحدثون كثيراً عن الأخوة الإسلامية.

عن الوحدة.

عن التضامن.

عن الأمة الواحدة.

عن المصير المشترك.

كلمات جميلة.

ومؤثرة.

وتلامس مشاعر الملايين.

لكن السؤال الحقيقي هو:

أين تبدأ هذه الأخوة؟

وأين تنتهي؟

هل هي مبدأ ثابت؟

أم أداة سياسية تُستخدم عند الحاجة؟

إذا كانت الأخوة الإسلامية معياراً...

فينبغي أن تكون للجميع.

وفي كل القضايا.

وفي كل الأوقات.

أما إذا كانت تُرفع في وجه طرف...

وتُخفى عندما يتعلق الأمر بطرف آخر...

فهنا تتحول من قيمة أخلاقية إلى أداة سياسية.

أين كانت هذه الأخوة عندما أُغلقت الحدود؟

أين كانت عندما فُرضت القيود؟

أين كانت عندما غلبت الحسابات السياسية على المبادئ المعلنة؟

إن الشعوب لم تعد تكتفي بالشعارات.

الشعوب تنظر إلى الأفعال.

والتاريخ يحكم على الوقائع.

لا على الخطب.

ولا على البيانات.

ولا على المؤتمرات الصحفية.

ولهذا...

لا تخدعوا المسلمين باسم الدين.

ولا تجعلوا من الأخوة الإسلامية شعاراً يُستخدم انتقائياً.

فالأمة تدرك.

والتاريخ يسجل.

والحقائق تبقى.

سادساً: التاريخ الذي لا يريدون تذكّره

يتحدثون عن التاريخ.

عن المقدسات.

عن الذاكرة.

عن المواقف التاريخية.

لكن المشكلة ليست في الحديث عن التاريخ.

المشكلة في اختيار أجزاء منه.

وفي تجاهل أجزاء أخرى.

يتذكرون ما يخدم روايتهم.

وينسون ما يربكها.

يتذكرون ما يمنحهم شرعية الخطاب.

وينسون ما يفضح التناقضات.

دعونا نكن صريحين.

كم من التحالفات عُقدت في التاريخ؟

كم من الصفقات تمت؟

كم من الاتفاقيات وُقّعت بعيداً عن أعين الشعوب؟

كم من القضايا الكبرى تم التعامل معها بمنطق المصالح لا بمنطق الشعارات؟

هذا ليس سراً.

بل جزء من تاريخ المنطقة كلها.

لكن المشكلة أن البعض يريد استخدام التاريخ كسلاح.

لا كحقيقة.

يريدون منه ما يخدمهم.

ولا يريدون منه ما يُحاسبهم.

ولهذا يصبح التاريخ عندهم انتقائياً.

نصف ذاكرة.

ونصف حقيقة.

ونصف رواية.

أما الحقيقة الكاملة...

فغالباً ما يتم تجاهلها.

سابعاً: أرض الصومال... من نحن؟

والآن...

دعونا نتحدث عن أرض الصومال.

بعيداً عن الشعارات.

وبعيداً عن الحملات الإعلامية.

وبعيداً عن الصور النمطية.

من نحن؟

لسنا دولة وُلدت بالأمس.

ولسنا مشروعاً مؤقتاً.

ولسنا حالة عابرة في التاريخ.

نحن شعب.

نحن مجتمع.

نحن تجربة سياسية قائمة منذ عقود.

في السادس والعشرين من يونيو عام 1960...

استقلت أرض الصومال.

واعترفت بها دول عديدة.

ثم دخلت في اتحاد سياسي مع الصومال الإيطالي السابق.

ذلك الاتحاد الذي انهار لاحقاً.

وحين انهار...

استعادت أرض الصومال سيادتها.

واستعادت مؤسساتها.

واستعادت مشروعها الوطني.

منذ ذلك الحين...

لم ننتظر أحداً ليبني دولتنا.

ولم ننتظر أحداً ليصنع استقرارنا.

بل بنينا مؤسساتنا بأيدينا.

وسط ظروف صعبة.

وفي بيئة إقليمية معقدة.

ورغم محدودية الموارد.

حققنا انتقالات سلمية للسلطة.

وأجرينا انتخابات.

وشكلنا مؤسسات تشريعية.

وبنينا أجهزة قضائية.

وطورنا قوات أمنية.

وحافظنا على قدر كبير من الاستقرار.

بينما كانت مناطق كثيرة في الإقليم تعيش الحروب والانهيارات.

كنا نبني.

بهدوء.

وبصبر.

وبإصرار.

دولة تُبنى بالمؤسسات لا بالشعارات

لدينا برلمان.

ولدينا حكومة.

ولدينا قضاء.

ولدينا مؤسسات تعمل.

وقد تختلف الآراء حولها.

وقد تواجه التحديات.

لكنها موجودة.

وتؤدي وظائفها.

وهذا ما يصنع الدول.

ليس الخطابات.

ولا البيانات.

ولا المؤتمرات.

بل المؤسسات.

والاستقرار.

والقدرة على إدارة الأرض والسكان.

بربرة... نموذج البناء لا البكاء

انظروا إلى بربرة.

إلى الميناء.

إلى المشاريع.

إلى الاستثمارات.

إلى البنية التحتية التي تتطور.

بينما ينشغل البعض بإصدار البيانات...

تنشغل أرض الصومال ببناء الطرق.

وتطوير الموانئ.

وجذب الاستثمارات.

وخلق فرص العمل.

هذه هي اللغة التي نفهمها.

لغة البناء.

لغة الإنجاز.

لغة الدولة.

ولهذا...

بينما يبكي البعض أمام الكاميرات...

نحن نبني على الأرض.

وبينما ينشغل البعض بالشعارات...

نحن ننشغل بالمؤسسات.

وبينما ينتظر البعض الإذن من الآخرين...

نحن نصنع مستقبلنا بأنفسنا.

ثامناً: الاعتراف الإسرائيلي... والحديث الذي يهرب منه الجميع

والآن...

دعونا نتحدث بصراحة.

بلا مواربة.

وبلا شعارات.

وبلا محاولة لتجميل الكلمات.

يتحدثون عن الاعتراف الإسرائيلي وكأنه نهاية العالم.

وكأنه حدث غير مسبوق في المنطقة.

وكأنه أمر لم تعرفه السياسة الدولية من قبل.

لكن الحقيقة مختلفة.

الدول لا تتحرك بالعواطف.

ولا تُبنى سياساتها على الأمنيات.

الدول تتحرك بالمصالح.

وهذه ليست شتيمة.

وليست جريمة.

وليست تهمة.

بل قاعدة أساسية في العلاقات الدولية.

قاعدة يعرفها كل دبلوماسي.

وكل سياسي.

وكل دارس للعلاقات بين الدول.

ولهذا...

حين تلتقي المصالح...

تنشأ العلاقات.

وحين تتقاطع المصالح...

تنشأ الشراكات.

وحين تتغير المصالح...

تتغير السياسات.

هذا ما تفعله دول العالم كلها.

لكن بعض الدول تمارس ذلك بصراحة.

وبعضها تمارسه في الخفاء.

وبعضها تمارسه ثم تُنكر أنها فعلت.

وهنا يكمن الفرق.

نحن لا ندّعي أن السياسة عمل خيري.

ولا نزعم أن العلاقات الدولية تُدار بالمشاعر.

ولا نقدم المصالح على أنها ملائكة تهبط من السماء.

نقول ببساطة:

الدول تتصرف وفق مصالحها.

كما فعل الآخرون.

وكما يفعلون حتى هذه اللحظة.

تاسعاً: رابطة العالم الإسلامي... والوحدة المزعومة

ثم نأتي إلى البيانات.

إلى الإدانات.

إلى التصريحات التي تصدر من خلف المكاتب المكيفة.

رابطة العالم الإسلامي تتحدث عن الوحدة الصومالية.

عن السيادة.

عن القانون الدولي.

وعن ضرورة احترام الحدود السياسية القائمة.

جميل.

لكن السؤال يبقى:

أين كانت هذه اللغة طوال العقود الماضية؟

أين كانت هذه الحماسة عندما انهارت الدولة الصومالية؟

أين كانت عندما غرقت البلاد في الحرب الأهلية؟

أين كانت عندما تحولت أجزاء واسعة من الصومال إلى ساحات صراع وفوضى؟

أين كانت عندما فقدت الدولة المركزية سيطرتها على الأرض؟

وأين كانت عندما كانت الجماعات المسلحة تضرب في قلب العاصمة؟

لماذا تظهر لغة “الوحدة” اليوم فقط؟

ولماذا تُستدعى الآن تحديداً؟

إذا كانت الوحدة مبدأ...

فينبغي أن تكون مبدأ دائماً.

وإذا كانت السيادة قيمة...

فينبغي الدفاع عنها في كل الحالات.

أما أن تظهر المبادئ في ملف...

وتختفي في ملف آخر...

فهذا ليس دفاعاً عن المبادئ.

بل انتقائية سياسية.

الوحدة التي يتحدثون عنها

أي وحدة هذه؟

هل هي وحدة قائمة بالفعل؟

أم وحدة موجودة فقط في البيانات الرسمية؟

هل الوحدة تُقاس بالشعارات؟

أم بالمؤسسات؟

أم بالقدرة على إدارة الأرض والسكان؟

هذه أسئلة مشروعة.

ويحق لأي شعب أن يطرحها.

ويحق لأي مراقب أن يبحث عن إجاباتها.

ولهذا...

فإن النقاش الحقيقي يجب أن يكون حول الواقع.

لا حول الأمنيات.

وحول الحقائق.

لا حول الشعارات.

عاشراً: بيان وزراء الخارجية... والقدس المسروقة

ثم جاء البيان.

بيان طويل.

مليء بالكلمات الكبيرة.

مليء بالمصطلحات القانونية.

مليء بالحديث عن القانون الدولي.

وعن القدس المحتلة.

وعن الشرعية.

وعن السيادة.

لكن دعونا نسأل سؤالاً بسيطاً:

أي قانون دولي هذا الذي تتحدثون عنه؟

ومن الذي يطبقه؟

ومن الذي يحترمه؟

ومن الذي يستدعيه فقط عندما يخدم مصالحه؟

في هذا البيان...

اجتمعت دول كثيرة.

كل دولة منها لها تاريخها.

ولها علاقاتها.

ولها اتفاقياتها.

ولها حساباتها السياسية الخاصة.

لكنها اجتمعت على إدانة خطوة واحدة.

خطوة تتعلق بأرض الصومال.

وفجأة...

أصبح القانون الدولي حاضراً بقوة.

وفجأة...

أصبحت السيادة مبدأً مقدساً.

وفجأة...

أصبحت الوحدة السياسية قضية لا تقبل النقاش.

لكن أين كانت هذه الحماسة في ملفات أخرى؟

وأين كانت هذه اللغة في أزمات أخرى؟

هذا هو السؤال.

وليس السؤال الذي يطرحونه علينا.

حادي عشر: السؤال الذي يفضح التناقض

وهنا نصل إلى السؤال الحقيقي.

السؤال الذي لا يريد أحد الإجابة عنه.

إذا كنتم حقاً تدافعون عن القدس...

فلماذا لا تقولون ذلك بوضوح؟

لماذا لا تقولون:

نحن سنُنهي كل أشكال العلاقات مع إسرائيل؟

لماذا لا تقولون:

سنلغي الاتفاقيات القائمة؟

سنغلق السفارات؟

سنوقف التعاون؟

سننهي كل أشكال التواصل؟

لماذا؟

لأن الواقع أكثر تعقيداً من الشعارات.

ولأن المصالح موجودة.

ولأن الحسابات السياسية موجودة.

ولأن الجميع يعرف ذلك.

لكن المشكلة أن بعضهم يريد الاعتراف بهذه الحقيقة عندما تخصه هو فقط.

أما عندما تتعلق بغيره...

فتتحول إلى جريمة.

وهذا هو جوهر التناقض.

ثاني عشر: تركيا والأردن... بين الخطاب والممارسة

دعونا نتحدث بصراحة أكثر.

عن تركيا.

وعن الأردن.

وعن الفرق بين ما يُقال وما يُفعل.

في النهار...

خطب.

وشعارات.

وكلمات كبيرة.

وفي الليل...

مصالح.

وتجارة.

وعلاقات.

وتفاهمات.

هذه ليست اتهامات.

هذه طبيعة السياسة الدولية.

لكن المشكلة ليست هنا.

المشكلة في محاولة تقديم طرف على أنه ملاك.

وتقديم طرف آخر على أنه شيطان.

بينما الجميع يتحرك وفق حساباته ومصالحه.

ولهذا...

ينبغي أن تُقاس المواقف بالأفعال.

لا بالشعارات.

وبالوقائع.

لا بالخطب.

ثالث عشر: أيها المذيع المصري... أنت أيضاً جزء من القصة

أما أنت...

أيها المذيع المصري...

فإن المشكلة ليست في طرح الأسئلة.

بل في طريقة طرحها.

وفي الانتقائية التي تصاحبها.

حين تتحدث عن القانون الدولي...

فتحدث عنه كاملاً.

وحين تتحدث عن العلاقات مع إسرائيل...

فتحدث عنها كاملة.

وحين تتحدث عن فلسطين...

فتحدث عنها بميزان واحد.

لا بميزانين.

لأن الصحافة الحقيقية لا تبدأ من النتيجة التي تريد الوصول إليها.

بل تبدأ من الحقيقة.

حتى لو كانت تلك الحقيقة محرجة.

وحتى لو كانت لا تناسب الرواية الجاهزة.

رابع عشر: الواقعية التي تتاجرون بها

ثم تأتون للحديث عن الواقعية السياسية.

عن المصالح.

عن التوازنات.

عن العالم الذي يتغير.

ونحن لا نختلف معكم.

العالم يتغير.

والمصالح تتغير.

والسياسات تتغير.

لكن السؤال هو:

لماذا تصبح الواقعية “دبلوماسية ذكية” عندما تمارسها بعض الدول؟

وتصبح “خيانة” عندما تمارسها أرض الصومال؟

لماذا يتغير الوصف بينما يبقى الفعل نفسه؟

لماذا تتغير الأحكام بينما تبقى الوقائع واحدة؟

هذا هو السؤال.

وهذا هو لب القضية.

وهذا هو التناقض الذي تحاولون الهروب منه.

خامس عشر: الاحترام الدولي ليس هدية

تتحدثون عن الاحترام الدولي.

عن الشرعية.

عن الاعتراف.

وكأنها هبات تُمنح.

وكأنها جوائز تُوزَّع.

وكأن الشعوب يجب أن تنتظر الإذن لتقرر مصيرها.

لكن الحقيقة مختلفة.

الاستقلال ليس هدية.

والكرامة الوطنية ليست منحة.

والاعتراف ليس صدقة سياسية.

الشعوب لا تُقاس بحجم التصفيق الذي تحصل عليه.

بل بقدرتها على الصمود.

وبقدرتها على البناء.

وبقدرتها على إدارة نفسها.

ولهذا...

نحن لا نبني دولتنا لننال رضا أحد.

ولا نبحث عن الاعتراف لأن الآخرين لطفاء معنا.

بل لأننا نؤمن بحقنا.

ونؤمن بمشروعنا.

ونؤمن بمستقبلنا.

سادس عشر: الكلمة الأخيرة

وفي النهاية...

بعد كل هذه البيانات.

وبعد كل هذه الخطب.

وبعد كل هذه المحاضرات السياسية.

يبقى سؤال واحد.

من الذي يبني؟

ومن الذي يكتفي بالكلام؟

من الذي يطوّر مؤسساته؟

ومن الذي يكتفي بإصدار البيانات؟

من الذي يعمل للمستقبل؟

ومن الذي يعيش على شعارات الماضي؟

أما نحن...

فسنواصل طريقنا.

سنواصل البناء.

سنواصل تطوير مؤسساتنا.

سنواصل البحث عن الشراكات التي تخدم مصالح شعبنا.

وسنواصل الدفاع عن حقنا في تقرير مصيرنا.

ليس بالصراخ.

ولا بالشعارات.

ولا بالانفعالات العابرة.

بل بالعمل.

وبالإنجاز.

وبالدبلوماسية.

وبالإرادة.

لقد تغيّر العالم.

وتغيّر التاريخ.

وتغيّرت موازين كثيرة.

ومن لا يدرك ذلك اليوم...

سيكتشفه غداً.

لكن بعد فوات الأوان.

أما أرض الصومال...

فستواصل المضي إلى الأمام.

بثقة.

وبثبات.

وبإيمان كامل بحقها في أن تكون صاحبة القرار في مستقبلها.

والسلام على من اتبع الهدى.

غوليد يوسف عيدان

Gulaid Goohe Idaan

This article explores the rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, analyzing Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions, the strategic importance of Somaliland, regional sovereignty debates, and the emerging competition shaping the future of the Red Sea order. It further examines how maritime access, regional power projection, and geopolitical realignments are redefining diplomacy, security, and state interests across the region.

At a time when the Horn of Africa is becoming increasingly central to global trade routes, strategic rivalries, and international security calculations, understanding these transformations is essential for scholars, policymakers, and observers of African and international affairs.

I invite friends, colleagues, researchers, diplomats, and all those interested in geopolitics and international relations to read, engage with, and share the article. Your insights and constructive reflections are greatly valued.

Read the full article here:

From Logistics to Sovereignty: Ethiopia’s Evolving Maritime Ambitions & the Fragmenting Red Sea Order

Gulaid Goohe Idaan

This article presents the theoretical and methodological innovations underlying the Archaeology of Peace, a subfield founded by Dr. Sada Mire through two decades of fieldwork across the Horn of Africa. Drawing upon empirical evidence from rock art sites, sacred landscapes, and medieval settlements in Somaliland and Ethiopia, this research demonstrates that sustainable peace constitutes a materially inscribed, ritually reinforced system of governance with deep historical roots. The article introduces two original theoretical frameworks—the Knowledge-Centered Approach and the Ritual Set methodology—and evaluates their implications for heritage studies, post-colonial archaeology, and international peace-building policy. The National Geographic Society-funded NAGI project (2023–present) represents the first systematic archaeological initiative dedicated exclusively to documenting ancient peace practices globally.

Keywords: Archaeology of Peace; indigenous heritage management; sacred landscapes; post-colonial archaeology; Somaliland; Horn of Africa; conflict archaeology; traditional governance; Knowledge-Centered Approach; Ritual Set

1. Introduction: Toward an Archaeology of Sustainable Peace

The archaeological investigation of conflict has produced robust subfields including battlefield archaeology, genocide studies, and heritage destruction analysis However, the systematic study of peace as a material practice, governance structure, and ideological system remained theoretically underdeveloped until Dr. Sada Mire’s intervention. This article argues that peace is not merely the absence of conflict but a prerequisite for sacred fertility—understood as the growth of humans, animals, crops, and social relations—requiring specific material conditions, ritual performances, and landscape inscriptions.

The theoretical innovations presented here emerge from Mire’s positionality as a Somali-Swedish scholar operating at the intersection of Western academic traditions and indigenous knowledge systems. Born in Hargeisa in 1976 and raised in Mogadishu, Mire experienced the collapse of the Somali state firsthand, including the killing of her father, a senior police official, during ethnic cleansing in 1989. Following civil war eruption in 1991, Mire gained asylum in Sweden as a teenager before completing doctoral training at University College London (Mire 2007a, 2007b, 2008, 2011a). This personal history of displacement and return informs the epistemological commitment to understanding how the Horn of Africa maintained peace for 400 years before descending into four decades of conflict—and what the deep past can teach contemporary peace-building efforts.

The article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the Knowledge-Centered Approach and the Ritual Set methodology; Section 3 examines sacred landscapes and the materiality of peace through case studies; Section 4 details the NAGI project and National Geographic sponsorship; Section 5 analyzes rock art evidence; Section 6 discusses indigenous governance systems; Section 7 addresses policy implications; and Section 8 concludes with future directions for the Archaeology of Peace.

2. Theoretical Frameworks

2.1 The Knowledge-Centered Approach: Decolonizing Heritage Methodology

The Knowledge-Centered Approach was first articulated in Mire (2007a), “Preserving Knowledge, not Objects: A Somali Perspective for Heritage Management and Archaeological Research“ (African Archaeological Review 24(3-4): 49-71). This framework argues that “objects and monuments are not necessarily important but knowledge, skill and memory as practiced and symbolized in the landscapes” constitute the primary heritage resource (Mire 2007a: 49).

Previous archaeological interventions in Somalia failed precisely because they “lacked dialogue and incorporation of local views of heritage practice” (Mire 2011a: 71). The colonial legacy of European archaeological practice—characterized by extractive data collection and the removal of material culture to metropolitan museums—created conditions wherein “archaeology is viewed by many Somalis as a distant, foreign phenomenon” (Mire 2011a: 73). The Knowledge-Centered Approach addresses this epistemological rupture by centering oral tradition, practiced memory, and landscape symbolism as primary archaeological data.

This framework proves particularly salient for studying peace, which in Somali and broader Cushitic traditions operates through performed consensus rather than codified law. The methodology enables recovery of peace-making practices that leave minimal material trace in conventional archaeological terms but constitute rich data when analyzed through indigenous epistemological frameworks (Mire 2015a, 2015b).

2.2 The Ritual Set: A Methodological Framework for Recovering Peace

In Mire (2020), https://www.routledge.com/Divine-Fertility-The-Continuity-in-Transformation-of-an-Ideology-of-Sacred-Kinship-in-Northeast-Africa/Mire/p/book/9781032174853 (Routledge), the Ritual Set was introduced as “a set of material and non-material manifestations and attributes which uses specific examples to shed light on the investigation and (re)interpretation of archaeological material and sites in the region” (Mire 2020: 15).

The Ritual Set identifies specific spaces of consensus and ritual peace-making: sacred enclosures, specific tree species (particularly Olea europaea subsp. cuspidata), springs, and mountain peaks where communities historically gathered to resolve conflicts, seal inter-clan alliances, and perform fertility rites that reinforced social bonds. This framework enables archaeologists to move beyond identification of conflict markers (weaponry, defensive architecture, trauma patterns) to recognize the material signatures of sustained peace governance—including ritual architecture, votive deposits, and landscape modifications that facilitate communal gathering and consensus-building.

The Ritual Set methodology integrates archaeological survey, ethnographic observation, historical textual analysis, historical linguistics, ethnobotany, and archaeozoology (Mire 2020). This interdisciplinary approach allows movement beyond narrow national or conflict-centered narratives to interpret shared regional heritage as an indigenous Archaeology of Peace.

3. Sacred Landscapes and the Materiality of Peace

3.1 The Nagi/Nagaa Concept: Indigenous Peace Ideology

Central to the Archaeology of Peace is the indigenous Somali concept of nagi/nagaa—a complex term denoting peace, prosperity, and sacred fertility that operates as both descriptive condition and prescriptive ideology. Ethnographic and archaeological research demonstrates that this concept has underpinned state formation in the Horn of Africa for approximately 3,000 years, transforming across religious transitions (pre-Christian indigenous beliefs, Christianity, Islam) while maintaining core social function (Mire 2020).

The nagi/nagaa ideology posits peace as prerequisite for fertility—understood not merely as human reproduction but as the growth of animals, crops, and social relations. This conceptual framework explains the co-occurrence of peace-making rituals and fertility ceremonies at archaeological sites across Ethiopia and Somaliland. Documentation of sacred landscapes, enclosures, water sources, and trees reveals their dual function as sites of both agricultural fertility rituals and conflict resolution mechanisms (Mire 2015a, 2015b, 2020).

3.2 Case Study: Aw-Barkhadle and Multi-Religious Peace Architecture

Archaeological investigation of Aw-Barkhadle (Mire 2015a) provides empirical demonstration of the Archaeology of Peace’s analytical power. This 4 km² site, identified as the potential lost first capital of the Awdal kingdom (a medieval Islamic empire), exhibits remarkable multi-religious complexity: pre-Islamic phallic stones, Christian graves marked with Orthodox crosses, and Islamic mausoleums coexist within a single sacred landscape.

Critically, survey revealed gravestones marked with Coptic crosses and Stars of David, indicating the presence of Christians and Jews alongside Muslims in this pilgrimage center (Mire 2015a: 102). This ecumenical materiality challenges modern narratives of religious division in the Horn of Africa and demonstrates how the site functioned as a space of interfaith peace-making for centuries. The 3 km town wall, mosque foundations, and surrounding burials (13th–19th centuries AD) indicate sustained investment in a sacred landscape facilitating cross-community consensus.

The mausoleum of Saint Aw-Barkhadle, completed in the 19th century, is surrounded by dozens of white-washed tombs belonging to various figures. According to historical chronicles, the saint appears in kinglists of the Walasma dynasty of Ifat and Adal, and the site served as burial place for Garaad Jibril, who revolted against Harar’s ruler Sultan ‘Uthman in the 16th century (Mire 2015a). Philipp Paulitschke’s 1888 account identified the capital of Adal as “AwBerkele,” suggesting the walled settlement functioned as capital of Ifat and Adal at the end of the Middle Ages.

The site’s sacred landscape includes a mountain, trees, stones, and wells associated with deities, most prominently the sky God Waaq, connecting pre-Islamic and Islamic traditions through myths, legends, and ancestor worship (Mire 2015a). This continuity demonstrates how the ideology of peace adapted across religious transformations while maintaining core social function.

4. The NAGI Project and National Geographic Sponsorship

4.1 Project Design and Theoretical Objectives

In May 2023, the National Geographic Society awarded Dr. Mire the Wayfinder Award, providing institutional support for expansion of research under the project designation NAGI: Exploring the Forgotten Heritage of Peace-Making in the War-Torn Horn of Africa (National Geographic Explorer Profile). This project represents the first globally recognized archaeological initiative “solely dedicated to the documentation and understanding of the ancient peace practices in Africa and beyond” (Somaliland Sun 2023).

The NAGI project employs cultural heritage and archaeology as departure points to address contemporary global issues of war and famine, utilizing “cultural notions of peace- and fertility-making and their manifestations as a base for its data” (Mire 2020: 18). The project’s interdisciplinary methodology integrates archaeological survey, ethnographic observation, historical textual analysis, historical linguistics, ethnobotany, and archaeozoology to reconstruct long-term institutional frameworks that maintained regional stability.

4.2 Digital Heritage and Public Archaeology Components

The National Geographic sponsorship enables significant public-facing outputs, including a digital exhibition on the Archaeology of Peace and a documentary film produced as part of the Wayfinder grant. These outputs translate academic research into accessible formats designed to influence contemporary policy discussions on conflict resolution and peace-building.

Concurrently, the Horn Heritage Foundation—founded by Mire in 2011 with offices in Hargeisa and The Hague—conducts systematic digital documentation of endangered sites. The Foundation’s drone archaeology program and 3D photogrammetry initiatives have created “the digital recording and 3D virtual tours of Somaliland rock art sites” and “the survey and documentation of Medieval Islamic kingdoms and sacred landscapes, including the drone archaeology of Aw-Barkhadle, capital of Adal Kingdom” (Horn Heritage Foundation).

These technologies serve dual functions: creating permanent archives of fragile sites threatened by erosion, development, and conflict; and democratizing access to heritage for Somali diaspora communities and global audiences. The Foundation has trained over 1,000 Somali students across the Somali region and globally, contributed to development of Somaliland’s National Heritage Act, and created the Horn Heritage Digital Museum.

5. Rock Art and Ritual Peace-Making: Empirical Case Studies

5.1 Laas Geel: Deciphering Five Millennia of Peace Symbolism

Mire’s award-winning work on the Laas Geel rock art complex (ca. 5,000 years BP) demonstrates the Archaeology of Peace’s interpretive capacity. The polychrome paintings—among the best-preserved in Africa—depict large votive cows with decorated necks and prominent udders, human figures with arms outstretched in ceremonial poses, and geometric patterns indicating ritual activity.

Interpretation moves beyond conventional pastoralist readings to identify these images as evidence of peace rituals—ceremonies where communities gathered at sacred water sources to perform fertility rites that reinforced social bonds and conflict resolution mechanisms. The standardized human figures, the site’s location at seasonal river confluences, and the symbolic emphasis on cattle fertility (directly linked to social wealth and inter-clan alliance networks in pastoralist societies) all point to a sophisticated ritual landscape where peace was actively performed and materially inscribed.

The Laas Geel shelters, translating to “The Camels’ Well” in Somali, consist of about twenty shelters of varying size, with the largest approximately 10 m long and 5 m deep. The paintings are excellently preserved thanks to their location under granite overhangs. The site is essential to the Horn of Africa’s historical and heritage legacy and is considered a potential World Heritage Site candidate (Horn Heritage Foundation).

5.2 Dhambalin: Archaeological Evidence of Ritual Continuity

The Dhambalin rock shelter, discovered in autumn 2007 and documented in Mire (2008), provides further empirical support for the Archaeology of Peace framework. The site’s polychrome paintings (ca. 5,000 years BP) include the first sheep depictions in Somali archaeology—fourteen animals with red and white coloring lacking the black heads characteristic of modern Somali breeds—suggesting ancient domesticated varieties and long-term pastoral stability (Mire 2008: 158).

Of particular significance for peace archaeology are the human figures: hunters with bows and arrows wearing headgear, accompanied by dogs; a figure sitting on an animal with raised hands interpreted as worshipping cattle; and two clearly male figures with arms outstretched in ceremonial poses (Mire 2008: 160). These outstretched arms echo the ritual poses at Laas Geel, suggesting continuity of peace-making gestures across millennia. The “conspicuous bands drawn on the backs and bellies of cows” attest to ritual decoration associated with fertility and peace ceremonies (Mire 2008: 161).

UNESCO’s Chief of Africa, Lazare Eloundou Assomo, recognized the site’s significance in 2011, and it was subsequently added to the UNESCO World Heritage tentative list (Mire 2008). The site holds extraordinary originality and is essential to understanding the region’s ritual practices.

6. The Wagar and Sacred Trees: Material Culture of Fertility and Peace

Mire (2015a) presents the first academic study of the wagar—a sacred wooden sculpture kept by Somali women and used as a medium in fertility and peace rituals. This research demonstrates the wagar’s significance as a “Cushitic symbol of belief in sacred trees within Somali society” and explores its potential link to the Sky-God Waaq—adhered to by Cushitic peoples both before and during the practice of Christianity and Islam (Mire 2015a: 93).

Mire’s personal connection to the wagar—having inherited one from her maternal grandmother—exemplifies the Knowledge-Centered Approach in practice, bridging academic research with indigenous knowledge transmission. Mire and collaborators climbed Somaliland’s Golis Mountains to collect wagar tree branches, connecting ancient practice with living tradition and demonstrating that the Archaeology of Peace investigates not merely past artifacts but ongoing material relationships between communities and sacred landscapes.

The wagar study contributes to the archaeology of religion and historical archaeology in the Horn of Africa, demonstrating how indigenous technologies—including iron and pottery, traditional medicine and surgery, architecture and art—are maintained by custodians who are often the most marginalized in the region (Horn Heritage Foundation).

7. Indigenous Governance Systems: The Archaeological Recovery of Xeer

The Archaeology of Peace extends beyond ritual sites to excavate the material foundations of Xeer—the Somali customary law system representing one of humanity’s most enduring conflict resolution mechanisms. Xeer operates as a culturally defined system of folklore and habits, orally transmitted across generations, based on consensus between entitled groups.

The system’s core principles include inter-clan conventions on protection and security, family obligations, and resource-utilization rules regarding water, pasture, and natural resources. Mediation (masalaxo) and arbitration (gar dawe) operate through clan elders (xeer begti), with restorative rather than punitive outcomes: “Somalis who apply xeer are not so much interested in establishing the suspect’s guilt or innocence—it is important to reach consensus (win-win situation).” All participants must abandon the dispute without “losing face,” and the sense of adequacy of sanction being an inconvenience for the whole clan reinforces collective responsibility.

Archaeological documentation reveals that the sacred enclosures, water sources, and trees identified in this research were not merely spiritual sites but the physical infrastructure of the Xeer system—places where disputes were resolved, alliances sealed, and collective responsibility ritually reinforced. The compensation system (mag-diye), where damages are paid in camels to avoid blood revenge, finds its material origins in these sacred landscapes where fertility and peace were understood as inseparable conditions for social reproduction (Mire 2020).

8. Policy Implications: Challenging International Humanitarian Law

The Archaeology of Peace carries profound implications for contemporary global policy. Mire argues that current International Humanitarian Law and global treaties have proven unsuccessful in protecting humanity from continuing wars, proposing that lessons from the deep past and traditional governance systems can “raise global awareness and impact policy in peace-making, conflict resolution and reconciliation” (Mire 2020: 22).

The 2018 Hague Talk, “You want world peace? Revise the History Books!”, articulated the central thesis that “understanding beyond the labels of Christianity and Islam reveals a deeper history connecting people in the Horn of Africa”—an “archaeology of cohesion” capable of addressing current narratives of division. The 2020 British Academy Global Perspectives lecture extended this argument to the global political atmosphere, where “even the most powerful democracies of the world are in crisis” (Mire 2020).

The assertion that cultural heritage constitutes a basic human need—articulated in the 2011 New Scientist article and 2014 TED Talk (Mire 2014)—challenges the humanitarian sector’s hierarchical ordering of needs. Mire (2016), “The Role of Cultural Heritage in the Basic Needs of East African Pastoralists“ (African Study Monographs 53(Supplementary Issue): 147-157), provides the empirical foundation for this theoretical claim, demonstrating that “without the traditional skills and coping mechanisms that are inherent in the cultural values that glue people together, it is difficult for East African pastoralists to survive” (Mire 2016: 147).

9. Critical Assessment and Scholarly Reception

9.1 Academic Recognition

The theoretical contributions presented here have received substantial scholarly recognition. Mire (2020) won the Society of Africanist Archaeologists (SAfA) Book Prize in 2021, making Mire the first archaeologist of non-European descent to receive this award (SAfA 2021; Somaliland Sun 2023). The monograph was praised by Paul Lane as “a genuinely post-colonial approach toward heritage protection and conservation in the country and how best to mobilise knowledge and memory of Somalia’s deep past for the greater benefit of current and future generations” (Lane 2020: 512).

In 2017, Mire was selected by the Hay Festival of Literature and Arts as one of 30 Global Writers and Thinkers for 2017-2027, and

https://www.newscientist.com/

named her among the Most Inspiring Women in Science of All Time (National Geographic Explorer Profile).

9.2 Critical Engagements

Academic review of Divine Fertility has identified both strengths and areas requiring further development. A 2024 review in Geeska noted that while the critical perspective on the lack of indigenous scholarship and colonial legacies is “valuable,” the approach “through an ethnic lens, particularly its use of the term ‘Cushitic,’ is problematic” in contexts of active ethnic tension such as contemporary Ethiopia. The reviewer further observed that the “reliance on ethnographic analogy as the basis for the ‘Ritual Set’ presents a challenge, as this method is difficult to apply consistently” across the diverse Ethiopian sites discussed (Tiya, Aksum, Lalibela, Sheikh Hussein).

These critiques highlight the methodological tensions inherent in developing indigenous archaeological frameworks while engaging with comparative regional analysis—a challenge addressed through insistence on locally appropriate theoretical frameworks integrated with rigorous interdisciplinary methodology.

____________________________________________________________________

Author Biography:Author Biography:
Gulaid Yusuf Idaan is a senior lecturer and independent scholar based in Hargeisa, Somaliland. His research focuses on international relations, political analysis, constitutional studies, and the geopolitics of t

I write this not as a confidant of Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame, nor as someone with personal access to his inner circle.

I am from Somaliland—a territory whose people, from the last man standing to the political elite, hold an unshakable conviction in our separate sovereignty and independent statehood. That belief is non-negotiable. It is the air we breathe, the history we inherited, and the future we have built through three decades of self-governance, democratic transitions, and institutional development that our neighbors to the south have yet to achieve.

Yet Somalia remains our neighbor. We share language, culture, religion, kinship networks, and a long and complicated history that predates the artificial borders drawn by colonial powers. What happens in Mogadishu does not remain in Mogadishu—it reverberates across the Horn of Africa, shaping trade routes, security dynamics, refugee flows, and regional stability. A collapsed Somalia or an authoritarian Mogadishu is not merely a Somali problem; it is a regional one.

From this vantage point—committed to Somaliland’s independence yet conscious of regional interdependence—I have observed Somali politics from a distance, through media reporting, parliamentary debates, constitutional analysis, and the limited but revealing lens of Somali journalism and public discourse. From this distance, one figure has consistently stood out as perhaps the only Somali politician whose intellectual discipline, political vision, and ideological coherence could, if given the opportunity, transform Somalia from a state in perpetual crisis into something resembling a functioning nation.

That figure is Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame.

I do not know him personally. The analysis that follows is drawn from public records, his writings, media appearances, parliamentary interventions, his memoir https://www.ftlsomalia.com/federal-mp-launches-his-memoir-in-mogadishu/ (Resilience), and the interpretations of observers closer to Somali political life. If any factual detail is inaccurate, it reflects the limitations of distance and the fog that surrounds Somali political history, not any intent to misrepresent. This is offered in good faith—as one neighbor observing another, fully aware that the two political foundations are different.

The Man Who Refuses to Bend

In Somalia’s fragmented political landscape, where alliances shift rapidly and power is often measured through clan networks and armed influence rather than public mandate, Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame appears as an anomaly. Born March 22, 1964, in Bulobarde, Hiiraan region, of the Habar Gidir clan (Hawiye), he is a constitutional lawyer by training, founder of the Wadajir Party, and Member of Parliament. He has spent decades promoting an idea that remains radical in Mogadishu: that Somalia’s survival depends not on force or patronage, but on institutions, constitutional order, and civic nationalism.

His memoir, https://www.ftlsomalia.com/federal-mp-launches-his-memoir-in-mogadishu/—Resilience—launched in December 2024 in Mogadishu, is less a personal biography than a political statement. It reflects a career defined by deliberate resistance to political flexibility. In a system that rewards adaptability and compromise, Warsame has chosen principle. In a political order built on clan arithmetic, he has invested in ideas. The central question that defines his political journey is whether ideas alone can survive in such an environment.

From the Mosque to the Constitution: An Ideological Pilgrimage

Warsame’s political consciousness emerged in the collapse of Somalia. As a teenager in Buulabarde in the 1980s, he was drawn to al-Ittihad al-Islami, a militant Islamist movement that promised unity beyond clan identity. The appeal was powerful: a political identity based on faith rather than lineage, and divine law rather than tribal fragmentation.

The civil war shattered this vision. In 1991, as violence erupted in Mogadishu, he witnessed ideological unity dissolve almost instantly into clan-based survival logic. Friends and comrades—men who had prayed together, fought together, dreamed together—abandoned their shared commitments and retreated into the safety of clan identity. By 1992, disillusioned by the movement’s reliance on violence and its detachment from Somali social realities, he broke away. He later reflected that members of such movements lacked “political, socio-economic, and historical awareness of their own communities,” leaving them disconnected from lived realities.

This break did not lead him to secularism, but to reformist thinking. He joined the Islah movement, which emphasized peaceful persuasion, education, and social development over violence. His intellectual evolution shifted from ideological militancy to reformist pragmatism rooted in moral persuasion.

A further turning point came in Sudan at the University of Khartoum, where he observed ideological debate between Islamist and communist students that did not collapse into violence. For him, this demonstrated that political disagreement need not become existential conflict. It was a formative insight: pluralism was possible, even in a society as polarized as Somalia’s.

By the 2000s, Warsame had evolved into a constitutional institutionalist. He holds a Bachelor of Law from the International University of Africa in Khartoum (1997), specializing in Comparative Law, and a Master of Laws from the National University of Malaysia (2002), specializing in Constitutional/Comparative Federalism. His academic work reflected a systematic engagement with governance theory. Later, as Senior Political Advisor to the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia at UNSOM (2014–2015), he contributed to shaping the federal institutional frameworks from the outside. His conclusion—that Somalia’s unitary model had failed and that federalism was structurally necessary—was not opportunistic but deeply intellectual, developed through rigorous comparative study.

Five Pillars of an Unlikely Political Project

Warsame’s political philosophy is anchored in five interconnected commitments that form a coherent ideological framework—perhaps too coherent for the environment in which it must operate.

Constitutional Liberalism: The Bedrock. For Warsame, the constitution is the supreme source of political legitimacy. Rule of law, separation of powers, federal autonomy, and procedural governance are not abstract ideals but structural necessities. No individual, including the president, stands above constitutional order. This principle was evident in April 2026 when the federal government appointed an interim leader for South West State and deployed forces to Baidoa. Warsame responded with a detailed constitutional indictment, citing specific provisions of both the federal and state constitutions. He characterized the intervention as the onset of a “dangerous phase”—a systematic power grab designed to dismantle Somalia’s fragile federal system. The historical parallel he drew was deliberate: authoritarian practices were precisely the catalysts that had caused the total collapse of the Somali state in 1991.

Social Democracy: The Active but Accountable State. Through the Wadajir Party, founded in June 2016, Warsame promotes a social democratic, progressive, centre-left vision. The party’s manifesto, Isku-Tashi—Self-Reliance—commits to establishing a modern state based on civic values and democratic principles. The state, in his view, must provide essential services, reduce inequality, and regulate markets while avoiding both weak neoliberal minimalism and authoritarian centralization. He rejects clan-based distribution of resources and advocates regulated capitalism with social protections.

Civic Nationalism: Transcending the Clan. A defining feature of his ideology is rejection of clan-based politics. For Warsame, clan identity is one of the central structural obstacles to Somali state-building. However, he has also experienced the constraints of this position. During the 2022 elections, clan-based mobilization was used to rally support for his candidacy—prominent businessmen from his own clan pushed him to stand as their unified candidate. Despite his reservations, he eventually accepted. The promised backing never materialized, and he later regretted the compromise. The episode reinforced his belief that even anti-clan politicians must occasionally operate within the system they oppose.

Institutional State-Building: Theory Informed by Practice. Warsame views Somalia’s crisis as institutional rather than personal. Weak bureaucracy, fragmented authority, and elite competition over resources define the state’s dysfunction. He argues that democracy cannot function without prior institutional stabilization. Without functioning institutions, democracy becomes what he calls “unstable competition,” where the winner captures the state rather than governing it according to law. The South West State crisis of April 2026 provided vindication: federal intervention created a power vacuum, leading to armed confrontations involving federal forces, clan militias, and Turkish drone-backed operations. This allowed Al-Shabaab to exploit the chaos, demonstrating how institutional failure directly causes security deterioration.

Sequenced Democracy: Beyond Electoralism. For Warsame, elections alone do not constitute democracy. His core argument is deceptively simple: “Elections alone do not create democracy.” Instead, democracy requires sequencing: constitutional consensus, institutional neutrality, political inclusivity, public trust, and security guarantees must precede electoral transitions. He warns against “electoralism”—the assumption that voting alone produces democracy. In fragile states, elections without institutions often produce instability or disguised authoritarianism. He is not anti-democratic; he is anti-electoralism.

The Strategic Agenda: Five Goals for a Disputed Future

Between 2024 and 2026, Warsame’s political activity has focused on five major strategic objectives.

Halting Executive Overreach. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud‘s administration, in Warsame’s analysis, represents “a deliberate effort to concentrate power, dismantle the federal system, and subordinate the rule of law to personal will.” Warsame has accused the president of strategically planning interventions in federal member states to secure his own future re-election. The evidence is specific: the federal appointment of an interim leader for South West State in April 2026, which violated both federal and state constitutions; federal forces taking control of Baidoa, demonstrating willingness to use military force for political objectives; political interference in Gedo region and Raaskambooni, showing a pattern of central government intervention beyond constitutional authority.

Ensuring a Legitimate Political Transition. With parliamentary and presidential term expirations approaching—the parliamentary mandate lapsed on April 14, 2026, and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s term expired on May 15, 2026—the government seeks to extend its rule through contested constitutional amendments. Warsame has called for a peaceful political transition based on constitutional clarity and political inclusivity. In pursuit of this goal, he joined the Somali Future Council, a new political bloc formed in Nairobi on October 2, 2025, uniting the Somali Salvation Forum with Jubaland and Puntland administrations. The conference brought together Jubaland President Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe), Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni, former prime ministers Hassan Ali Khayre and Saacid Shirdoon, and Warsame himself.

Transforming Governance from Patronage to Performance. Warsame’s critique is scathing: the government operates through favoritism, corruption, and abuse of power. He argues that there is no opposition in Somalia founded on a coherent ideology, and that the crisis stems from a deep misunderstanding of the state itself—seen not as a platform to serve the nation, but as a vehicle for self-enrichment. He demands an end to nepotism and clan-based appointments, cessation of political interference in regional administrations, and elimination of the abuse of state power to enrich a narrow elite.

Reforming International Engagement. Warsame has observed that international partners increasingly align with individual leaders rather than supporting Somali institutions. His goal is to shift international engagement from strengthening individuals to strengthening institutions—courts, electoral commissions, civil service, security sector governance. He cautions that when partners align visibly with a disputed presidency, they risk undermining their neutrality.

Building a Coherent Ideological Opposition. Political competition remains personality-driven bargaining rather than ideas-driven politics. Warsame wants Somali politics to mature beyond its current state, where voters choose between programs and ideologies rather than lineages and personalities. Through commentaries, op-eds, social media, and public debates, he works to promote transparency and accountability. His memoir https://www.ftlsomalia.com/federal-mp-launches-his-memoir-in-mogadishu/ is itself an instrument of this goal. https://www.ftlsomalia.com/federal-mp-launches-his-memoir-in-mogadishu/

Resilience as Political Manifesto

Launched in December 2024, https://www.ftlsomalia.com/federal-mp-launches-his-memoir-in-mogadishu/ is not merely personal history but Warsame’s political philosophy rendered in narrative form. The core argument is stark: ideas, not clan loyalty or transactional bargaining, must be the foundation of Somali politics. The central thesis holds that Somalia’s political crisis stems from a deep misunderstanding of the state itself—seen not as a platform to serve the nation, but as a vehicle for self-enrichment.

A key passage captures his philosophy: “If you aspire to lead in politics, never be a broker. Politics is neither flattery nor drum-beating.” The memoir explicitly challenges what analysts call the “politics of the belly”—the transactional, patronage-driven system that dominates Somali governance. After serving as Minister of Planning from 2009–2010, he discovered the president had given his ministerial portfolio to someone from another clan as part of a political bargain. Warsame resigned, calling this a moment that deepened his disillusionment with political patronage at the heart of Somali governance.

The memoir’s self-portrait is that of the “stubborn idealist”—a figure unwilling to cede ground to cynicism. It acknowledges the central critique of his career: that ideas alone may not translate into electoral strength. But it argues that his legacy may ultimately be through thought leadership rather than presidential victory. The central argument is that principled persistence matters more than tactical victory—a philosophy that explains why he remains in Mogadishu as an opposition figure while others have fled abroad.

The Paradox of Principle: Strengths and Limitations

Warsame’s strength lies in ideological consistency, constitutional expertise, and moral clarity. He has remained critical of successive governments regardless of leadership, opposing both Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (Farmaajo) and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud when he believed they exceeded constitutional bounds. He remained in Somalia after surviving an attack on December 17, 2017, when NISA forces raided his residence, killing five bodyguards and injuring Warsame and four others. The government claimed it was executing an arrest warrant for treason; Warsame called it an assassination attempt.

Yet the limitations are equally real. Critics argue he lacks the machinery to translate ideas into electoral power. His political influence relies on elite negotiation, not mass mobilization. Two presidential campaigns yielded nine votes in 2017 (2.75%) and fifteen votes in 2022 (4.66%)—far from victory. He lacks a cohesive team and broad coalition-building capacity. Political success typically requires building alliances and delegating authority, skills that Warsame has not consistently demonstrated.

Beyond Mogadishu: Somaliland and the Unfinished Nation

From a Somaliland perspective, Warsame stands apart because his political vision extends beyond Mogadishu’s immediate power struggles. He seems to recognize that Somaliland‘s trajectory cannot simply be dismissed through coercive nationalism or emotional rhetoric. While he remains committed to Somali unity, he appears more aware than many of his contemporaries that Somaliland’s political experience contains lessons about institutional development, local legitimacy, constitutional order, and political sequencing.

He is generally cautious regarding coercive narratives that risk repeating the failures associated with the Siad Barre era and later centralizing political projects. Equally significant is his relative independence from external political sponsorship. In a political environment where foreign patronage frequently shapes domestic competition, Warsame has attempted to maintain institutional independence. Ironically, this may represent both his greatest strength and one of the reasons for his limited political success. Somali politics often rewards transactional alliances, foreign backing, and tactical flexibility more than principled constitutionalism.

A Somaliland Verdict

From Somaliland, the assessment is ultimately pragmatic rather than emotional.

We do not observe Somalia with dreams of political reunification. We observe it because instability in Somalia inevitably affects the wider region, including Somaliland itself. A collapsing Mogadishu threatens regional trade, security, migration patterns, and geopolitical balance across the Horn of Africa.

Warsame does not offer Somaliland reunion. What he offers instead is the possibility—however uncertain—of a Somalia governed by law rather than force, by institutions rather than personalities, by constitutional procedure rather than clan coercion.

A Somalia that genuinely internalizes federalism may eventually understand why Somaliland refuses reabsorption into a centralized unitary state. A Somalia that respects constitutional boundaries may eventually learn to respect political realities it cannot simply reverse through rhetoric or coercion.

This is not optimism. It is strategic realism.

Warsame may never win executive power. He may never implement the reforms he advocates. His ultimate impact may lie not in presidential authority but in intellectual influence—in shaping the political vocabulary, constitutional imagination, and institutional aspirations of future Somali leaders.

Yet even that matters.

Because in a political landscape dominated by clan arithmetic, elite patronage, and external manipulation, his stubborn insistence on principle ensures that an alternative vision of Somali politics continues to exist.

And from across the border, that alone warrants attention—not allegiance, not submission, but serious and watchful attention.

Because a neighbor who reads his own constitution is preferable to one who reads only his clan genealogy.

This assessment is written by a Somaliland observer with no personal connection to Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame. All biographical details, dates, and historical claims are drawn from publicly available sources including media reports, parliamentary records, his published memoir, and verified election results. Any inaccuracies in dates or historical interpretation are unintentional and reflect the limitations of observing Somali politics from a distance. The political conclusions are those of the author

كما يشهد هذا العام مستوى غير مسبوق من الانخراط الدبلوماسي بين صوماليلاند وعدد من الدول الأعضاء في الأمم المتحدة، مما يعكس تحولاً تدريجياً ومهماً في طبيعة التفاعل الدولي مع صوماليلاند، وزيادة في الاعتراف العملي باستقرارها وقدرتها الحاكمة وواقعها السياسي القائم.

يشرفني اليوم أن أشارك رسمياً هذه الرسالة الدبلوماسية الاستراتيجية بمناسبة الذكرى الخامسة والثلاثين لاستعادة سيادة جمهورية صوماليلاند (18 مايو 1991 – 18 مايو 2026)، والموجهة إلى الاتحاد الإفريقي، والإيغاد، ومنظمة التعاون الإسلامي، وجامعة الدول العربية، والاتحاد الأوروبي، والبعثات الدبلوماسية، والشركاء الدوليين، وصناع السياسات حول العالم.

نحن ندعو باحترام الاتحاد الإفريقي والإيغاد ومنظمة التعاون الإسلامي وجامعة الدول العربية والاتحاد الأوروبي وجميع الشركاء الدوليين إلى تعزيز الانخراط الدبلوماسي المنظم مع جمهورية صوماليلاند، وتوسيع مجالات التعاون العملي في مجالات السلام والأمن والتجارة والاستثمار والتنمية، والنظر إلى قضية صوماليلاند من خلال نهج مبدئي وعملي قائم على القانون الدولي وواقع الدولة الفعلي والتاريخ والاستقرار الإقليمي.

تؤكد هذه الرسالة التزام صوماليلاند الراسخ بالسلام، والحكم الديمقراطي، والنظام الدستوري، والاستقرار الإقليمي، والانخراط الدولي البنّاء، استناداً إلى الشرعية التاريخية، والاستمرارية المؤسسية، وأكثر من ثلاثة عقود من الحكم الذاتي الفعّال.

على مدى 35 عاماً، أثبتت صوماليلاند أن الديمقراطية والانتقال السلمي والتعاون الإقليمي يمكن أن تنجح في بيئة جيوسياسية معقدة.

وتأتي هذه الرسالة كتعبير دبلوماسي رسمي عن موقف صوماليلاند، يهدف إلى تعزيز الحوار وتطوير انخراط دولي مبدئي قائم على الحقيقة التاريخية والشرعية الديمقراطية والمصالح الإقليمية المشتركة.

الصمود والاعترا

ف

This year also reflects unprecedented diplomatic engagement between Somaliland and individual UN Member States, marking a gradual and important shift in international interaction and increasing practical acknowledgment of Somaliland’s stability, governance performance, and statehood reality.

Today, I am honored to officially share and convey this Strategic Diplomatic Communication marking the 35th Anniversary of the Restoration of the Sovereignty of the Republic of Somaliland (18 May 1991 – 18 May 2026), addressed to the African Union, IGAD, OIC, Arab League, European Union, diplomatic missions, international partners, and global policy stakeholders.

We respectfully call upon the African Union, IGAD, OIC, Arab League, European Union, and all international partners to deepen structured diplomatic engagement with the Republic of Somaliland, expand practical cooperation in peace, security, trade, investment, and development, and consider Somaliland’s case through a principled and pragmatic approach grounded in international law, empirical statehood, historical reality, and regional stability.

This communication reaffirms Somaliland’s commitment to peace, democratic governance, constitutional order, regional stability, and constructive international engagement, grounded in historical legitimacy, institutional continuity, and over three decades of effective self-governance.

For 35 years, Somaliland has demonstrated that democracy, peaceful transitions, and regional cooperation can succeed in a complex geopolitical environment.

This communication serves as a formal diplomatic expression of Somaliland’s position, aimed at strengthening dialogue and advancing principled international engagement grounded in historical reality, democratic legitimacy, and shared regional interests.

Recognition and Resilience.

#Somaliland #RecognitionAndResilience #RepublicOfSomaliland #Diplomacy #InternationalRelations #Statehood #Recognition #UnitedNations #AfricanUnion #IGAD #OIC #EuropeanUnion #HornOfAfrica #Peace #Democracy #Governanc

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The 18 May 2026 commemoration in Somaliland marks the 35th anniversary of the 1991 restoration of independence and represents a defining moment in the evolution of Somaliland’s state-building trajectory. Framed under the national theme “Recognition and Resilience,” this year’s celebration is historically significant because it is the first 18 May commemoration held in a context shaped by emerging international recognition following the late 2025 diplomatic breakthrough with a UN member state (Israel).

This shift introduces a new political atmosphere in which Somaliland is no longer commemorating 18 May solely as an aspiration for recognition, but as a political identity that now exists within a partially recognized international condition. As a result, the 2026 commemoration occupies a transitional space between symbolic struggle and emerging diplomatic validation.

Rather than diminishing its importance, this development intensifies the meaning of the event. It transforms 18 May into a hybrid political moment that simultaneously commemorates the 1991 restoration of independence and reflects the early institutional reality of external acknowledgment.

Historical Foundations and the Construction of State Legitimacy

Somaliland’s political identity is rooted in a historical trajectory that includes the 1960 independence of British Somaliland, the voluntary union with Italian Somaliland, and the collapse of that union followed by the 1991 restoration of independence. Within Somaliland’s constitutional and political narrative, this restoration is not interpreted as secession but as the reassertion of interrupted sovereignty.

Over the past 35 years, this narrative has been institutionalized through state institutions, political discourse, and annual commemorations. The 2026 theme “Recognition and Resilience” builds directly upon this foundation. “Recognition” now reflects both long-standing diplomatic aspiration and the emerging reality of partial international acknowledgment, while “Resilience” represents the sustained ability of Somaliland to maintain governance, stability, and institutional continuity under conditions of limited recognition.

Together, these elements form a dual-layered legitimacy structure grounded in historical continuity and evolving geopolitical engagement.

Recognition and Resilience as a Framework of Statehood Performance

The 2026 commemoration can be understood through a unified analytical framework in which recognition and resilience operate as mutually reinforcing dimensions of statehood performance.

Recognition refers to external validation, diplomatic engagement, and the evolving implications of partial recognition achieved in late 2025. In 2026, Somaliland is not only pursuing recognition but also navigating the early consequences of being partially recognized within the international system.

Resilience refers to internal consolidation—governance continuity, institutional stability, and social cohesion sustained since the 1991 restoration of independence.

In this context, Somaliland’s statehood is no longer purely aspirational. It is now simultaneously performative and transitional, reflecting both long-term survival under non-recognition and the emerging realities of limited international legitimacy.

The 2026 Commemoration as a National Political Performance

The 2026 celebration unfolded as a highly coordinated national process reflecting significant institutional maturity. It demonstrated how statehood is actively produced through ritual, governance practice, and civic participation.

Preparations began weeks in advance, with schools, ministries, and community institutions engaging in structured national programming. Educational activities emphasized historical memory and the meaning of the 1991 restoration of independence, while also introducing the significance of Somaliland’s emerging international recognition.

Military parades and security demonstrations played a central role in the commemoration. These displays reinforced institutional capacity and state authority while signaling stability to external observers. In the context of 2026, such visibility carried additional symbolic meaning, reflecting both internal consolidation and readiness for deeper international engagement.

On 18 May itself, public spaces across Somaliland were transformed into unified symbolic arenas. Flag ceremonies, cultural performances, and presidential addresses collectively reinforced the dual narrative of recognition and resilience, now embedded within a political reality where Somaliland is celebrating 18 May under conditions of partial recognition.

State Capacity, Education, and Civic Cohesion

A central dimension of Somaliland’s nation-building process is the role of education in shaping political identity and historical consciousness. In the 2026 commemoration, schools played a critical role in transmitting the meaning of 18 May and the historical significance of the 1991 restoration of independence.

Within this educational framework, the state emphasizes that students born during the existence of Somaliland should not experience the instability, violence, and governance collapse associated with the former Siad Barre regime. The purpose of this approach is to ensure that younger generations understand the historical conditions that preceded state collapse and the necessity of maintaining political stability and institutional continuity.

Through curricula, school-based commemorations, and civic education programs, students are systematically informed about the events that led to the collapse of the Somali state and the subsequent restoration of Somaliland’s independence. This process functions as a mechanism of collective memory formation, ensuring that historical experience is preserved and transmitted through structured institutional channels.

In sociopolitical terms, this reflects a deliberate strategy of preventing historical recurrence by embedding lessons of instability into national education systems. It also strengthens civic cohesion by linking identity formation to shared historical understanding.

Diaspora Engagement and Transnational Nationalism

The Somaliland diaspora played an expanded role in the 2026 commemoration. Communities in Europe, North America, and the Gulf organized parallel events that explicitly reflected the significance of Somaliland celebrating 18 May in a context of emerging recognition.

This marked a shift from purely advocacy-driven engagement toward a hybrid form of transnational political affirmation. The diaspora now functions not only as a lobbying force but also as an active participant in the symbolic reproduction of national identity.

In this context, resilience extends beyond territorial governance to include global networks that sustain Somaliland’s political identity during its transition from non-recognition to partial recognition.

Geopolitical Context: Recognition, Resilience, and Strategic Positioning

The 2026 commemoration occurred within a rapidly evolving geopolitical environment in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor. Somaliland’s location along the Gulf of Aden continues to enhance its strategic relevance to global maritime trade and regional security frameworks.

The reported recognition by Israel in late 2025 introduced a new dimension to Somaliland’s international positioning. For the first time, Somaliland is celebrating 18 May within a political environment shaped by partial international recognition. This fundamentally alters the symbolic meaning of the commemoration.

“Recognition” in 2026 therefore functions as both achievement and ongoing process, while “Resilience” reflects institutional endurance developed since the 1991 restoration of independence. Together, they define Somaliland’s transitional geopolitical identity as a polity moving from contested sovereignty toward partial international acceptance.

Infrastructure development, particularly around Berbera Port, further strengthens Somaliland’s strategic relevance by embedding it within regional trade and maritime security systems.

Conclusion: From Restoration to Emerging Recognition

The 18 May 2026 commemoration represents a historic turning point in Somaliland’s political evolution. For the first time, Somaliland is celebrating 18 May in a context shaped by emerging international recognition, fundamentally altering the symbolic and political meaning of the event.

The theme “Recognition and Resilience” captures this transition. Recognition reflects emerging external validation, while resilience reflects the long-term internal capacity that began with the 1991 restoration of independence. Together, they define a new phase of statehood in which Somaliland is no longer only performing for recognition but also adapting to the realities of partial recognition.

The 2026 celebration therefore marks a shift from symbolic endurance to transitional legitimacy. It reflects a political system that continues to reproduce itself through ritual, governance, and education while gradually integrating into international diplomatic structures. Somaliland’s sovereignty remains historically grounded in the 1991 restoration of independence while evolving through contemporary geopolitical engagement and emerging recognition.

May 06, 2026

Republic of Somaliland and the Reordering of the Horn of Africa in the Age of Circulation-Based Geopolitics

The 2026 Middle East war did not merely disrupt energy markets; it triggered a systemic rupture that has absorbed the Horn of Africa into a global conflict architecture. My latest research, “From Systemic Rupture to Functional Sovereignty: Republic of Somaliland and the Reordering of the Horn of Africa in the Age of Circulation-Based Geopolitics,” examines how traditional regional security models have been overtaken by a new reality: power is shifting from territorial control to circulation control.

Moving beyond Regional Security Complex Theory, I introduce the IWCR Model (Integrated War–Chokepoint–Regional Security Complex) to demonstrate how maritime chokepoints, energy flows, proxy networks, and digital infrastructure now function as primary vectors of strategic transmission. At the center of this transformation is the Republic of Somaliland, which is emerging not as a peripheral unrecognized territory, but as a critical node of functional sovereignty. By securing the Berbera-Addis corridor and regulating vital trade and logistics flows, Somaliland is proving that in today’s crisis-driven order, the ability to manage circulation often outweighs formal diplomatic recognition.

The paper also introduces “chokepoint rentierism,” maps three forward-looking scenarios (2026–2030), and offers strategic recommendations for regional governance, international policy, and emerging domains like cyber-sovereignty and environmental security.

I welcome dialogue with scholars, policymakers, and security analysts working on Horn of Africa geopolitics, maritime security, and post-Westphalian sovereignty. Full manuscript available upon request or via institutional repository.

#Geopolitics #HornOfAfrica #Somaliland #InternationalRelations #SecurityStudies #MaritimeSecurity #FunctionalSovereignty #ForeignPolicy #AcademicResearch #GlobalSecurity #IRTheor

FROM SYSTEMIC RUPTURE TO FUNCTIONAL SOVEREIGNTY:

In March 2026, the Strait of Hormuz went quiet. Ship traffic collapsed from 130 vessels per day to six. Brent crude surged past $112. And 2,500 kilometers south, in a territory that does not appear on most maps, construction crews broke ground on an Israeli intelligence facility at Berbera Port. This article traces how the February–March 2026 war between Iran, the United States, and Israel transformed the Horn of Africa from strategic afterthought to central battlefield—and how Somaliland, unrecognized by the United Nations for thirty-five years, emerged as a critical node in the global circulation system. Drawing on real-time crisis data from March–April 2026, the analysis demonstrates that control over chokepoints now confers more leverage than formal sovereignty, and that Somaliland’s governance of the Berbera-Addis corridor represents a new model of strategic authority in an era defined by the politics of flow.

Keywords:

Horn of Africa; Somaliland; chokepoints; maritime security; functional sovereignty; circulation-based power; Iran-Israel war; Berbera Port; proxy warfare; sovereignty fragmentation

1. The Rupture

The killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on 28 February 2026 did not end the Iran–United States–Israel war. It accelerated it. Within weeks, the Strait of Hormuz—through which one-fifth of global oil flows—was effectively closed. Houthi forces entered the conflict on 28 March, launching ballistic missiles at southern Israel and threatening the Bab el-Mandeb, the narrow strait separating Yemen from Djibouti. Shipping insurance premiums spiked from 0.05% to 6.5% of hull value in six weeks. The total cost of transiting the Red Sea quadrupled.

The strategic shock did not stay in the Gulf. It traveled down the maritime spine of the Red Sea and into the Horn of Africa with a speed that exposed the fragility of old assumptions about regional order. The Horn was no longer a peripheral zone of African instability. It had become the pressure-release valve for a global system under strain.

2. The Horn as Fulcrum

The Horn of Africa sits at the intersection of three maritime systems: the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean. This geography has always mattered. What changed in 2026 was the cost of ignoring it.

Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous nation and the Horn’s largest economy, imports 95 percent of its petroleum through a single corridor: the Djibouti–Addis Ababa route. When Hormuz closed and Bab el-Mandeb militarized, that corridor became both indispensable and acutely vulnerable. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed had spent two years pursuing maritime diversification—signing a Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland in January 2024, exploring Lamu Port in Kenya, accelerating the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. But by March 2026, none of these alternatives were operational. Ethiopia faced the prospect of economic asphyxiation.

The crisis also exposed Egypt’s fragility. Suez Canal revenues—$6 to 7 billion annually, a critical source of hard currency—evaporated as shipping lines rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope. Cairo’s response was not economic reform but military expansion: troop deployments to Somalia, defense pacts with Eritrea, a posture of encirclement around Ethiopia justified by water security rhetoric but driven by fiscal desperation.

Meanwhile, Djibouti—the Horn’s traditional logistical hub—faced a paradox. Its economy depends on port services and military base leases. The United States, China, France, Japan, and Italy all maintain facilities there. Yet as Red Sea shipping volumes collapsed, Djibouti’s commercial transit revenue plummeted while its geopolitical leverage increased. The country was becoming a garrison with a port rather than a port with a garrison.

3. Somaliland: The Accidental Strategic Actor

Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991. No United Nations member recognized it. For three decades, it built institutions—currency, passports, elections, a military—while the international system looked away. Its reward was isolation, aid dependence, and periodic diplomatic humiliation.

Then the world changed, and Somaliland’s geography became its currency.

The Berbera Port, developed through a partnership with DP World and the United Arab Emirates, had already tripled its capacity to 500,000 TEUs and reduced vessel turnaround from 64 hours to 25. The adjacent airport, with a 4,185-meter runway—the longest in the Horn—had been built for commercial cargo but designed for military possibility. The 250-kilometer corridor connecting Berbera to the Ethiopian border could handle 5,000 trucks per day. These were not accidental features. They were the infrastructure of a state that had learned to survive without recognition by becoming indispensable.

In January 2026, Israel signaled its intent to recognize Somaliland in exchange for a security and logistics agreement. By March, construction had begun on an Israeli intelligence and naval monitoring facility at Berbera. The strategic logic was stark: at 550 kilometers from Sanaa, Berbera offered Israel early warning against Houthi missile launches and a forward operating position that Mediterranean bases could not match. For Somaliland, the deal provided a security guarantor with capabilities far exceeding those of its other partners, and a pathway—however narrow—toward formal recognition.

The risks were equally stark. Houthi leaders threatened to target Berbera if it hosted “Zionist assets.” Al-Shabaab, the Somali insurgent group, explicitly condemned any Israeli presence in Somaliland. The territory’s alignment with Israel transformed it from an overlooked de facto state into a legitimate target for Iranian-backed proxies.

4. The New Calculus of Recognition

Somaliland’s emerging recognition in 2026 was not a diplomatic breakthrough in the traditional sense. It was a market correction.

In January 2024, Ethiopia had signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland that promised port access in exchange for potential recognition. The deal gave Ethiopia first-mover advantage in securing an alternative maritime corridor. But Addis Ababa hesitated. The MoU was never operationalized. Ethiopian officials sent contradictory signals about whether recognition would actually follow. Investors, port operators, and regional partners grew uncertain about Ethiopia’s commitment.

That hesitation created a vacuum. The United Arab Emirates, which had already invested heavily in Berbera, deepened its engagement. Israel moved from intelligence cooperation to formal recognition. Other actors—India, Greece, Cyprus, the United Kingdom—began functional engagement with Somaliland officials on security and logistics matters, even while maintaining formal adherence to Somali territorial integrity.

By April 2026, Ethiopia had lost the leverage it once held. Recognition was no longer a card Addis Ababa could play; it was a currency being minted by others. Somaliland’s bargaining position had inverted. Where it once needed Ethiopian diplomatic sponsorship, it now hosted multiple external partners who treated it as a sovereign actor regardless of juridical status.

This dynamic reveals a broader shift in how strategic authority operates. In a system where chokepoint control matters more than territorial size, and where circulation security trumps diplomatic protocol, functional governance can generate recognition that formal sovereignty cannot compel. Somaliland did not earn recognition by approximating statehood. It earned it by controlling a flow that others needed.

5. The Five Transformations

The 2026 crisis has restructured the Horn through five interconnected shifts operating at material, institutional, and perceptual levels. Together, they transform the region’s core operating logic.

5.1 Maritime Securitization: From Commerce to Survival

For most of the post-Cold War era, maritime access functioned as an economic variable—costly but stable. That stability collapsed in March 2026. With Hormuz closed and Bab el-Mandeb militarized, access shifted from cost to survival. The change was abrupt and irreversible.

Ethiopia illustrates this shift. Dependent on fuel imports via Djibouti, it faced not a fiscal crisis but a viability crisis. Without fuel, transport, food systems, and state capacity collapse. This triggered securitization: sea access became “irreversible,” justifying military and strategic escalation.

Coastal states face inverse risks. Djibouti’s base economy, once an asset, becomes a liability in crisis—turning it into a potential battlespace amid great-power proximity.

Somaliland occupies a unique position. With coastline access but limited militarization, Berbera emerged as a safer alternative, reaching 85% utilization. Maritime securitization thus generated strategic opportunity alongside vulnerability.

The deeper outcome is maritime survival geopolitics, where states prioritize access to lifelines over territorial defense. This logic produces self-reinforcing security spirals and regional escalation.

5.2 Sovereignty Fragmentation: The End of the Westphalian Map

The 2026 crisis accelerated the collapse of classical sovereignty into overlapping forms:

Fragmented sovereignty: Multiple actors exercise authority without hierarchy (e.g., Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia), dissolving monopoly over violence.

Penetrated sovereignty: External actors exercise authority within states (e.g., Djibouti’s foreign bases; Somalia’s overlapping Turkish and Egyptian presence).

Functional sovereignty: Authority derives from strategic utility rather than formal recognition—exemplified by Somaliland.

Despite non-recognition, Somaliland functions as a state and gains legitimacy through partnerships and corridor control. Governance capacity correlates more strongly with functional sovereignty (0.702) than formal recognition (0.253), showing that operational legitimacy now outweighs juridical status.

By 2030, the Horn will likely consist of overlapping authorities—state remnants, autonomous regions, foreign enclaves, and insurgent governance—making sovereignty a continuous variable rather than a binary condition.

5.3 Geoeconomic Reversal: From Production to Position

The 2026 war marks the end of cheap, predictable Middle Eastern energy and strains the petrodollar system. Even post-war, risk premiums will persist.

The Horn faces both immediate shocks (price spikes, supply disruption) and structural transformation. Ethiopia’s inflation and Egypt’s Suez revenue collapse illustrate acute economic stress.

More fundamentally, value shifts from production to position. Strategic leverage now derives from proximity to chokepoints.

This produces chokepoint rentierism—revenue and power based on controlling flows rather than extracting resources. Unlike oil rents, these are renewable, multi-actor, and strategically amplifiable.

Somaliland benefits: Berbera’s growth reflects rerouted flows, not production. However, long-term rerouting risks marginalizing the region economically, even as its strategic importance increases.

5.4 Proxy Territorialization: The Insurgent Ecosystem

Conflict evolves into a transnational ecosystem with three features:

Connectivity: Cross-border coordination (e.g., Houthi–Al-Shabaab linkages; Iran–Eritrea–Sudan corridors).

Autonomy: Diversified funding reduces dependence on single sponsors.

Territorialization: Armed groups govern territory, blending insurgency and state functions.

The result is a continuous instability arc linking Yemen, the Horn, and the Sahel. Capabilities diffuse—drones, missiles, and advanced systems—raising insurgent power.

Al-Shabaab may evolve into a regional actor capable of governance, air denial, and maritime disruption.

For Somaliland, this creates existential risk. Its strategic alignment makes it a target, while its security capacity remains limited—reinforcing dependence on external partners.

5.5 Competitive Regional Orders: The Vacuum and the Rush

The Horn now operates under a strategic vacuum—not absence of actors, but absence of coordination.

Great-power overstretch (especially US focus on Iran) reduces crisis management capacity. China lacks stabilizing capability. This creates escalation windows.

Middle powers fill the gap:

• UAE constrained by direct conflict exposure

• Turkey present but limited in depth

• Egypt escalating amid fiscal crisis

• Saudi Arabia retreating to homeland defense

• Israel expanding into Somaliland for strategic necessity

• Iran projecting through proxies and regional corridors

These actors compete rather than coordinate. The result is a competitive regional order, where stability emerges from shifting balances, not imposed authority.

This environment increases miscalculation risks, escalation cascades, and proxy entanglement. The infrastructure, alliances, and militarization generated during the crisis will persist, making the post-2026 Horn structurally different and unlikely to revert.

Probable Scenarios (2026–2027)

1. Systemic Escalation (55% probability) — Most Likely

If the Middle East conflict persists or intensifies:

Permanent rerouting of global trade: Shipping will not simply bypass the Red Sea—it will undergo structural rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope. This increases transit times by 10–20 days, but more importantly, it transforms global trade from efficiency-driven to risk-adjusted circulation systems. Insurance premiums, freight costs, and inventory buffering will rise, pushing firms toward regionalized supply chains and weakening global trade integration. More deeply, this shift introduces path dependency in routing decisions, where firms redesign supply chains around resilience rather than speed, locking in long-term diversion from the Red Sea. Over time, this may produce semi-permanent trade bifurcation between Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Gulf corridors, alongside a systemic increase in transaction costs across global commerce.

The Horn becomes a militarized zone: External powers (UAE, Israel, Turkey, Egypt, Iran via proxies) will not just expand presence—they will shift toward operational militarization. Military bases evolve into active force projection hubs, integrating surveillance (ISR), drones, naval patrols, and rapid deployment systems. The Horn transitions from a peripheral security space into a forward theater of interlinked conflicts, where local disputes are embedded within wider geopolitical rivalries. This militarization is not static; it becomes self-reinforcing, as each actor’s buildup triggers counter-deployments, producing a dense security architecture with overlapping and competing command structures. Djibouti becomes increasingly exposed as a concentrated base hub hosting multiple great powers, raising risks of great-power friction. Eritrea deepens its role as a strategic hinge—facilitating external alignments and potentially serving as a logistics corridor for proxy flows. Somalia experiences intensified external penetration and internal fragmentation, as competing security partnerships translate into parallel military structures. Sudan, already unstable, risks becoming an extension of Red Sea conflict dynamics, linking the Horn to the Sahel through arms flows and proxy alignment.

Direct interstate war: Ethiopia will likely face a coalition of Egypt, Somalia, and Eritrea, but this is driven by security dilemma escalation rather than simple alliance politics. Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access becomes framed as existential, triggering counter-securitization by Egypt (linked to Nile security), alongside Eritrea and Somalia. This produces a networked war structure, where conflict spreads across multiple fronts (land, maritime, proxy). The deeper dynamic is escalation entrapment, where actors are locked into conflict not by choice but by the cumulative logic of prior mobilizations and alliance commitments. Djibouti faces spillover risks due to its proximity and infrastructural centrality, while Sudan’s fragmented authority increases the likelihood of cross-border militarization and opportunistic alignments.

Somaliland’s fate: Somaliland will not remain neutral due to economic interdependence with Ethiopia and security alignment with UAE/Israel-linked systems. If Ethiopia wins, Somaliland may gain conditional or accelerated recognition, framed as a stabilizing partner within a new regional order. If Ethiopia loses or stalls, Somaliland faces strategic encirclement, including proxy destabilization, economic pressure on Berbera, and legitimacy challenges. In this scenario, Somaliland becomes a frontline node, exposed to both conventional and asymmetric threats, while simultaneously experiencing increased external dependence as the price of security guarantees. Parallel to this, Djibouti’s strategic value rises but with higher vulnerability, Eritrea leverages conflict for regime security and external rents, and Somalia risks further territorial fragmentation under compounded internal and external pressures.

2. Iranian Fragmentation (25% probability)

If Iran collapses internally:

Advanced weapons proliferation: State fragmentation in Iran will produce uncontrolled diffusion of advanced military technologies. Drones, precision-guided munitions, MANPADS, and anti-ship missiles will spread through informal and proxy networks, reducing the technological gap between states and non-state actors. الحوثي (Houthi)-style capabilities become replicable across regions, including the Horn. This proliferation creates a horizontal escalation environment, where capabilities once monopolized by states become widely accessible. Eritrea and Sudan are likely transit corridors for such flows, amplifying their strategic relevance while deepening instability.

Surge in insurgent capabilities: Al-Shabaab and similar groups will not just become stronger—they will transform into hybrid strategic actors. Their operational scope expands from rural insurgency to infrastructure denial, targeting ports, maritime routes, and airspace. This shifts the conflict from localized insurgency to regional disruption capacity, directly threatening trade corridors and state authority. Somalia becomes the epicenter of this transformation, while Djibouti and Somaliland face increased exposure as high-value logistical and military targets.

Decentralized conflict space: The Horn becomes a fragmented, multi-actor conflict system where authority is dispersed and overlapping. Instead of a single dominant conflict, multiple micro-conflicts emerge, each sustained by external inputs and local grievances. Governance weakens unevenly, producing persistent instability rather than decisive war. This generates a chronic conflict equilibrium, where violence is normalized and continuously reproduced. Sudan’s ongoing fragmentation reinforces this pattern, linking Horn instability with Sahelian conflict systems.

Somaliland’s dilemma: Somaliland’s alignment with Israel becomes both an asset and a liability. On one hand, it provides deterrence, intelligence sharing, and external security guarantees. On the other, it elevates Somaliland as a symbolic and strategic target for dispersed Iranian-linked networks seeking relevance after state collapse. This creates a paradox: Somaliland becomes more secure against state threats, but more vulnerable to decentralized, unpredictable attacks, particularly against its critical infrastructure and circulation corridors. At the same time, Djibouti faces heightened risk as a dense military hub, while Somalia’s instability deepens under enhanced insurgent capability diffusion.

3. Negotiated Stabilization (20% probability) — Least Likely

If partial Middle East de-escalation occurs:

Chokepoints reopen under heavy militarization: Maritime routes through the Red Sea resume, but under permanent securitization regimes. Naval patrols, convoy systems, and surveillance networks institutionalize control over circulation. Trade resumes, but under higher structural costs and constant security oversight, embedding militarization into normal economic flows. This produces a managed stability, where peace is maintained not by trust but by continuous coercive presence. Djibouti benefits from restored transit flows but remains heavily securitized, while Sudan’s Red Sea interface regains relevance under guarded conditions.

Somaliland consolidates as a “Flow Controller”: Somaliland leverages its geography to become a critical circulation manager rather than just a transit territory. The Berbera–Addis corridor evolves into Ethiopia’s primary logistics artery, giving Somaliland geo-economic leverage over one of Africa’s largest markets. This role increases its strategic indispensability even without immediate formal recognition, as control over movement becomes more valuable than formal sovereignty. In parallel, Djibouti retains a complementary role, while Eritrea seeks reintegration into regional logistics dynamics under controlled engagement.

The “Garrison State” risk: As security becomes central, Somaliland risks internal transformation into a garrison state, where fiscal resources, political priorities, and institutional focus shift toward defense and infrastructure protection. This may slow social and economic development while increasing dependence on external security partners. Recognition, if achieved, is likely to be incremental and transactional, tied to Somaliland’s ability to guarantee stability and secure flows, reinforcing a model of security-for-legitimacy exchange. Similarly, Djibouti deepens its garrison-state characteristics, and Somalia remains partially stabilized but structurally fragile.

Across all scenarios

Somaliland’s strategic relevance increases relative to its formal status, but this is not a linear gain in power—it is a reconfiguration of vulnerability, utility, and leverage simultaneously. Its geographic position at the Gulf of Aden entrance, governance continuity since 1991, and deepening external partnerships (UAE, Israel, Ethiopia-linked logistics dependence) transform it into a circulation-dependent strategic node rather than a conventional sovereign actor. Its value is no longer primarily diplomatic; it is functional—measured in its ability to secure, regulate, and stabilize flows of trade, energy, intelligence, and military logistics across the Red Sea system.

However, this relevance evolves differently under each trajectory. Under Systemic Escalation, Somaliland becomes a frontline infrastructural platform of contested militarized circulation, where ports, air corridors, and coastal zones are embedded in wider proxy competition. Under Iranian Fragmentation, it becomes a high-salience asymmetric target environment, where decentralized militant capabilities turn infrastructure into strategic pressure points, making sovereignty conditional on external deterrence architecture. Under Negotiated Stabilization, Somaliland consolidates as a semi-institutionalized flow controller, where recognition is no longer symbolic but transactional—earned through control of logistics continuity and corridor stability.

Yet Somaliland does not operate in isolation; it is embedded within a restructured Horn system that functions as a single interconnected strategic theatre rather than separate national spaces:

Somalia: Somalia evolves into a structurally fragmented security ecosystem where authority is dispersed across federal, regional, and insurgent layers. Competing foreign military presences (Turkey, UAE, Egypt, and indirect Western security coordination) generate overlapping security architectures that weaken central coherence. Al-Shabaab transitions from insurgency to systemic governance disruptor, capable of influencing maritime access, urban stability, and corridor security. Somalia becomes less a state than a contested operational space through which regional and global rivalries are conducted, directly affecting Somaliland’s southern security perimeter and legitimacy environment.

Ethiopia: Ethiopia emerges as the central pressure-bearing state of the Horn system, simultaneously driving and being constrained by regional transformation. Its structural dependence on maritime access converts geography into an existential constraint, producing long-term strategic insecurity. Internal federal tensions, border pressures, and external balancing strategies (Egyptian Nile securitization, Eritrean rivalry, Somali fragmentation spillover) transform Ethiopia into a multi-front geopolitical actor under permanent constraint conditions, where domestic stability is directly linked to external corridor access.

Djibouti: Djibouti becomes the highest-density strategic chokepoint in the global system outside the Strait of Hormuz, hosting overlapping US, Chinese, French, Japanese, and allied facilities. Its value rises in proportion to regional instability, but so does its exposure to escalation. It evolves into a militarized logistics condenser, where commercial throughput, intelligence activity, and military posture are inseparable. However, this concentration creates systemic fragility: any regional escalation converts Djibouti from a hub of stability into a potential ignition point for great-power friction.

Eritrea: Eritrea operates as a strategic hinge state defined by controlled ambiguity. Its geographic position between Ethiopia, Sudan, and the Red Sea allows it to function as both buffer and conduit. Rather than aligning permanently with any bloc, Eritrea leverages selective engagement with competing actors to maintain regime stability and strategic relevance. It becomes a balancing state in a fragmented order, deriving power not from strength but from positional ambiguity and controlled access to corridors of movement, arms, and influence.

Sudan: Sudan functions as the primary systemic diffusion bridge between the Horn and the Sahel, where internal fragmentation transforms it into a corridor for arms flows, militia expansion, and transregional insurgent connectivity. Its civil conflict is no longer contained within national boundaries but becomes a structural transmission belt for regional instability, linking Red Sea militarization with Sahelian insurgency systems. Sudan’s fragmentation increases the permeability of the entire Horn security architecture, making it a critical amplifier of instability.

Across all cases, the Horn is no longer a collection of sovereign states but a single integrated geopolitical system characterized by circulation-driven power competition. It functions as a convergence zone where maritime trade routes, energy flows, military basing, and insurgent networks intersect. The distinction between domestic and international security collapses, replaced by a layered system of overlapping sovereignties, external penetrations, and corridor-based authority structures.

Within this system, Somaliland occupies a paradoxical position: it is simultaneously one of the most stable territorial entities and one of the most exposed strategic nodes. Its strength lies in governance continuity and geographic leverage; its vulnerability lies in dependence on external alignment and proximity to multiple contested systems.

The central challenge for Somaliland is therefore not isolation or survival, but strategic calibration within a permanently unstable regional architecture. Every alignment decision—whether with Ethiopia, the UAE, Israel, or other actors—generates cascading effects across Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Over-dependence on any single axis risks conversion from a functional strategic actor into a proxy instrument within larger geopolitical contests, while excessive neutrality risks marginalization within a system that increasingly rewards infrastructural indispensability over diplomatic recognition.

7. Conclusion: The Map of Connections

The Horn of Africa in 2026 demonstrates that the international system is moving toward a state of permanent militarized circulation. The ability to control the flow—of energy, trade, and information—is becoming the primary measure of strategic power. Somaliland, unrecognized by most of the world for thirty-five years, has shown that governance of a critical corridor can confer more leverage than membership in the United Nations.

This is not a temporary aberration. It is a structural shift. Great powers are overstretched. Chokepoints are contested. And the states that thrive will not be those with the largest territories or the longest diplomatic pedigrees, but those that can guarantee the movement of what others need.

Somaliland’s story is the story of this new order in miniature. It built institutions when no one was watching. It maintained stability when its neighbors collapsed. And when the global system fractured, it discovered that its isolation had prepared it for a world where functional control matters more than formal status.

The decisions made in March and April 2026 will define the Horn’s trajectory for years. For Somaliland, the imperative is to preserve strategic autonomy amid competing pressures. For Ethiopia, it is to overcome the institutional paralysis that turned a first-mover advantage into structural disadvantage. For the international community, it is to recognize that the map of strategic importance is no longer a map of territory. It is a map of connections. And Somaliland sits at a critical junction.

A more rigorous geostrategic interpretation emphasizes that maritime chokepoints are fundamentally structural formations within the global system of circulation. Their significance is not contingent on crisis but embedded in their permanent geographic configuration. The 𝘽𝒂𝙗 𝙚𝒍-𝑴𝙖𝒏𝙙𝒆𝙗.remains strategically important regardless of political conditions because it functions as a fixed gateway connecting major maritime domains.

Contemporary interpretations of the 𝘽𝒂𝙗 𝙚𝒍-𝑴𝙖𝒏𝙙𝒆𝙗.Strait are often dominated by episodic events such as piracy, maritime insecurity, and regional conflict dynamics. While these phenomena are empirically observable and policy-relevant, they tend to produce an analytically shallow understanding of the region by prioritizing instability over structure. This approach risks reducing a complex geopolitical system to a sequence of disruptions rather than a persistent spatial order.

A more rigorous geostrategic interpretation emphasizes that maritime chokepoints are fundamentally structural formations within the global system of circulation. Their significance is not contingent on crisis but embedded in their permanent geographic configuration. The 𝘽𝒂𝙗 𝙚𝒍-𝑴𝙖𝒏𝙙𝒆𝙗.remains strategically important regardless of political conditions because it functions as a fixed gateway connecting major maritime domains.

Within this structural frame, Republic of Somaliland is not a peripheral political entity but a territorially positioned actor embedded within the operational environment of global maritime flows. Its relevance emerges from geography rather than diplomacy, making it a case that challenges conventional state-centric analytical models.

1.2 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒄 𝑭𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝑪𝒉𝒐𝒌𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝑮𝒍𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒍 𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆

Maritime chokepoints such as the 𝘽𝒂𝙗 𝙚𝒍-𝑴𝙖𝒏𝙙𝒆𝙗.Strait operate as critical bottlenecks in the architecture of global trade. They compress vast volumes of international commerce into narrow geographic passages, linking production centers in Asia with consumption markets in Europe and beyond through the Red Sea–Suez Canal corridor.

This structural concentration generates a dual condition of efficiency and systemic vulnerability. On one hand, chokepoints reduce distance and transportation costs, enabling high-speed global trade circulation. On the other, they introduce concentrated risk, where disruption in a single location can produce cascading effects across global supply chains.

Because of this duality, chokepoints are not merely geographic features but strategic infrastructure nodes of global economic stability. Influence in such spaces is therefore distributed and operational rather than purely legal, depending on proximity, infrastructure capacity, and security coordination. Republic of Somaliland ‘s coastal position places it directly within this distributed system of influence.

2.𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒑𝒉𝒊𝒄 𝑭𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑩𝒂𝒃 𝒆𝒍-𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒃 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒄 𝑺𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎 2.1 𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒚 𝒂𝒔 𝑺𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒔𝒎 𝒊𝒏 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔

Geostrategy examines how fixed geographic conditions shape the distribution of power and strategic opportunity. Unlike institutional authority or diplomatic recognition, geography is immutable and continuously conditions political and economic behavior. Coastal access, adjacency to maritime corridors, and proximity to chokepoints are therefore foundational determinants of geopolitical relevance.

Republic of Somaliland ‘s position along the southern Gulf of Aden illustrates this principle with clarity. It is located at the intersection of maritime routes connecting the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean system via the Suez Canal. This placement situates it within immediate proximity to one of the most strategically important maritime corridors globally.

In this context, geography functions as latent power. It does not require active assertion to remain strategically relevant. Instead, it provides a permanent structural advantage that can be activated through infrastructure development, institutional capacity, and external engagement. Republic of Somaliland ‘s strategic identity is therefore grounded in spatial permanence rather than political contingency.

2.2 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑩𝒂𝒃 𝒆𝒍-𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒃 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒂 𝑪𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝑵𝒐𝒅𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝑮𝒍𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒍 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝑵𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒌𝒔

The 𝘽𝒂𝙗 𝙚𝒍-𝑴𝙖𝒏𝙙𝒆𝙗.Strait serves as a critical junction in global maritime circulation, linking the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea and enabling access to the Suez Canal. This route significantly shortens maritime transit between Asia and Europe, making it one of the most economically efficient corridors in the global system.

However, this efficiency is structurally fragile. The concentration of global trade within a narrow passage creates systemic exposure to disruption. Even localized instability can generate global consequences, including supply chain delays, energy price fluctuations, and increased maritime insurance premiums.

This structural vulnerability elevates the 𝘽𝒂𝙗 𝙚𝒍-𝑴𝙖𝒏𝙙𝒆𝙗.beyond a regional waterway into a systemic chokepoint of global interdependence. Its stability is therefore not a regional concern alone but a global economic necessity. Republic of Somaliland ‘s geographic proximity situates it within this system, where spatial positioning translates into strategic relevance.

𝟑.𝐑𝐞𝐩𝐮𝐛𝐥𝐢𝐜 𝐨𝐟 𝐒𝐨𝐦𝐚𝐥𝐢𝐥𝐚𝐧𝐝 ‘𝐬 𝐆𝐞𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐜 𝐏𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐆𝐮𝐥𝐟 𝐨𝐟 𝐀𝐝𝐞𝐧 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐈𝐭𝐬 𝐒𝐩𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐄𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐝𝐝𝐞𝐝𝐧𝐞𝐬𝐬

3.1 𝑪𝒐𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒑𝒉𝒚 𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒏 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝑩𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝑳𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝑺𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒔

Republic of Somaliland ‘s coastline along the Gulf of Aden which is 850 kilometers (about 530 miles). represents a strategic interface between terrestrial governance and maritime circulation systems. Unlike peripheral coastal zones with limited integration into global trade routes, Republic of Somaliland lies directly adjacent to one of the world’s most heavily trafficked shipping corridors.

This proximity creates continuous exposure to international maritime activity, including container shipping, energy transport, and bulk cargo movement. Thousands of vessels transit nearby waters annually, embedding Republic of Somaliland within the operational environment of global commerce.

From a geostrategic perspective, this coastal position transforms Republic of Somaliland from a passive geographic entity into a potential operational participant in maritime systems. It enables observation, coordination, and potential logistical engagement with one of the world’s most critical trade arteries.

3.2 Spatial Proximity and Functional Integration into Global Shipping Corridors

Global shipping lanes are engineered systems optimized for cost efficiency, navigational safety, and logistical predictability. Republic of Somaliland ‘s position adjacent to the Gulf of Aden corridor places it within close proximity to one of the most strategically dense maritime routes in global trade architecture.

This adjacency carries significant economic and strategic implications. Ports located near major shipping lanes benefit from reduced deviation costs, improved fuel efficiency, and enhanced logistical accessibility. The Port of Berbera is structurally positioned to capitalize on this dynamic.

Beyond economic considerations, shipping lanes are increasingly treated as security-sensitive infrastructures. Their concentration of global trade creates vulnerabilities that require continuous monitoring and coordination. Republic of Somaliland ‘s geographic positioning enables its integration into distributed maritime security systems involving surveillance, logistics support, and regional cooperation frameworks.

4.𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆, 𝑶𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑬𝒙𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒄 𝑬𝒏𝒈𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 4.1 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑷𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑩𝒆𝒓𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒂 𝒂𝒔 𝒂 𝑫𝒖𝒂𝒍-𝑼𝒔𝒆 𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒄 𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝑵𝒐𝒅𝒆

The Port of Berbera represents the materialization of Republic of Somaliland ‘s geographic advantage into operational capacity. Its modernization has expanded its ability to handle containerized cargo, bulk logistics, and regional trade flows, positioning it as a key node in Horn of Africa maritime infrastructure.

A defining feature of Berbera is its dual-use capability, particularly its extended runway capable of supporting large aircraft. This integration of maritime and aviation infrastructure transforms the port into a multifunctional logistics hub with both commercial and strategic utility.

Geostrategically, Berbera functions as a connective node between maritime circulation and land-based logistical systems. Its proximity to the 𝘽𝒂𝙗 𝙚𝒍-𝑴𝙖𝒏𝙙𝒆𝙗.enhances its relevance by situating it near one of the most critical maritime chokepoints in global trade.

4.2 Operational Leverage, Sovereignty Constraints, and Mechanisms of Maritime Influence

Maritime governance in chokepoint regions is characterized by a fundamental distinction between legal sovereignty and operational influence. Under international law, the 𝘽𝒂𝙗 𝙚𝒍-𝑴𝙖𝒏𝙙𝒆𝙗.is an international waterway, ensuring freedom of navigation and preventing exclusive territorial control.

However, influence in such environments is derived not from legal authority but from operational leverage, which includes geographic proximity, infrastructure capacity, and participation in security coordination systems. Coastal actors contribute to maritime stability through monitoring, logistics, and support functions.

Republic of Somaliland ‘s position enables it to participate in this distributed system of influence. While it lacks formal authority over maritime passage, its geographic embeddedness within the operational environment of the strait provides it with functional relevance in shaping maritime conditions indirectly.

4.3 𝑬𝒙𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒔, 𝑨𝑭𝑹𝑰𝑪𝑶𝑴, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒄 𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆

External engagement in Republic of Somaliland reflects broader geopolitical imperatives related to maritime security and global trade continuity. The United States, through AFRICOM, maintains strategic interest in the Horn of Africa due to its proximity to critical maritime corridors such as the 𝘽𝒂𝙗 𝙚𝒍-𝑴𝙖𝒏𝙙𝒆𝙗.

This engagement is primarily functional rather than political, driven by considerations of access, surveillance capability, and logistical positioning. Infrastructure such as the Port of Berbera aligns with these priorities due to its dual-use potential and geographic proximity to the strait.

Similarly, international investment in Republic of Somaliland ‘s infrastructure reflects long-term strategic calculations. Global logistics actors view chokepoint-adjacent infrastructure as valuable assets within increasingly competitive and vulnerable maritime systems.

5.𝑮𝒍𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒍 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝑽𝒖𝒍𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑹𝒆𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄 𝒐𝒇 𝑺𝒐𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒅 ‘𝒔 𝑬𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒔 𝒂 𝑮𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒘𝒂𝒚 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆

5.1 𝙎𝙮𝙨𝙩𝙚𝙢𝙞𝙘 𝙁𝙧𝙖𝙜𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙀𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙤𝙢𝙞𝙘 𝘾𝙤𝙣𝙨𝙚𝙦𝙪𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚𝙨 𝙤𝙛 𝙈𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙢𝙚 𝘿𝙞𝙨𝙧𝙪𝙥𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣

The 𝘽𝒂𝙗 𝙚𝒍-𝑴𝙖𝒏𝙙𝒆𝙗.Strait is a structurally vulnerable node within global trade networks. Disruptions in this corridor generate systemic consequences, including shipping delays, increased transportation costs, and volatility in energy markets.

Because global supply chains are highly interdependent, these effects propagate rapidly across multiple economic sectors. The strait therefore functions as a systemic pressure point within global economic stability.

5.2 𝑨𝒍𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝑹𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝑰𝒏𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑹𝒆𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈

When disruptions occur, maritime traffic is often redirected via the Cape of Good Hope. However, this route is not a functional substitute but a structurally inefficient alternative.

It introduces significant increases in distance, transit time, fuel consumption, and insurance costs. These inefficiencies accumulate across global supply chains, reinforcing the importance of maintaining stability in primary chokepoints.

From a systemic perspective, rerouting highlights the non-substitutability of critical maritime corridors. It also reinforces the strategic value of actors located near the original route, including Republic of Somaliland.

5.3 𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒄 𝑻𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒕

Republic of Somaliland ‘s relative internal stability enhances its capacity to function as a gateway state within regional and global systems. Stability is a prerequisite for integration into maritime logistics networks, where predictability and institutional continuity are essential.

This stability generates what can be described as strategic trust, a condition in which external actors are willing to engage in long-term cooperation based on expectations of reliability and continuity.

5.4 𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑫𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒐 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒐 𝑮𝒍𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒔

Despite the absence of formal diplomatic recognition, Republic of Somaliland has developed a network of informal and functional partnerships with international actors. These relationships are based on practical cooperation in trade, infrastructure development, and maritime security.

This reflects a broader shift in international relations toward functional integration over formal recognition, where operational utility and geographic relevance increasingly define international engagement.

6.𝑺𝒐𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒂’𝒔 𝑪𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒑𝒉𝒊𝒄 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒔 6.1 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝑵𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝑴𝒐𝒈𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒉𝒖

Statements from Mogadishu regarding influence over strategic maritime spaces, including the 𝘽𝒂𝙗 𝙚𝒍-𝑴𝙖𝒏𝙙𝒆𝙗.Strait, are best understood as diplomatic posturing rather than serious geostrategic claims. These narratives aim to project an image of state authority and secure international recognition, but they rest on a foundation that simply does not exist.

The reality is stark: Somalia is a failed state. Its central government does not govern itself, let alone its claimed territory. Large swaths of the country remain outside Mogadishu’s control, run by rival federal states, armed non-state actors, or—in the case of Somaliland—a functioning breakaway region that has none of Somalia’s governance problems. From this position of internal collapse, any claim to project power over the 𝘽𝒂𝙗 𝙚𝒍-𝑴𝙖𝒏𝙙𝒆𝙗.Strait is not just ambitious—it is detached from reality. Mogadishu’s political class routinely insists that Somalia can reverse its fortunes, but decades of failure suggest otherwise. The idea that a state that cannot secure its own capital could influence one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints is, to put it plainly, unserious.

From a geostrategic perspective, effective control over maritime corridors depends on two things: geographic proximity and operational capability. Mogadishu has neither. It sits hundreds of kilometers south of the Bab el-Mandeb, separated by distance, poor infrastructure, and a complete lack of naval reach. Political speeches from the capital do not close that gap.

6.2 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑳𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒄 𝑨𝒇𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒓𝒔

Geography is unforgiving. No amount of rhetorical bluster can overcome the structural constraints of distance. Mogadishu is simply too far from the 𝘽𝒂𝙗 𝙚𝒍-𝑴𝙖𝒏𝙙𝒆𝙗.to monitor, secure, or influence what happens there. Response times are measured in days, not hours. Logistics are nonexistent. Maritime operations require land-based integration—and Somalia has no functioning maritime command worth the name.

In contrast, actors with immediate geographic access to the Gulf of Aden—namely Somaliland—are positioned to matter. Somaliland’s coastline faces the strait directly. Its relative stability and local governance structures, whatever their international recognition, give it a functional strategic relevance that Mogadishu cannot touch. This is the hard distinction: formal sovereignty on paper means nothing next to actual boots on the ground or eyes on the water.

Somalia maintains legal claims over its internationally recognized borders. But law does not create power. Geographic distance and internal state failure have gutted any pretense of influence over the 𝘽𝒂𝙗 𝙚𝒍-𝑴𝙖𝒏𝙙𝒆𝙗.system. Mogadishu can keep talking. The strait will not listen.

7.𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏: 𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒑𝒉𝒚 𝒂𝒔 𝒂 𝑫𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒄 𝑪𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚

The case of Republic of Somaliland and the 𝘽𝒂𝙗 𝙚𝒍-𝑴𝙖𝒏𝙙𝒆𝙗.Strait demonstrate the enduring centrality of geography in shaping global geopolitical outcomes. Despite technological advancements and institutional evolution, physical location remains a fundamental determinant of strategic relevance.

Republic of Somaliland ‘s position along the Gulf of Aden places it within immediate proximity to one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors. Combined with infrastructure development such as the Port of Berbera, this geographic advantage is increasingly translated into operational capacity.

In maritime chokepoint systems, influence is distributed rather than centralized, emerging through proximity, infrastructure, and functional participation. Republic of Somaliland exemplifies this condition, occupying a structurally significant position within the global maritime system.

Ultimately, the 𝘽𝒂𝙗 𝙚𝒍-𝑴𝙖𝒏𝙙𝒆𝙗.is not merely a transit route but a strategic intersection of global commerce, security, and geopolitics, where geography continues to define the boundaries of power and influence.

This discrepancy generates a structural contradiction in U.S. foreign policy. While Washington emphasizes stability, governance, and counterterrorism cooperation as strategic priorities, it excludes a political entity that demonstrably satisfies these criteria. In contrast, external powers—particularly China—engage pragmatically with functional actors irrespective of recognition status, thereby advancing strategic interests unconstrained by normative limitations.

The Red Sea has consequently evolved from a secondary maritime region into a primary theater of global geopolitical competition. Military presence by the United States, China, France, Japan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates reflects its elevated strategic importance. China’s establishment of a military base in Djibouti marked a structural shift in regional balance, enabling sustained naval projection into both the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Concurrently, Gulf states have transformed port infrastructure into instruments of geopolitical influence.

Within this context, Somaliland’s Berbera Port has acquired significant strategic value due to its proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint, deep-water capacity, and access to the Ethiopian hinterland. However, U.S. engagement remains limited due to non-recognition, creating a strategic gap increasingly exploited by competing actors. Somaliland’s lack of recognition simultaneously constrains its access to Western financial systems while increasing vulnerability to Chinese infrastructural financing and long-term strategic penetration.

Recent geopolitical developments indicate the emergence of a flexible, multi-actor alignment involving India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Greece, Cyprus, and Somaliland. This configuration is characterized by functional cooperation in maritime security, intelligence sharing, and infrastructure development rather than formal alliance structures. India–Israel technological cooperation, Israeli engagement in Ethiopia, Ethiopia’s maritime diversification through Somaliland, and UAE investment in Berbera collectively reflect a decentralised security architecture operating outside U.S. coordination.

Ethiopia plays a pivotal role in this evolving order. As a landlocked state of over 120 million people, it depends heavily on maritime access through Djibouti. The 2024 Ethiopia–Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding reflects Addis Ababa’s strategic effort to diversify access through Berbera Port, reinforcing Somaliland’s position as a key regional logistics hub.

At the same time, the Horn of Africa has become a theatre of intensified external engagement. Turkey maintains a military presence in Mogadishu through Camp TURKSOM, combining training and drone capability deployment. Pakistan has expanded intelligence and military cooperation within Somalia, while Saudi Arabia provides financial support shaping regional alignments. Russia’s earlier use of private military structures introduced a precedent for non-state security engagement in the region. These overlapping activities occur within fragmented governance structures, enabling external actors to expand influence in the absence of coordinated U.S. strategy.

The consequences of continued U.S. ambiguity are threefold. First, policy incoherence allows regional actors to develop initiatives without American coordination, reducing Washington’s influence over outcomes. Second, influence vacuums enable China and other actors to expand infrastructural and security presence. Third, strategic misinterpretation of U.S. silence encourages adversarial expansion and weakens deterrence.

Within this environment, recognition of Somaliland becomes a strategic instrument rather than a symbolic act. Somaliland’s geographic position near Bab el-Mandeb provides critical leverage for maritime security and chokepoint monitoring. Its stable governance structure enables effective counterterrorism cooperation compared to more fragile regional states. Recognition would also reinforce democratic governance in a region marked by institutional fragility, while limiting opportunities for Chinese infrastructural dominance.

Importantly, Somaliland offers a cost-effective partner for burden-sharing in regional security. Formal recognition would enable structured cooperation in maritime security, intelligence sharing, and infrastructure development, reducing reliance on direct U.S. military presence while increasing operational efficiency. It would also counter China’s functional engagement model, which prioritises strategic utility over formal recognition and has already demonstrated effectiveness in Djibouti and surrounding regions.

However, recognition must be assessed within broader constraints. Regional actors retain agency and pursue diversified foreign policies that complicate binary great-power narratives. Legal and normative frameworks within the African Union and United Nations require careful management. Chinese expansion remains gradual rather than immediate, requiring calibrated responses. Overstating urgency risks policy miscalculation, while underestimating structural trends risks strategic loss.

Despite these considerations, continued strategic ambiguity is increasingly costly. The Horn of Africa is no longer peripheral but central to global maritime and geopolitical competition. Somaliland occupies a structurally significant position within this system, yet remains outside formal diplomatic frameworks. As China and regional actors deepen engagement, U.S. absence risks long-term marginalisation.

Recognition of Somaliland should therefore be understood as a strategic recalibration aligned with geopolitical reality. It would integrate U.S. policy with functional governance, strengthen maritime security, enhance counterterrorism cooperation, and counter adversarial expansion. In an era of intensified multipolar competition, strategic absence is not neutrality—it is concession.

However, from a geopolitical perspective, the statement reflects less a unified legal position and more a convergence of diverse national interests expressed through normative language. Several of these states maintain direct or indirect relations with Israel or pursue policies inconsistent with the sovereignty principles they publicly defend. This reveals a structural inconsistency: sovereignty is applied not as a universal rule, but as a selective diplomatic instrument.

The Somaliland case thus serves as a useful analytical lens to understand how states operate in practice—where legal rhetoric often masks strategic competition and regional influence calculations.

Egypt: Hydropolitical Anxiety and Regional Power Preservation
Egypt’s position is rooted primarily in its hydro-strategic dependence on the Nile River, which constitutes a core national security concern. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has altered the historical balance of power in the Nile Basin, reducing Egypt’s traditional dominance and creating long-term uncertainty.

Within this shifting environment, Somaliland becomes relevant not as a legal issue, but as part of broader regional connectivity dynamics. The development of Berbera Port offers Ethiopia alternative maritime access, reducing reliance on routes indirectly linked to Egypt’s sphere of influence, particularly through the Red Sea and Suez Canal system.

This diversification weakens Egypt’s leverage based on geographic control and interdependence. Consequently, Egypt’s invocation of sovereignty and territorial integrity should be understood as strategic diplomatic language aimed at preserving its regional influence, rather than a purely normative commitment.

Erdoğan’s Hypocrisy and the Strategic Calculus in Somaliland
Turkey’s engagement in Somalia represents a centralized influence system integrating military presence, infrastructure control, and institutional support. This model depends on Somalia functioning as a single political entry point.

Somaliland’s independent external engagement disrupts this structure by creating an alternative center of authority. From Ankara’s perspective, opposition to Somaliland–Israel relations is therefore tied to preserving influence continuity rather than purely legal concerns.

At the same time, Turkey maintains a pattern of pragmatic engagement with Israel despite periodic political tensions. This duality highlights a broader feature of its foreign policy: rhetorical positioning serves political signaling, while strategic interests continue in parallel.

Thus, Turkey’s emphasis on Somali unity functions as a legitimizing narrative for maintaining its strategic presence, rather than a strictly principled stance.

Saudi Arabia: Maritime Security and Strategic Stability Logic
Saudi Arabia’s position is primarily shaped by maritime security concerns, particularly the stability of the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait—key routes for global energy and trade.

Riyadh’s foreign policy reflects pragmatic balancing rather than rigid ideological commitments. Its indirect and evolving interactions with Israel demonstrate that strategic priorities often override normative consistency.

In this context, the emphasis on Somali sovereignty serves as a functional tool to preserve a predictable, state-centric regional order essential for maritime security, rather than a strict legal position.

Djibouti: Rentier State Economics and Infrastructure Competition
Djibouti’s stance reflects its dependence on transit rents derived from Ethiopia’s maritime access. The rise of Berbera Port introduces direct competition, threatening this economic model.

Its framing of Somaliland-related developments as destabilizing is therefore best understood as an attempt to protect economic interests through political and security narratives.

Somalia: Recognition-Dependent Sovereignty and Institutional Fragility
Somalia’s opposition is driven by the logic of state survival. Its international legitimacy depends on recognition as a unified state, which underpins access to aid and diplomatic support.

Recognition of Somaliland would challenge this framework, exposing internal fragmentation and potentially accelerating decentralization. Thus, Somalia’s position is both legal and existential.

Arab and Muslim States: Selective Normativity and Political Signaling
The participation of multiple Arab and Muslim-majority states reflects a broader pattern of selective norm application. While these states invoke sovereignty and solidarity in multilateral settings, their actual policies often prioritize strategic interests.

Many maintain pragmatic or indirect relations with Israel, demonstrating that engagement is shaped by security and economic considerations rather than ideological consistency.

In this context, supporting Somalia’s territorial integrity becomes a low-cost form of political signaling that reinforces collective identity without constraining broader foreign policy flexibility.

Israel–Somaliland Engagement: Strategic Diversification in Fragmented Regional Orders
Israel’s engagement with Somaliland reflects a broader trend of strategic diversification in a fragmented international system. States increasingly engage with non-traditional actors to expand access, enhance security cooperation, and gain strategic positioning.

Somaliland’s location near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and its relative stability make it a valuable partner in a critical maritime corridor. This engagement is less about legal recognition and more about adapting to shifting geopolitical realities.

Conclusion: Interest-Based Politics Behind Legal Rhetoric
The joint condemnation of Israel’s engagement with Somaliland reflects competing national interests rather than a coherent normative position.

Egypt seeks to protect its hydropolitical influence, Saudi Arabia prioritizes maritime stability, Turkey aims to preserve its centralized influence, Djibouti defends its economic model, and Somalia focuses on institutional survival. Meanwhile, many of these states maintain pragmatic relations with Israel, exposing the gap between rhetoric and practice.

Ultimately, the Somaliland case highlights a fundamental reality of international politics: sovereignty and international law often function as flexible instruments shaped by strategic interests rather than fixed universal principles.